Games with vector-valued payoffs and their application to competition between organizations

In 1959, Lloyd Shapley wrote a short paper on games with vector payoffs. He analyzed zero-sum matrix games. Here, we extend Shapley's equilibrium concept to general games with vector payoffs, introduce an organizational interpretation of the concept, elaborate the relationship of the original concept to another equilibrium concept where each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among internal ‘factions,'' and finally comment upon its relationship to the concept of party unanimity Nash equilibrium (PUNE).

Atmospheric densities and temperatures from precisely reduced observations of the Explorer IX satellite

Upper atmospheric densities and temperatures from photographs of Explorer IX satellit

Value and Politics

A brief, historical review of the study of the interdependency between politics and economic distribution is offered. While the impact of economic interests on politics has been acknowledged for thousands of years, and the impact of politics on distribution for hundreds, it is only in the last thirty years that formal models of the interdependency between economic distribution and politics have been formulated. A general model of political-economic equilibrium is proposed, in which political competition and economic distribution jointly determine each other. Several examples are given. The author proposes that political economy, conceived of as studying this process of joint determination, is in its infancy.Political-economic equilibrium