A theoretical model of wage discrimination with inspection fines

In neoclassical models, workers are classified a priori into discrimination groups. We develop a probabilistic model of wage discrimination in which workers need not be classified a priori. Our model is a generalization of the standard framework, whereas Becker's model is an extreme case. A second implication is that the traditional approach to measuring discrimination (the Oaxaca–Blinder approach) must be modified to take into account this probabilistic framework.

Returns to foreign languages of native workers in the EU

Most papers on returns to languages are concerned with immigrants. We use the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) to infer returns on non-native languages by non-immigrants in nine countries of the European Union. We differ fromthe few other studies that deal with the same problem in three respects. First, we correct for time-dependent measurement errors in self-reporting as suggested by Dustmann and Van Soest and find that the resulting IV estimates are much larger than those obtained by OLS. We also suggest that there is little room for time-persistent errors and heterogeneity, and that therefore our estimates should not suffer from the other usual biases. Secondly, instead of using a dummy for each language, we use the ratio of the population that is not proficient in a language in each country considered. Finally, we estimate instrumental variable quantile regressions to illustrate how returns to languages vary at different points of the distribution of earnings.

OPTIMAL PRICING AND GRANT POLICIES FOR MUSEUMS

Considering two potential sources of income (public grants and ticket revenues),we have defined a theoretical model where the public agency is the principal and the manager of the museum is the agent. This model allows us to design the optimal contract between both sides and thus to establish the optimal values of grants, ticket prices, budget and effort applied by the manager. Furthermore, we have found a theoretical reason to explain the inelastic pricing strategy that has been found in some of the empirical research on cultural and sports economics. The main conclusion is that the optimal contract allows a Pareto optimum solution in prices that does not change if we introduce moral hazard into this relationship. This solution allows us to conclude that the public agency should regulate ticket prices in accordance with the social valuation. However, public grants and museum budgets would be affected by the existence of this problem, moving the equilibrium away from the Pareto optimum situation. In this case, even with a risk averse manager and a risk neutral public agency, grants and budgets will depend on results because higher budgets related to good results provide the main incentives to increase the manager’s level of effort. Although the focus of this paper is on museum administration, the model that we have developed can be easily generalized and applied to other institutions, such as schools, sport facilities or NGOs, which are able to raise funds directly from private (e. g. ticket revenues or membership fees) or public sources (e.g. public grants).cultural economics, grants, public prices, museums, principal- agent model

The Determinants of Soccer Player Substitutions: a Survival Analysis of the Spanish Soccer League

This paper analyzes the pattern of player substitutions during a soccer match, using data from the First Division (Primera División) of the Spanish National Soccer League in the 2004-2005 season. To do so, an inverse Gaussian hazard model is adopted to analyze the first substitutions of each team that take place at half-time and in the second half of matches. The results show that the most important factor is the score as it stands prior to the time of the player substitution. Furthermore, defensive substitutions are made later in the match than offensive substitutions. We also find some evidence that the home team makes more substitutions than the visiting team in the halftime interval.hazard model; soccer substitutions; strategy.

Extended Coronal Emission Lines in Active Galactic Nuclei

VLT and NTT spectra are used to examine the nuclear and extended coronal line emission in a sample of well-known Seyfert 1 and 2 galaxies. The excellent spatial resolution obtained with VLT allowed us to map [SiVI] 1.963 $\mu$m and [SiVII] 2.48 $\mu$m on scales of up to 20 pc. Coronal line emission, extended to distances of $\sim$100 pc, is detected in some of the lines analyzed, particularly in [FeX] 6374\AA, [FeXI] 7891\AA, and [SiVII] 2.48$\mu$m. Most coronal lines are strongly asymmetric towards the blue and broader than low-ionization lines. This result is particularly important for Circinus, where previous observations had failed at detecting larger widths for high-ionization lines. Photoionization models are used to investigate the physical conditions and continuum luminosities necessary to produced the observed coronal emission. We found that an ionization parameter U> 0.10 is necessary to reproduce the observations, although the clouds should be located at distances < 30 pc.Comment: 4 pages, 6 figures, to appear in proceedings of IAU Symposium No. 222, The Interplay Among Black Holes, Stars and ISM in Galacti Nucle

IS A TAX CUT ON CULTURAL GOODS CONSUMPTION ACTUALLY DESIRABLE?:A MICROSIMULATION ANALYSIS

Proposals for tax cuts on cultural goods represent an ongoing debate in cultural policy. The main aim of this paper is to shed some light on this debate using microsimulation tools. First, we have estimated an Almost Ideal Demand System for nineteen different groups of goods, including cultural goods. Expenditure and price elasticities have been obtained from this model. Using this information, three alternatives cuts in the V.A.T. rate on cultural goods have been microsimulated and evaluated in terms of revenue and welfare. These types of fiscal reforms will lead to welfare and efficiency gains that can be described as regressive.Microsimulation, tax reforms, cultural consumption, welfare

How do your rivals' releasing dates affect your box office?

In this paper, we study to what extent a movie's box office receipts are affected by the temporal distribution of rival films. We propose a theoretical model that analyses the effects of past, present and future releases on a film's results. Using this model we can analyse how rivals' release dates impact on others' box office revenues. This theoretical model also allows us to carry out some comparative statics by changing some relevant parameters such as time depreciation, film quality or the timeline of exhibition. We have tested the empirical implications of this model using information on the films released in five countries: the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain. In order to maintain a degree of homogeneity, we have constructed an unbalanced panel consisting of films that were released in at least three of these countries. The geographical dimension of our data set allows us to use panel data techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity among the films released. This allows us to control for one of the most relevant features of the movie market, namely the presence of highly differentiated products.temporal competition, movie exhibition, film industry, panel data, unobserved heterogeneity, differentiated product