The building of knowledge through virtual maps in collaborative learning environments

The purpose of this paper is to show relevant issues (resulting from theoretical and empiric research) about how virtual maps can be used to elicit the building of knowledge and to encourage collaborative learning. The intention of this work is to develop strategies for collaborative learning environments from a net of information perspectives, which might contribute to the improvement of significant pedagogical practices. The virtual maps study is supported by rhizome principles whose characteristics allow us to understand the process of selecting and connecting what is relevant and meaningful for the multilinear building of knowledge. In this paper, a brief theoretical and conceptual approach is presented and major contributions and difficulties about the use of virtual maps are discussed. At the end, new questions and future trends about the virtual maps application are mentioned

Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven.executive and team-based compensation; subject pool effects; real effort experiment; incentives; sorting; mergers

Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven. Suite à une fusion, les dirigeants doivent relever le défi d'offrir une nouvelle structure de rémunération incitative et de favoriser la coopération entre tous les membres de la nouvelle entreprise. Cette tâche n'est pas toujours facile: la culture d'entreprise, les modes de rémunération, les critères d'embauche et les habitudes de travail peuvent différer selon la firme d'origine. Dans cette recherche mobilisant l'économie expérimentale, nous traitons de cette question en dissociant les modes de rémunération de la composition des équipes. Les résultats d'une expérience avec effort réel, menée avec des gestionnaires d'une grande compagnie pharmaceutique, montrent que ces deux composantes affectent la performance des gestionnaires et que les expériences vécues par ces personnes avant la fusion ont aussi un impact sur leur coopération. En répliquant cette expérience avec des étudiants français et canadiens, nous observons que les différences avec les gestionnaires sont d'une nature stratégique plutôt que de substance: les gestionnaires sont guidés par la réalisation de l'objectif alors que les étudiants se préoccupent davantage des coûts.executive and team-based compensation, subject pool effects, real effort experiment, incentives, sorting, mergers, fusion d'entreprises, rémunération et composition d'équipe, expérience avec effort réel, comparaison de participants étudiants avec des gestionnaires d'entreprises

Redesigning Teams and Incentives:A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company

After a merger, company officials face the challenge to uniform compensation schemes and to redesign teams with managers originating from different incentives and working habits. In this paper, we offer a new way to investigate in post-merger the relationship between executive pay and performance, allowing to dissociate the respective influence of shifts occurring both in compensation incentives and in team composition. The results of a real effort experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company show that not only changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also that both managers' past compensation schemes and company cultures matter for cooperation. The efficiency of a new compensation package is conditional on the reshuffling of teams and the past of incentives within the new teams.executive compensation; real effort experiments; team-based compensation

Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits, and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real task experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance, but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with magagers appearing performance driven, while students are more cost driven.executive and team-based compensation, subject pool effects, real task experiment, incentives, sorting, mergers

Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a merger. An Experiment with Managers and Students

International audienceAfter a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real task experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven

Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a merger. An Experiment with Managers and Students

After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real task experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven while students are more cost driven.Executive and team-based compensation; subject pool effects; real task experiment; incentives; sorting; mergers

Grid of analysis supporting the participative design methodology

PALETTE deliverable - report number D.PAR.01This deliverable presents the participatory design methodology of the PALETTE project and some first results of the implementation of this process. Some principles of the Actor Network Theory and of the Agile Methodology are embedded in the different stages of this methodology whose twelve stages (described in details in the last section) will be the basis of the participative development of services and scenarios of use