Public Interest Lawyering & Judicial Politics: Four Cases Worth a Second Look in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar

This First Look Essay argues that the Court should consider public interest lawyering when it decides a First Amendment challenge to the Canon prohibiting judicial candidates from soliciting money in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar. It suggests that four cases are worth a second look : Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009); Shelley v. Kraemer (1948); and a Florida Supreme Court case involving discipline of a judge, In re Hawkins

Confederate cotton creates modern issues, as the right to wear the Confederate flag is contested in contemporary U.S. schools

Although the Civil War was more than 150 years ago, some leftover tensions from 1865 still persist. Ruthann Robson argues that the courtroom is one such battlefield for these conflicts, examining cases regarding the rights of students to wear the Confederate flag to school

The Sexual Misconduct of Donald J. Trump: Toward a Misogyny Report

The numerous allegations of sexual misconduct—unwanted, unwelcome, often aggressive sexual behavior—levied against Donald Trump merit attention and redress. Despite obstacles to civil remedies, there has been some litigation, but it has mostly been unsatisfactory. The many allegations reported in the media have not been amenable to judicial, legislative, executive, or political resolution. Women, including women who allege Trump committed sexual misconduct against them when they were minors, have generally not been afforded the remedies to which they are entitled. Because litigation and media accounts have proven inadequate to the task of addressing Trump’s sexual misconduct, there should be a government inquiry and resulting Report. Such a Report—a Misogyny Report focused on Donald Trump—would assist the nation in assessing and contextualizing the troubling and persistent allegations of his sexual misconduct. An inquiry and Report could provide a forum for considering each individual woman affected and as part of a pattern of Trump’s conduct. Further, an inquiry and Report could ameliorate the silencing of women—through isolation, threats, and nondisclosure agreements— and propose remedies to empower these women as well as other women. A Misogyny Report could also suggest specific correctives to obstacles in the path of bringing and completing litigation that could address the alleged sexual misconduct of Trump and ultimately of others. A government Misogyny Report initiated by Congress or some other governmental body could provide a much-needed reckoning

Why Don\u27t We All Just Wear Robes?

(Excerpt) Lawyers and law professors select our professional outfits each day, often experiencing a mix of consternation and gratification. The dread springs from our failures: to know what constitutes the “right look;” to be able to achieve that “right look;” to anticipate what the day will bring; to have prepared by doing the laundry or other tasks. The joy resides in self-expression; we fashion ourselves as works of art, even within the constraints of professional attire. It could have been different. We could have sacrificed the satisfaction of self-expression for the complacency of conformity; we could wear robes. Judges—at least when they are on the bench—are relieved from the obligation of selecting their attire as they are denied their individuality. But the history and current controversies of robes, for judges and others, is not so simple. Professional dress in classrooms and court rooms shares the common ancestry of academic and legal robes, both of which are related to the dress of religious clerics. By the Tudor era, various regulations attended to the specific requirements of various ceremonial robes, while more generally graduate students and barristers were essentially equated with gentlemen and allowed to dress accordingly. Fashions changed: black replaced more colorful garments during the mourning for monarchs; wigs substituted for hoods as head coverings. Yet the main purposes are hierarchal: a person’s individuality is subsumed by a costume that symbolized respect for the profession and the dignity of it. It can sometimes seem to be a tempting solution to alleviate the discriminations, angst, and even cost of dressing professionally—especially for those whose appearance is gendered female or nonbinary—to argue for the adoption of robes in the legal and teaching professions. But, even if this were possible, it is not a tenable solution. Section I of this Article considers the cult of the judicial robe, examining judicial views on the metonymy of judges and their attire, as well as First Amendment and ethical issues regarding when and how judges can wear their robes. Part II shifts to lawyers in the courtroom, especially— but not only—women attorneys, and analyzes cases challenging judges who imposed dress codes on attorneys. Part III considers the possibility of dress in the courtroom as “disruptive” to “decorum” with an emphasis on our clients and others who appear in the courtroom but who can too often be forgotten. This section begins by discussing the historical precedent of William Penn, then the Chicago Eight trial, and then more recent controversies regarding the courtroom attire and expressions of spectators. Part IV returns to the issue of professional dress for teachers, who like attorneys once wore robes, and then interrogates the mandate of the graduation robe. The robe, like any other article of attire, can be deployed in an oppressive manner as well as a liberatory one