Book Reviews

Costigan, Jr.: handbook on American Mining Law; Minor: The Law of Real Property (Based on Minor\u27s Institutes); Mikell: Cases on Criminal Law, selected from decisions of English and American Courts; Beecher: The Annotated Constitution of Michigan, with Introduction by Fred A. Bake

Sterilizable wide angle gas bearing gyro FGG334S Quarterly progress report, Jul. 1 - Oct. 1, 1967

Vibration and shock testing for spin motors for sterilizable wide angle gas bearing gyr

Acquiring Jurisdiction without Personal Service, Seizure of Aid of Statute

It is often assumed that courts can acquire jurisdiction only by personal service to give jurisdiction in personam, or by a seizure to give jurisdiction in rem; but it is not so. The assumption is induced no doubt by the fact that in the ordinary common law actions jurisdiction is acquired in that way. Mr. Justice Field very distinctly pointed out in the case of Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U. S. 714, that it was not the fact that the land was not seized that rendered the judgment void. It was the fact that the land was not the res in litigation in the prior case that made the judgment void

The Way of the Tansgressor Is Easy

The Way of the Transgressor is Easy, if he is shrewd enough to take an immunity bath, or avail himself of any of a dozen other provisions of the law made with good intentions and left lying about loose enough to be misappropriated. One rule that has served him many a good turn, is that there is no contribution between tort-feasors. Another way of stating it is that the courts are not open to help rogues out of the predicaments into which their dishonest dealings placed them, and the counterpart of the doctrine in equity is that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. So far therefore as civil liability is concerned, all that is necessary to protect the knave is to get his dupe to join in the knavery. This successfully done he may fleece his victim with impunity. This doctrine has even been applied to criminal liability, under the notion that the prosecution is in some way for the redress of the person injured (McCord v. People, 46 N. Y. 470; State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271), theerby extending the immunity to both civil and criminal liability; but at this, most of the courts have balked, saying that if both are guilty, that is no reason why each should not be punished, and pointing out that the doctrine is inapplicable, because, in the criminal suit, the state is seeking relief and is no party to the knavery. Criminals have never been allowed to escape by merely showing that others are guilty and have not been punished (Com. v. Morrill, 8 Cush. 571; In re Cummins, 16 Colo. 451, 27 Pac. 887, L. R. A. 752, 25 Am. St. Rep. 291). In this connection the thing desired by the professional criminal is something that will afford him ample protection against criminal prosecution; for he has sufficient civil protection in the doctrine above mentioned

The Way of the Tansgressor Is Easy

The Way of the Transgressor is Easy, if he is shrewd enough to take an immunity bath, or avail himself of any of a dozen other provisions of the law made with good intentions and left lying about loose enough to be misappropriated. One rule that has served him many a good turn, is that there is no contribution between tort-feasors. Another way of stating it is that the courts are not open to help rogues out of the predicaments into which their dishonest dealings placed them, and the counterpart of the doctrine in equity is that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. So far therefore as civil liability is concerned, all that is necessary to protect the knave is to get his dupe to join in the knavery. This successfully done he may fleece his victim with impunity. This doctrine has even been applied to criminal liability, under the notion that the prosecution is in some way for the redress of the person injured (McCord v. People, 46 N. Y. 470; State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271), theerby extending the immunity to both civil and criminal liability; but at this, most of the courts have balked, saying that if both are guilty, that is no reason why each should not be punished, and pointing out that the doctrine is inapplicable, because, in the criminal suit, the state is seeking relief and is no party to the knavery. Criminals have never been allowed to escape by merely showing that others are guilty and have not been punished (Com. v. Morrill, 8 Cush. 571; In re Cummins, 16 Colo. 451, 27 Pac. 887, L. R. A. 752, 25 Am. St. Rep. 291). In this connection the thing desired by the professional criminal is something that will afford him ample protection against criminal prosecution; for he has sufficient civil protection in the doctrine above mentioned

Leading and Illustrative Cases: with notes on the law of Judgments, Attachments, Garnishments and Executions

The prior edition being exhausted, this one became necessary. The scope of the book has been considerably changed by developing the law of jurisdiction and the estoppel by judgments. Room for this has been obtained by dropping some of the less important cases on other topics. In several instances a case has been displaced by another on the same point, because thought to cover the matter better.https://repository.law.umich.edu/books/1052/thumbnail.jp

Substitutional Gifts to Classes

In some recent cases we have fresh reminder of the futility of Sir William Grant\u27s distinction between original and substitutional gifts, a rule over which courts have quarreled and disagreed ever since it was promulgated, and which never was applied to the exclusion of anyone without disappointing the wish of the testator. In speaking of this rule in Re Hickey, [1917], 1 Ch. D. 601, 604, Neville, J., says: The alleged principle seems to be that the meaning of the word \u27substitute\u27 involves the idea of replacing one thing by another. One cannot \u27substitute\u27 something for nothing. The proposition appears to me axiomatic but not very illuminating. If the testator uses the word its meaning must affect the construction of his will; but where the court uses it, it is merely a mode of expressing a view of the construction already formed

Book Reviews

Freeman (ed.): The American State Reports, containing the cases of general value and authority, subsequent to those contained in the American Decisions and the American Reports, decided in the courts of last resort of the several state

Is a Judgment Open to Collateral Attack if Rendered without Written Pleadings as Required by Statute, or if the Writings Do Not Comply with the Statutory Requirements?

It is believed that no good reason can be assigned for answering the above question in the affirmative. Certainly none has yet been discovered in a careful search of the cases involving the point. And yet the assurance and unanimity with which lawyers and judges give the affirmative answer to it on first thought is indeed remarkable. For instance, Mr. Justice FIELD in speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, on the question as to whether a judgment is subject to collateral attack if one served with process is not permitted to make any defense when he appears in answer to such process, said arguendo: The decree of a court of equity upon oral allegations without written pleadings would be an idle act of no force beyond that of an advisory proceeding of the chancellor. 1 He made the statement as if it were obviously true, and citation of authority was unnecessary and would be surplusage. He certainly cites no authority for his proposition, indeed there is none to cite; nor does he advance any reason to support his conclusion to that effect. Such judicial utterances as are to be found to this effect are of very much the same off-hand and ill considered sort. When the question came before the same court in a later case in which it was necessary to decide the question to dispose of the case, the same justice had no difficulty in reaching the opposite conclusion.