Book Reviews

DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT-A CHRONOLOGY. By Percival E. Jackson. ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE. By Philippe Nonet . MOMENT OF MADNESS: THE PEOPLE VS. JACK RUBY. By Elmer Gertz

Smy2p Participates in COPII Vesicle Formation Through the Interaction with Sec23p/Sec24p Subcomplex

The coat protein complex II (COPII) is essential for vesicle formation from the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) and is composed of two heterodimeric subcomplexes, Sec23p/Sec24p and Sec13p/Sec31p, and the small guanosine triphosphatase Sar1p. In an effort to identify novel factors that may participate in COPII vesicle formation, we isolated SMY2, a yeast gene encoding a protein of unknown function, as a multicopy suppressor of the temperature-sensitive sec24-20 mutant. We found that even a low-copy expression of SMY2 was sufficient for the suppression of the sec24-20 phenotypes, and the chromosomal deletion of SMY2 led to a severe growth defect in the sec24-20 background. In addition, SMY2 exhibited genetic interactions with several other genes involved in the ER-to-Golgi transport. Subcellular fractionation analysis showed that Smy2p was a peripheral membrane protein fractionating together with COPII components. However, Smy2p was not loaded onto COPII vesicles generated in vitro. Interestingly, coimmunoprecipitation between Smy2p and the Sec23p/Sec24p subcomplex was specifically observed in sec23-1 and sec24-20 backgrounds, suggesting that this interaction was a prerequisite for the suppression of the sec24-20 phenotypes by overexpression of SMY2. We propose that Smy2p is located on the surface of the ER and facilitates COPII vesicle formation through the interaction with Sec23p/Sec24p subcomplex

Biogenesis of mitochondrial porin

We review here the present knowledge about the pathway of import and assembly of porin into mitochondria and compare it to those of other mitochondrial proteins. Porin, like all outer mitochondrial membrane proteins studied so far is made as a precursor without a cleavble lsquosignalrsquo sequence; thus targeting information must reside in the mature sequence. At least part of this information appears to be located at the amino-terminal end of the molecule. Transport into mitochondria can occur post-translationally. In a first step, the porin precursor is specifically recognized on the mitochondrial surface by a protease sensitive receptor. In a second step, porin precursor inserts partially into the outer membrane. This step is mediated by a component of the import machinery common to the import pathways of precursor proteins destined for other mitochondrial subcompartments. Finally, porin is assembled to produce the functional oligomeric form of an integral membrane protein wich is characterized by its extreme protease resistance

Thinking the unthinkable: Imagining an ‘un-American,’ Girl-friendly, Women- and Trans-Inclusive Alternative for Baseball

The purpose of this article is twofold: to capture the injustice inherent in the gendered bifurcation of baseball and softball via the prism of critical feminist sport studies; and to begin to imagine a girl-friendly/women-and trans-inclusive future for baseball that is less fertile for cooptation into post-911 United States security state discourses. In this article I link the "unthinkability" of the occupational segregation of baseball in North America to the dominance of the ideology of the two sex system and European disasporic morality. To illustrate the extent of this occupational segregation via the gendered bifurcation of baseball and softball, I draw on feminist sport studies to examine the exemplars or "texts" of three Canadian brother/sister baseball softball duos: Jason Bay and Lauren Bay Regula; Brett and Danielle Lawrie; and Mathew and Katie Reyes

Artificial agents among us: Should we recognize them as agents proper?

In this paper, I discuss whether in a society where the use of artificial agents is pervasive, these agents should be recognized as having rights like those we accord to group agents. This kind of recognition I understand to be at once social and legal, and I argue that in order for an artificial agent to be so recognized, it will need to meet the same basic conditions in light of which group agents are granted such recognition. I then explore the implications of granting recognition in this manner. The thesis I will be defending is that artificial agents that do meet the conditions of agency in light of which we ascribe rights to group agents should thereby be recognized as having similar rights. The reason for bringing group agents into the picture is that, like artificial agents, they are not self-evidently agents of the sort to which we would naturally ascribe rights, or at least that is what the historical record suggests if we look, for example, at what it took for corporations to gain legal status in the law as group agents entitled to rights and, consequently, as entities subject to responsibilities. This is an example of agency ascribed to a nonhuman agent, and just as a group agent can be described as nonhuman, so can an artificial agent. Therefore, if these two kinds of nonhuman agents can be shown to be sufficiently similar in relevant ways, the agency ascribed to one can also be ascribed to the other-this despite the fact that neither is human, a major impediment when it comes to recognizing an entity as an agent proper, and hence as a bearer of rights