Degrees of cooperation in household consumption models: a revealed preference analysis

We develop a revealed preference approach to analyze non-unitary consumption models with intrahousehold allocations deviating from the cooperative (or Pareto efficient) solution. At a theoretical level, we establish revealed preference conditions of household consumption models with varying degrees of cooperation. Using these conditions, we show independence (or non-nestedness) of the different (cooperative-noncooperative) models. At a practical level, we show that our characterization implies testable conditions for a whole spectrum of cooperative-noncooperative models that can be verified by means of mixed integer programming (MIP) methods. This MIP formulation is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis. An application to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) demonstrates the empirical relevance of consumption models that account for limited intrahousehold cooperation.household consumption, intrahousehold cooperation, revealed preferences, Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), mixed integer programming (MIP).

Nash bargained consumption decisions: a revealed preference analysis.

We present a revealed preference analysis of the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. Our specific focus is on a two-player game involving consumption decisions. We consider a setting in which the empirical analyst has information on both the threat points bundles and the bargaining outcomes. We first establish a revealed preference characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. This characterization implies conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for consistency of observed consumption behavior with the Nash bargaining model. However, these conditions turn out to be nonlinear in unknowns and therefore difficult to verify. Given this, we subsequently present necessary conditions and sufficient conditions that are linear (and thus easily testable). We illustrate the practical usefulness of these conditions by means of an application to experimental data. Such an experimental setting implies a most powerful analysis of the empirical goodness of the Nash bargaining model for describing consumption decisions. To our knowledge, this provides a first empirical test of the Nash bargaining model on consumption data. Finally, we consider the possibility that threat point bundles are not observed. This obtains testable conditions for the Nash bargaining model that can be used in non-experimental (e.g. household consumption) settings, which often do not contain information on individual consumption bundles in threat points.

Noncooperative household consumption with caring

We present a household consumption model that accounts for caring household members, while allowing for noncooperative behavior in decisions on public goods. The intrahousehold consumption outcome critically depends on the degree of caring between the household members. By varying the degree of intrahousehold caring, the model encompasses a whole continuum of household consumption models that are situated between the fully cooperative model and the noncooperative model without caring. This feature is used to define a measure for the degree of cooperation within the household. We also establish a dual characterization of our noncooperative model with caring preferences: we show that the model is dually equivalent to a noncooperative model with non-caring preferences that is characterized by intrahousehold transfers. Finally, following a revealed preference approach, we derive testable implications of the model for empirical data. We demonstrate the practical usefulness of the model through an illustrative application.

Testable implications of general equilibrium models: an integer programming approach

Focusing on the testable implications on the equilibrium manifold, we show that the rationalizability problem is NP-complete. Subsequently, we present an integer programming (IP) approach to characterizing general equilibrium models. This approach avoids the use of the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm for quantifier elimination that is commonly used in the literature. The IP approach naturally applies to settings with any number of observations, which is attractive for empirical applications. In addition, it can easily be adjusted to analyze the testable implications of alternative general equilibrium models (that include, e.g., public goods, externalities and/or production). Further, we show that the IP framework can easily address recoverability questions (pertaining to the structural model that underlies the observed equilibrium behavior), and account for empirical issues when bringing the IP methodology to the data (such as goodness-of-fit and power). Finally, we show how to develop easy-to-implement heuristics that give a quick (but possibly inconclusive) answer to whether or not the data satisfy the general equilibrium models.General equilibrium, equilibrium manifold, exchange economies, production economies, NP-completeness, nonparametric restrictions, GARP, integer programming.

Degrees of cooperation in household consumption models: a revealed preference analysis.

