1,427 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
CHERIvoke: Characterising pointer revocation using CHERI capabilities for temporal memory safety
A lack of temporal safety in low-level languages has led to an epidemic of use-after-free exploits. These have surpassed in number and severity even the infamous buffer-overflow exploits violating spatial safety. Capability addressing can directly enforce spatial safety for the C language by enforcing bounds on pointers and by rendering pointers unforgeable. Nevertheless, an efficient solution for strong temporal memory safety remains elusive.
CHERI is an architectural extension to provide hardware capability addressing that is seeing significant commercial and open- source interest. We show that CHERI capabilities can be used as a foundation to enable low-cost heap temporal safety by facilitating out-of-date pointer revocation, as capabilities enable precise and efficient identification and invalidation of pointers, even when using unsafe languages such as C. We develop CHERIvoke, a technique for deterministic and fast sweeping revocation to enforce temporal safety on CHERI systems. CHERIvoke quarantines freed data before periodically using a small shadow map to revoke all dangling pointers in a single sweep of memory, and provides a tunable trade-off between performance and heap growth. We evaluate the performance of such a system using high-performance x86 processors, and further analytically examine its primary overheads. When configured with a heap-size overhead of 25%, we find that CHERIvoke achieves an average execution-time overhead of under 5%, far below the overheads associated with traditional garbage collection, revocation, or page-table systems.EP/K026399/1, EP/P020011/1, EP/K008528/
CHERI: a research platform deconflating hardware virtualisation and protection
Contemporary CPU architectures conflate virtualization and protection,
imposing virtualization-related performance, programmability,
and debuggability penalties on software requiring finegrained
protection. First observed in micro-kernel research, these
problems are increasingly apparent in recent attempts to mitigate
software vulnerabilities through application compartmentalisation.
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) extend
RISC ISAs to support greater software compartmentalisation.
CHERI’s hybrid capability model provides fine-grained compartmentalisation
within address spaces while maintaining software
backward compatibility, which will allow the incremental deployment
of fine-grained compartmentalisation in both our most trusted
and least trustworthy C-language software stacks. We have implemented
a 64-bit MIPS research soft core, BERI, as well as a
capability coprocessor, and begun adapting commodity software
packages (FreeBSD and Chromium) to execute on the platform
Rigorous engineering for hardware security: Formal modelling and proof in the CHERI design and implementation process
The root causes of many security vulnerabilities include a pernicious combination of two problems, often regarded as inescapable aspects of computing. First, the protection mechanisms provided by the mainstream processor architecture and C/C++ language abstractions, dating back to the 1970s and before, provide only coarse-grain virtual-memory-based protection. Second, mainstream system engineering relies almost exclusively on test-and-debug methods, with (at best) prose specifications. These methods have historically sufficed commercially for much of the computer industry, but they fail to prevent large numbers of exploitable bugs, and the security problems that this causes are becoming ever more acute.
In this paper we show how more rigorous engineering methods can be applied to the development of a new security-enhanced processor architecture, with its accompanying hardware implementation and software stack. We use formal models of the complete instruction-set architecture (ISA) at the heart of the design and engineering process, both in lightweight ways that support and improve normal engineering practice -- as documentation, in emulators used as a test oracle for hardware and for running software, and for test generation -- and for formal verification. We formalise key intended security properties of the design, and establish that these hold with mechanised proof. This is for the same complete ISA models (complete enough to boot operating systems), without idealisation.
We do this for CHERI, an architecture with \emph{hardware capabilities} that supports fine-grained memory protection and scalable secure compartmentalisation, while offering a smooth adoption path for existing software. CHERI is a maturing research architecture, developed since 2010, with work now underway on an Arm industrial prototype to explore its possible adoption in mass-market commercial processors. The rigorous engineering work described here has been an integral part of its development to date, enabling more rapid and confident experimentation, and boosting confidence in the design.This work was supported by EPSRC programme grant EP/K008528/1 (REMS: Rigorous Engineering for Mainstream Systems).
This work was supported by a Gates studentship (Nienhuis).
This project has received funding from the European Research Council
(ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme (grant agreement 789108, ELVER).
This work was supported by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-0237 (CTSRD),
HR0011-18-C-0016 (ECATS),
and FA8650-18-C-7809 (CIFV)
CHERI: A hybrid capability-system architecture for scalable software compartmentalization
CHERI extends a conventional RISC Instruction-
Set Architecture, compiler, and operating system to support
fine-grained, capability-based memory protection to mitigate
memory-related vulnerabilities in C-language TCBs. We describe
how CHERI capabilities can also underpin a hardware-software
object-capability model for application compartmentalization
that can mitigate broader classes of attack. Prototyped as an
extension to the open-source 64-bit BERI RISC FPGA softcore
processor, FreeBSD operating system, and LLVM compiler,
we demonstrate multiple orders-of-magnitude improvement in
scalability, simplified programmability, and resulting tangible
security benefits as compared to compartmentalization based on
pure Memory-Management Unit (MMU) designs. We evaluate
incrementally deployable CHERI-based compartmentalization
using several real-world UNIX libraries and applications.We thank our colleagues Ross Anderson, Ruslan Bukin,
Gregory Chadwick, Steve Hand, Alexandre Joannou, Chris
Kitching, Wojciech Koszek, Bob Laddaga, Patrick Lincoln,
Ilias Marinos, A Theodore Markettos, Ed Maste, Andrew W.
Moore, Alan Mujumdar, Prashanth Mundkur, Colin Rothwell,
Philip Paeps, Jeunese Payne, Hassen Saidi, Howie Shrobe, and
Bjoern Zeeb, our anonymous reviewers, and shepherd Frank
Piessens, for their feedback and assistance. This work is part of
the CTSRD and MRC2 projects sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-
0237 and FA8750-11-C-0249. The views, opinions, and/or
findings contained in this paper are those of the authors and
should not be interpreted as representing the official views
or policies, either expressed or implied, of the Department
of Defense or the U.S. Government. We acknowledge the EPSRC
REMS Programme Grant [EP/K008528/1], Isaac Newton
Trust, UK Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), Thales
E-Security, and Google, Inc.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.
Recommended from our members
CheriRTOS: A Capability Model for Embedded Devices
Embedded systems are deployed ubiquitously
among various sectors including automotive, medical, robotics
and avionics. As these devices become increasingly connected,
the attack surface also increases tremendously; new mechanisms
must be deployed to defend against more sophisticated attacks
while not violating resource constraints. In this paper we present
CheriRTOS on CHERI-64, a hardware-software platform atop
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) for
embedded systems.
Our system provides efficient and scalable task isolation,
fast and secure inter-task communication, fine-grained memory
safety, and real-time guarantees, using hardware capabilities as
the sole protection mechanism. We summarize state-of-the-art se-
curity and memory safety for embedded systems for comparison
with our platform, illustrating the superior substrate provided
by CHERI’s capabilities. Finally, our evaluations show that a
capability system can be implemented within the constraints of
embedded systems
Beyond the PDP-11: Architectural support for a memory-safe C abstract machine
We propose a new memory-safe interpretation of the C abstract machine that provides stronger protection to benefit security and debugging. Despite ambiguities in the specification intended to provide implementation flexibility, contemporary implementations of C have converged on a memory model similar to the PDP-11, the original target for C. This model lacks support for memory safety despite well documented impacts on security and reliability. Attempts to change this model are often hampered by assumptions embedded in a large body of existing C code, dating back to the memory model exposed by the original C compiler for the PDP-11. Our experience with attempting to implement a memory-safe variant of C on the CHERI experimental microprocessor led us to identify a number of problematic idioms. We describe these as well as their interaction with existing memory safety schemes and the assumptions that they make beyond the requirements of the C specification. Finally, we refine the CHERI ISA and abstract model for C, by combining elements of the CHERI capability model and fat pointers, and present a softcore CPU that implements a C abstract machine that can run legacy C code with strong memory protection guarantees.This work is part of the CTSRD and MRC2 projects that are sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-0237 and FA8750- 11-C-0249. The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies, either expressed or implied, of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. We gratefully acknowledge Google, Inc. for its sponsorship
Recommended from our members
Efficient tagged memory
We characterize the cache behavior of an in-memory tag table and
demonstrate that an optimized implementation can typically achieve a near-zero memory traffic overhead. Both industry and academia have repeatedly demonstrated tagged memory as a key mechanism to enable enforcement of powerful security invariants, including capabilities pointer integrity, watchpoints, and information-flow tracking. A single-bit tag shadowspace is the most commonly proposed requirement, as one bit is the minimum metadata needed to distinguish between an untyped data word and any number of new hardware-enforced types. We survey various tag shadowspace approaches and identify their common requirements and positive features of their implementations. To avoid non-standard memory widths, we identify the most practical implementation for tag storage to be an in-memory table managed next to the DRAM controller. We characterize the caching performance of such a tag table and demonstrate a DRAM traffic overhead below 5\% for the vast majority of applications. We identify spatial locality on a page scale as the primary factor that enables surprisingly high table cache-ability. We then demonstrate tag-table compression for a set of common applications. A hierarchical structure with elegantly simple optimizations reduces DRAM traffic overhead to below 1\% for most applications. These insights and optimizations pave the way for commercial applications making use of single-bit tags stored in commodity memory
