Politicians, Bureaucrats and Targeted Redistribution: The Role of Career Concerns

Stronger career concerns induce appointed bureaucrats to adopt different policies than elected politicians. In particular, bureaucrats are less likely to use targeted redistribution to achieve personal political goals. I use the example of patronage jobs in local governments in the United States to provide empirical support for this claim. I show that the number of full-time public employees is signi?cantly higher in local governments with elected chief executives. This difference increases during election years. In addition, consistent with the notion that career concerns are especially strong for young bureaucrats, I ?nd that the number of full-time public employees increases with the age of appointed chief executives. There is no such relationship in the case of elected chief executives.

Decentralization and political institutions

Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests hypotheses posed by theoretical literature that the results of decentralization depend on features of political institutions. Using data from up to 95 countries for 25 years, we show that the effect of decentralization on economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision strongly depends on two aspects of political centralization: 1) strength of national party system (measured by the age of the main parties and fractionalization of the government parties) and 2) subordination (whether local and state executives are appointed or elected). We find solid support for Riker’s theory (1964) in developing countries: Strong parties significantly improve the results of fiscal decentralization in terms of economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. There is also some evidence that subordination of local to higher-level governments improves the effect of decentralization on growth and public goods provision (in developed and developing countries) and government quality (in developing countries)

Decentralization and Political Institutions

Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests Riker’s theory (1964) that the results of fiscal decentralization depend on the level of countries’ political centralization. We analyze crosssection and panel data from up to 75 developing and transition countries for 25 years. Two of Riker’s predictions about the role of political institutions in disciplining fiscally-autonomous local politicians are confirmed by the data. 1) Strength of national political parties significantly improves outcomes of fiscal decentralization such as economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. 2) In contrast, administrative subordination (i.e., appointing local politicians rather than electing them) does not improve the results of fiscal decentralization.

Decentralization and Political Institutions

Does fiscal decentralization lead to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher economic growth? This paper tests hypotheses of the theoretical literature that results of decentralization depend on features of political institutions. Using data from up to 95 countries for 25 years we show that the effect of fiscal decentralization strongly depends on two aspects of political centralization: 1) strength of national party system (measured by the age of main parties and fractionalization of government parties) and 2) subordination (whether local and state executives are appointed or elected). We find solid support for Riker’s theory (1964): in developing countries, strong parties significantly improve the results of fiscal decentralization for economic growth, quality of government, and public goods provision. There is also some evidence from developing countries that administrative subordination of local to higher-level authorities improves decentralization results.Decentralization, Political Institutions, Riker's Theory

Estimation of treatment effects (in Russian)

The essay contains a short survey of methods used for estimation of average treatment effects, when the independent variable of interest is binary.

Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia

This paper compares electoral outcomes of 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia among geographical areas with differential access to the only independent from the government national TV channel. It was available to three-quarters of Russia’s population and its signal availability was idiosyncratic conditional on observables. Independent TV decreased aggregate vote for the government party by 8.9 percentage points, increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 6.3 percentage points, and decreased turnout by 3.8 percentage points. The probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals who watched independent TV even controlling for voting intentions measured one month before elections.

Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia

How do media affect voting behavior? What difference can an independent media outlet make in a country with state-controlled media? Our paper addresses these questions by comparing electoral outcomes and votes reported by survey respondents during the 1999 parliamentary elections in Russia for those geographical areas that had access and those that had no access to the only national TV channel independent from the government (“NTV”). The effect is identified from exogenous variation in the availability of the signal, which appears to be mostly idiosyncratic, conditional on controls. The findings are as follows. 1) The presence of the independent TV channel decreased the aggregate vote for the government party by 2.5 percentage points and increased the combined vote for major opposition parties by 2.1 percentage points. 2) The probability of voting for opposition parties increased for individuals who watched NTV even controlling for voting intentions measured one month prior to the elections. 3) NTV had a smaller effect on votes of people with higher political knowledge and those using alternative sources of political news and a larger effect on retired persons who watch TV substantially more than working individuals.

The National Solidarity Programme: Assessing the Effects of Community-Driven Development in Afghanistan

Over the past two decades, community-based approaches to project delivery have become a popular means for governments and development agencies to improve the alignment of projects with the needs of rural communities and to increase the participation of villagers in project design and implementation. This article briefly summarizes the results of an impact evaluation of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a community-driven development programme in Afghanistan that created democratically-elected community development councils and funded small-scale development projects. Using a randomized controlled trial across 500 villages, the evaluation finds that NSP had a positive effect on access to drinking water and electricity, acceptance of democratic processes, perceptions of economic well-being and attitudes towards women. Effects on perceptions of local and national government performance and material economic outcomes were, however, more limited or short-lived