We develop a revealed preference approach to analyze non-unitary consumption models with intrahousehold allocations deviating from the cooperative (or Pareto eff cient) solution. At a theoretical level, we establish revealed preference conditions of household consumption models with varying degrees of cooperation. Using these conditions, we show independence (or non-nestedness) of the different (cooperative-noncooperative) models. At a practical level, we show that our characterization implies testable conditions for a whole spectrum of cooperative-noncooperative models that can be verified by means of mixed integer programming (MIP) methods. This MIP formulation is particularly attractive in view of empirical analysis. An application to data drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) demonstrates the empirical relevance of consumption models that account for limited intrahousehold cooperation.

Testable implications of general equilibrium models: an integer programming approach.

Focusing on the testable implications on the equilibrium manifold, we show that the rationalizability problem is NP-complete. Subsequently, we present an integer programming (IP) approach to characterizing general equilibrium models. This approach avoids the use of the Tarski-Seidenberg algorithm for quantifier elimination that is commonly used in the literature. The IP approach naturally applies to settings with any number of observations, which is attractive for empirical applications. In addition, it can easily be adjusted to analyze the testable implications of alternative general equilibrium models (that include, e.g., public goods, externalities and/or production). Further, we show that the IP framework can easily address recoverability questions (pertaining to the structural model that underlies the observed equilibrium behavior), and account for empirical issues when bringing the IP methodology to the data (such as goodness-of-fit and power). Finally, we show how to develop easy-to-implement heuristics that give a quick (but possibly inconclusive) answer to whether or not the data satisfy the general equilibrium models.General equilibrium; Equilibrium manifold; Exchange economies; Production economies; NP-completeness; Nonparametric restrictions; GARP; integer programming;

Nash bargained consumption decisions: a revealed preference analysis

We present a revealed preference analysis of the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. Our specific focus is on a two-player game involving consumption decisions. We consider a setting in which the empirical analyst has information on both the threat points bundles and the bargaining outcomes. We first establish a revealed preference characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. This characterization implies conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for consistency of observed consumption behavior with the Nash bargaining model. However, these conditions turn out to be nonlinear in unknowns and therefore difficult to verify. Given this, we subsequently present necessary conditions and sufficient conditions that are linear (and thus easily testable). We illustrate the practical usefulness of these conditions by means of an application to experimental data. Such an experimental setting implies a most powerful analysis of the empirical goodness of the Nash bargaining model for describing consumption decisions. To our knowledge, this provides a first empirical test of the Nash bargaining model on consumption data. Finally, we consider the possibility that threat point bundles are not observed. This obtains testable conditions for the Nash bargaining model that can be used in non-experimental (e.g. household consumption) settings, which often do not contain information on individual consumption bundles in threat points.

Is utility transferable? A revealed preference analysis

We provide a revealed preference analysis of the transferable utility hypothesis, which is widely used in economic models. First, we establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed group behavior to be consistent with Pareto efficiency under transferable utility. Next, we show that these conditions are easily testable by means of integer programming methods. The tests are entirely nonparametric, which makes them robust with respect to specification errors. Finally, we demonstrate the practical usefulness of our conditions by means of an application to Spanish consumption data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical test of the transferable utility hypothesis.

The empirical content of Cournot competition.

We consider the testable implications of the Cournot model of market competition. Our approach is nonparametric in that we abstain from imposing any functional specification on market demand and firm cost functions. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for (reduced form) equilibrium market price and quantity functions to be consistent with the Cournot model. In addition, we present identification results for the corresponding inverse market demand function and the firm cost functions. Finally, we use our approach to derive testable restrictions for the models of perfect competition, collusion and conjectural variations. This identifies the conditions under which these different models are empirically distinguishable from the Cournot model.

Is utility transferable? A revealed preference analysis.

We provide a revealed preference analysis of the transferable utility hypothesis, which is widely used in economic models. First, we establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed group behavior to be consistent with Pareto efficiency under transferable utility. Next, we show that these conditions are easily testable by means of integer programming methods. The tests are entirely nonparametric, which makes them robust with respect to specification errors. Finally, we demonstrate the practical usefulness of our conditions by means of an application to Spanish consumption data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical test of the transferable utility hypothesis.