Singular Gaussian Measures in Detection Theory

No abstract availabl

Capacity of classes of Gaussian channels. Part I - Discrete-time

Capacity of discrete time Gaussian channel

Investigations in space communications theory, including topics related to random processes, filtering, telemetry Semiannual status report, 1 Oct. 1966 - 31 Mar. 1967

Random processes, filtering, and telemetry problems in space communications theor

First Do No Harm: Interpreting the Crime of Aggression to Exclude Humanitarian Intervention

The yet to be implemented Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute criminalizes, as the crime of aggression, acts of aggression which by their “character, gravity and scale” constitute a “manifest violation” of the Charter of the United Nations. This article argues that Article 8 bis must be construed so as to exclude from the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction uses of force, which are facial violations of the UN Charter, but which nonetheless comport with the principles and purposes of the Charter, such as bona fide humanitarian intervention unauthorized by the Security Council. This article examines and applies the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state practice, and opinion juris to conclude that such humanitarian intervention is not a use of force per se prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, despite widespread belief to the contrary. Even if Article 2(4) prohibits bona fide humanitarian interventions, humanitarian interventions will not be—by their “character, gravity and scale”—“manifest” violations of the UN Charter, and therefore are not crimes within the competency of the International Criminal Court to punish

First Do No Harm: Interpreting the Crime of Aggression to Exclude Humanitarian Intervention

The yet to be implemented Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute criminalizes, as the crime of aggression, acts of aggression which by their “character, gravity and scale” constitute a “manifest violation” of the Charter of the United Nations. This article argues that Article 8 bis must be construed so as to exclude from the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction uses of force, which are facial violations of the UN Charter, but which nonetheless comport with the principles and purposes of the Charter, such as bona fide humanitarian intervention unauthorized by the Security Council. This article examines and applies the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, state practice, and opinion juris to conclude that such humanitarian intervention is not a use of force per se prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, despite widespread belief to the contrary. Even if Article 2(4) prohibits bona fide humanitarian interventions, humanitarian interventions will not be—by their “character, gravity and scale”—“manifest” violations of the UN Charter, and therefore are not crimes within the competency of the International Criminal Court to punish

Some Other Men\u27s Rea - the Nature of Command Responsibility in the Rome Statute

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides for Command Responsibility. The provision addressing this is ambiguous and raises a number of interpretive issues. Command responsibility can either be understood as a mode of liability-a way of holding commanders vicariously responsible for the acts of their subordinates, or it can be understood as a separate, distinct crime based on the commander\u27s dereliction of his supervisory duties. The Rome Statute is not clear on the matter and points in both directions. In recent years, the mode of liability approach has come under increasing scrutiny by academics and by judges, particularly at the ICTY. This is rightly so, because the mode of liability approach offends basic notions of justice and accountability for personal responsibility. The separate crime theory conversely, serves to punish commanders for their omissions and comports with modern notions of due process and fundamental fairness. A mode of liability approach is particularly problematic in the context of specific intent crimes, like genocide, because the Rome Statute only requires that a military superior be negligent to be punishable under command responsibility. If command responsibility is a distinct crime, there is no conflict here; however, if command responsibility is a mode of liability, it effectively nullifies the element of genocidal intent, the hallmark of the crime of crimes. This dissertation explores some of the interpretive issues the Court must address in order to construe command responsibility in the Rome Statute as a distinct crime. The conclusion here is that there is sufficient foundation in the Rome Statute to construe command responsibility as a separate, distinct crime, and still maintain the Court\u27s jurisdiction over that crim

Inflight and ground-based simulation of handling qualities of very large airplanes in landing approach

Inflight and ground based simulation of Boeing 367-80 variable stability aircraft handling qualities during landing approac