Fast Protection-Domain Crossing in the CHERI Capability-System Architecture
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) supplement the conventional memory management unit (MMU) with instruction-set architecture (ISA) extensions that implement a capability system model in the address space. CHERI can also underpin a hardware-software object-capability model for scalable application compartmentalization that can mitigate broader classes of attack. This article describes ISA additions to CHERI that support fast protection-domain switching, not only in terms of low cycle count, but also efficient memory sharing with mutual distrust. The authors propose ISA support for sealed capabilities, hardware-assisted checking during protection-domain switching, a lightweight capability flow-control model, and fast register clearing, while retaining the flexibility of a software-defined protection-domain transition model. They validate this approach through a full-system experimental design, including ISA extensions, a field-programmable gate array prototype (implemented in Bluespec SystemVerilog), and a software stack including an OS (based on FreeBSD), compiler (based on LLVM), software compartmentalization model, and open-source applications.This work is part of the CTSRD and MRC2 projects sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-0237 and FA8750-11-C-0249. We also acknowledge the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) REMS Programme Grant [EP/K008528/1], the EPSRC Impact Acceleration Account [EP/K503757/1], EPSRC/ARM iCASE studentship [13220009], Microsoft studentship [MRS2011-031], the Isaac Newton Trust, the UK Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), Thales E-Security, and Google, Inc.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version of the article can be found at: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7723791
Recommended from our members
CheriABI: Enforcing Valid Pointer Provenance and Minimizing Pointer Privilege in the POSIX C Run-time Environment
The CHERI architecture allows pointers to be implemented as capabilities (rather than integer virtual addresses) in a manner that is compatible with, and strengthens, the semantics of the C language. In addition to the spatial protections offered by conventional fat pointers, CHERI capabilities offer strong integrity, enforced provenance validity, and access monotonicity. The stronger guarantees of these architectural capabilities must be reconciled with the real-world behavior of operating systems, run-time environments, and applications. When the process model, user-kernel interactions, dynamic linking, and memory management are all considered, we observe that simple derivation of architectural capabilities is insufficient to describe appropriate access to memory. We bridge this conceptual gap with a notional \emph{abstract capability} that describes the accesses that should be allowed at a given point in execution, whether in the kernel or userspace. To investigate this notion at scale, we describe the first adaptation of a full C-language operating system (FreeBSD) with an enterprise database (PostgreSQL) for complete spatial and referential memory safety. We show that awareness of abstract capabilities, coupled with CHERI architectural capabilities, can provide more complete protection, strong compatibility, and acceptable performance overhead compared with the pre-CHERI baseline and software-only approaches. Our observations also have potentially significant implications for other mitigation techniques.This work was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-0237 (``CTSRD'') and HR0011-18-C-0016 (``ECATS''). The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. We also acknowledge the EPSRC REMS Programme Grant (EP/K008528/1), the ERC ELVER Advanced Grant (789108), Arm Limited, HP Enterprise, and Google, Inc. Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited
The OMERACT Core Domain Set for Clinical Trials of Shoulder Disorders.
OBJECTIVE:To reach consensus on the core domains to be included in a core domain set for clinical trials of shoulder disorders using the Outcome Measures in Rheumatology (OMERACT) Filter 2.1 Core Domain Set process. METHODS:At OMERACT 2018, the OMERACT Shoulder Working Group conducted a workshop that presented the OMERACT 2016 preliminary core domain set and its rationale based upon a systematic review of domains measured in shoulder trials and international Delphi sessions involving patients, clinicians, and researchers, as well as a new systematic review of qualitative studies on the experiences of people with shoulder disorders. After discussions in breakout groups, the OMERACT core domain set for clinical trials of shoulder disorders was presented for endorsement by OMERACT 2018 participants. RESULTS:The qualitative review (n = 8) identified all domains included in the preliminary core set. An additional domain, cognitive dysfunction, was also identified, but confidence that this represents a core domain was very low. The core domain set that was endorsed by the OMERACT participants, with 71% agreement, includes 4 "mandatory" trial domains: pain, function, patient global - shoulder, and adverse events including death; and 4 "important but optional" domains: participation (recreation/work), sleep, emotional well-being, and condition-specific pathophysiological manifestations. Cognitive dysfunction was voted out of the core domain set. CONCLUSION:OMERACT 2018 delegates endorsed a core domain set for clinical trials of shoulder disorders. The next step includes identification of a core outcome measurement set that passes the OMERACT 2.1 Filter for measuring each domain
- …