China’s junior partner. Russia’s Korean policy. OSW Point of View 72 December 2018

Russia’s policy towards the conflict over the North Korean nuclear program, which in 2017-18 assumed the proportions of a serious international crisis, has been subordinated to its geopolitical goals in the region and to the strategy it is pursuing on a global scale. Its long-term goal is to prevent the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the aegis of the United States and to weaken the US’s position in the region. Its shortterm goal is to avert the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula and the possible collapse of North Korea

Russia on the US presidential elections. Neutrality, with a slight tilt towards Trump. OSW Commentary 2020-11-05.

Russia’s ruling elite believes that the outcome of the US presidential elections will have only a negligible impact on Washington’s policy towards Moscow, because the American establishment is convinced that Russia under Vladimir Putin has consistently pursued an anti-American policy. In Russia’s view, each candidate has both strong and weak points, but in the end the Kremlin would prefer to see Donald Trump remain in the White House. To this end, Moscow has been active – particularly in the sphere of propaganda – with the aim of weakening Joe Biden’s candidacy and stoking domestic tensions in American society. However, the scope of Russia’s activity seems more limited compared to the previous electoral campaign. However, Moscow is likely to step up its activities should a political conflict emerge over the outcome of the election. A victory for the Democratic presidential candidate will result in revisions in US policy towards Russia. The incoming Biden administration can be expected to combine tough rhetoric on its divergences with Russia in the field of values with attempts to find areas where their interests converge and where cooperation can take place (such as arms control, the resolution of regional conflicts and the fight against terrorism), complemented by efforts to coordinate the West’s policy towards Russia

China’s Junior Partner: Russia’s Korean policy. OSW Point of View Number 72, December 2018

Russia’s policy towards the conflict over the North Korean nuclear program, which in 2017-18 assumed the proportions of a serious international crisis, has been subordinated to its geopolitical goals in the region and to the strategy it is pursuing on a global scale. Its long-term goal is to prevent the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the aegis of the United States and to weaken the US’s position in the region. Its short-term goal is to avert the danger of an outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula and the possible collapse of North Korea

Russia vis-à-vis Iran. OSW commentary NUMBER 292 | 30.01.2019

Russia’s relations with Iran are almost entirely based on geopolitical assumptions. Both states are interested in weakening the position the United States holds in the region; both have a common enemy in the form of Sunni extremism. Combined with the successful cooperation in Syria, which is not devoid of elements of rivalry, these priorities make Russia and Iran strategic partners in the Middle East

The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 44, November 2014

The ‘turn to the East’ proclaimed by Russia in 2010 has failed to bring about a fundamental breakthrough in her relations with Asian countries, nor has it produced impulses for the economic modernization of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Although the energisation of Russian policy towards Asia which has taken place under this slogan has diversified Russian foreign policy somewhat, this diversification has two weak points: Firstly, it has occurred only in the political sphere. The share of Asian countries in Russia’s foreign economic relations has not risen significantly in comparison with the share of European and North American countries. Secondly, the ‘turn to the East’ has turned out primarily to be a turn towards China. In all spheres – diplomatic, economic, energy and military – it is Beijing that has become the most important Asian partner for Moscow. The result is that the policy that aimed to limit the excessive – in the Kremlin’s view – dependence of Russia on the West is likely to turn Russia into a ‘junior partner’ of the People’s Republic of China

Russia's strategy towards Moldova: continuation or change? OSW Commentary No. 74, 2012-04-19

The nomination on 21 March of deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin to the newly created post of the Russian president’s special representative for Transnistria and to the post of co-chairman of the Russian-Moldovan intergovernmental committee demonstrates the Kremlin’s increased interest in Moldova, and may be a sign of a change in Russia’s strategy towards this country. Other developments which may suggest a revival of Russia’s policy towards Moldova include the appointment on 5 April of Farit Mukhametshin as Russia’s new ambassador in Chisinau. Mukhametshin is a high-ranking official who had previously headed the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), which is one of the major instruments of Russia’s ‘soft power’ policy towards the post-Soviet states. The Kremlin’s growing interest in Moldova has further been confirmed by an unprecedented visit by Russia’s defence minister Anatoly Serdyukov to Transnistria on 12 April, and a two-day visit by Dmitri Rogozin to Chisinau and Tiraspol on 16–17 April

Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s New Silk Road: adaptation instead of competition. OSW Commentary NUMBER 219 | 21.07.2016

The argument that a crisis in Russian-Chinese relations is unavoidable has been repeatedly referred to by analysts since the 1990s. The reason for this crisis would be geopolitical competition between the two powers in Central Asia. In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the concept of the New Silk Road (referred to by the Chinese side as ‘One Belt, One Road’). At the same time, Moscow announced its efforts to build its own integration project in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union. These two developments seemed to confirm that the initial argument was correct and that the two projects were apparently fated to compete. Meanwhile, in May 2015, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, a joint declaration was issued calling for combining the two projects and creating a formal mechanism for their coordination in the form of a joint task force. The vision of “a great Eurasian partnership” announced by President Vladimir Putin during the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg on 16–17 June 2016 – which he also referred to as the Greater Eurasia project – is a signal that Moscow has ultimately opted for the strategy of joining a stronger partner (bandwagoning) instead of choosing the strategy of counterbalancing the rising power of China. At the same time, Moscow is trying to conceal the growing asymmetry in Russian-Chinese relations

A test of strength. The escalation of the crisis in Russian-American relations. OSW Commentary NUMBER 264 | 11.04.2018

On 6 April, the Trump administration introduced additional, more severe sanctions against Russia, covering 24 people and 14 companies: Russian oligarchs, the businesses they run, senior government officials and heads of state corporations, and (again) the Russian state arms company Rosoboroneksport. The immediate consequence of the new sanctions has been a downturn on the Russian stock market and the weakening of the rouble, as well as financial problems for the companies sanctioned, especially those belonging to the oligarch Oleg Deripaska. In the longer term the Russian oligarchs and their companies which conduct extensive activity abroad will find that the sanctions hamper their operations, and as a result, their dependence on the Kremlin will increase. On the other hand, the Kremlin will have increasing difficulty in recouping the affected oligarchs’ losses, which will lead to an increase in tensions within the elite, as well as a rise in social discontent, which will make the functioning of Putin’s regime more costly. The US sanctions represent the next stage of the crisis in Russian-American relations. They were imposed just after the expulsion from Russia of 60 American diplomats in retaliation for a similar decision by the US regarding Russian diplomats. The crisis may deepen further as a result of the military response which the US has announced in response to a chemical attack in Duma, Syria on 7 April, most likely by the Assad regime’s forces. An escalation of the crisis does not suit the Kremlin, which still seems to nurture hope that the recently announced further Putin-Trump meeting could initiate the process of normalisation of Russian-American relations. On the other hand, for reasons concerning its image, the Kremlin will probably undertake some kind of limited retaliation against the US, in order to demonstrate to Washington its potential to cause harm. All this means a long-lasting crisis in Russian-American relations

Could Transnistria block Moldova's integration with the EU? OSW Commentary No. 95, 2012-10-23

Moldova’s progress in its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the European Union, with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as its key element, has become a source of tension between Chisinau and the breakaway Republic of Transnistria. An almost certain refusal by Transnistria to join the DCFTA, will deprive the region of the benefits it currently enjoys under the EU Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP) worsening its already precarious economic situation. It is to be expected that the issue will become an additional source of tension between the two sides of the Transnistrian conflict, and might also have a negative impact on the EU–Russia relationship. The signing of the Association Agreement, which is scheduled for the autumn of 2013, will be an important step towards Moldova’s integration with the EU. Both sides assign great importance to the speediest possible finalisation of the Agreement, and so far the negotiations have been described as progressing very smoothly. Transnistria’s highly sceptical attitude towards its possible accession to the DCFTA, however, is consistent with the interests of its main ally, Moscow. It is highly probable that Russia intends to thwart Moldova’s EU association process. Moscow’s objective seems to be to draw Moldova permanently into its own sphere of influence, and therefore it perceives Chisinau’s movement towards the EU as a transgression against its geopolitical interests. Consequently, in order to hinder this process, Russia may instrumentally exploit its extensive influence over Transnistria to provoke a crisis between Tiraspol and Chisinau. An apparent increase in Russian presence in the region over the last few months (including tighter control over Transnistria’s KGB and the Ministry of Information) may suggest that the Kremlin is preparing to implement such a scenario

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices