Britain's great security mirage: the Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian naval threat, 1898–1906

The attached is a post-print version of the article entitled "The Franco-Russian naval threat in British naval thinking, 1899-1906: a reappraisal". This was subsequently changed to "Britain's great security mirage: the Royal Navy and the Franco-Russian naval threat, 1898–1906" for the final published version.This article focuses on the relationship between the threat perception analyses of the British Admiralty and the strategic orientation of the Royal Navy at the outset of the twentieth century. The current view is that this was an era when fear of France and Russia drove British naval policy. However, as this article will show, Britain’s Naval Intelligence Department formed a low opinion of French and Russian naval capabilities at this time and this negative evaluation exerted considerable influence over decision-making. The belief that, owing to multiple qualitative deficiencies, these powers could definitely be beaten in battle lessened the standing of the Franco-Russian naval challenge and freed the Admiralty to consider the danger posed by other possible enemies, most notably Germany