Mechanisms in the Core of a Fee Game

A Fee Game is a cooperative game with incomplete information the ex post realizations of which show side payment character. The game appears in coalitional function form depending on the 'types' of the players which are randomly chosen and about which the players have private information. We specify incentive compatible mechanisms and show that with a natural condition the core of the game is not empty: it contains constant mechanisms.

Cephoids: Duality and reference vectors

A Cephoid is a Minkowski sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. We discuss the concept of duality for Cephoids. Also, we show that the reference number uniquely defines a face. Based on these results, we exhibit two graphs on the outer surface of a cephoid. The first one corresponds to a maximal face and its reference system. The second graph describes the generalized tentacles.

Computing the Minkowski sum of prisms

Within this paper we compute the Minkowski sum of prisms ("Cephoids") in a finite-dimensional vector space. We provide a representation of a finite sum of prisms in terms of inequalities.convex analysis, Minkowski sum, polytopes

Effi cient Specialization in Ricardian Production

It is well known that the analysis of efficient specialization in Ricardian production with many countries and many commodities cannot be broken down to the simple case of two countries and two commodities. By drawing on some recent results of convex geometry and the theory of cephoids, this paper characterizes efficient patterns of incomplete specialization in the general case.Ricardian trade; efficient specialization; comparative cost; cephoids; deGua simplexes

The Canonical Extensive Form of a Game Form - Part II - Representation

This paper exhibits to any noncooperative game in strategic or normal form a 'canonical' game in extensive form that preserves all symmetries of the former one. The operation defined this way respects the restriction of games to subgames and yields a minimal total rank of the tree involved. Moreover, by the above requirements the 'canonical extensive game form' is uniquely defined.Games, Extensive Form, Normal Form, Strategic Form

Game theory

Game Theory describes human interaction involving conflict, cooperation and competition, the term Interpersonal Decision Theory is synonymous. The term reflects the fact that most essential features of this field are manifested in parlor games. This topic-level treatment covers large parts of the basic concepts and methods and sketches some fields of recent applications. The simultaneous occurrence of strategic, stochastic and dynamic phenomena, the fundamental role of epistemic aspects like knowledge and information and the impact of institutional and organizational structures make game theoretic analysis a highly complex task

Convex vNM-stable sets for linear production games

We characterize convex vNM-Stable Sets according to von Neumann and Morgenstern for orthogonal linear production games with a continuum of players. The results of [Rosenmüller & Shitovitz, International Journal of Game Theory 29 (2000)] are thereby substantially improved. Simultaneously, this is a corrigendum concerning the proof of a lemma in our first paper.

Strategic Behavior on Financial Markets

Kannai Y, Rosenmüller J. Strategic Behavior on Financial Markets. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 351. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2003.We discuss the strategic behavior of agents on a financial market in the presence of a central bank which is borrowing and lending money

A Characterization of vNM-Stable Sets for Linear Production Games

We discuss linear production games or market games with a continuum of players which are represented as minima of finitely many nonatomic measures. Within this contex we consider vNM-Stable Sets according to von Neumann and Morgenstern. It is shown that we can classify or characterize all solutions of this type which are convex polyhedra, i.e., which are the convex hull of finitely many measures. We also compare this with the case of a finite game. For certain classes of glove games we optain a characterization also in the finite case using the results from the continuum.

Efficient Specialization in Ricardian Production

It is well known that the analysis of efficient specialization in Ricardian production with many countries and many commodities cannot be broken down to the simple case of two countries and two commodities. By drawing on some recent results of convex geometry and the theory of cephoids, this paper characterizes efficient patterns of incomplete specialization in the general case.Bekanntlich lässt sich die Analyse effizienter Spezialisierung bei Ricardianischer Produktion mit vielen Ländern und vielen Gütern nicht auf den einfachen Fall mit zwei Ländern und zwei Gütern zurückführen. Dieses Papier charakterisiert nun alle effizienten Muster minimal unvollständiger Spezialisierung im allgemeinen Fall. Dabei kommen neuere Ergebnisse aus der konvexen Geometrie und der Theorie der Cephoiden zur Anwendung