University Scholar Series: Jonathan Roth

Roman Warfare On April 13, 2011 Jonathan Roth spoke in the University Scholar Series hosted by Provost Gerry Selter at the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. Jonathan Roth is a Professor in the History Department at SJSU. In this seminar, he examines the evolution of Roman war over its thousand-year history. He highlights the changing arms and equipment of the soldiers, unit organization and command structure, and the wars and battles of each era.https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/uss/1008/thumbnail.jp

Bias In, Bias Out? Evaluating the Folk Wisdom

We evaluate the folk wisdom that algorithmic decision rules trained on data produced by biased human decision-makers necessarily reflect this bias. We consider a setting where training labels are only generated if a biased decision-maker takes a particular action, and so "biased" training data arise due to discriminatory selection into the training data. In our baseline model, the more biased the decision-maker is against a group, the more the algorithmic decision rule favors that group. We refer to this phenomenon as bias reversal. We then clarify the conditions that give rise to bias reversal. Whether a prediction algorithm reverses or inherits bias depends critically on how the decision-maker affects the training data as well as the label used in training. We illustrate our main theoretical results in a simulation study applied to the New York City Stop, Question and Frisk dataset

Differential Privacy for the Analyst via Private Equilibrium Computation

We give new mechanisms for answering exponentially many queries from multiple analysts on a private database, while protecting differential privacy both for the individuals in the database and for the analysts. That is, our mechanism's answer to each query is nearly insensitive to changes in the queries asked by other analysts. Our mechanism is the first to offer differential privacy on the joint distribution over analysts' answers, providing privacy for data analysts even if the other data analysts collude or register multiple accounts. In some settings, we are able to achieve nearly optimal error rates (even compared to mechanisms which do not offer analyst privacy), and we are able to extend our techniques to handle non-linear queries. Our analysis is based on a novel view of the private query-release problem as a two-player zero-sum game, which may be of independent interest