Interview of Keith Robinson

Wright interviews Robinson on his experiences in the mission field in Italy. The interview was conducted in Searcy, AR

Environmental capacity in the East Midlands: an evidence base fit for purpose

This report relates to the initial study into the measurement of Environmental Capacity within the East Midlands Region considering what indicators/measures of Environmental Capacity can be put into place in the near future within the region and what are the aspirations regarding longer term indicators / measures of Environmental Capacity in the region. The study involved in depth interviews with relevant employees from local authorities and other key agencies within the region covering the current data collected/used in monitoring and the possible link to the monitoring of Environmental Capacity as well as the interviewees' awareness of and attitudes towards Environmental Capacity as a monitoring tool

Economic Theory, Divided Infringement and Enforcing Interactive Patents

High tech companies – especially in the emerging areas of the Internet of Things, wearable devices, and personalized medicine – have found it difficult to enforce their patents on interactive technologies. This is especially true when multiple parties combine to perform all of the steps of a claimed method. This problem is referred to as joint or divided infringement, and some commentators advocate that “interactive” patents susceptible to divided infringement should not be enforced. In contrast, this article argues that economic theory supports the enforcement of interactive patents. Previous papers have analyzed divided infringement problems from a doctrinal and policy perspective. This article is the first to analyze divided infringement from an economic perspective, using three prevalent economic theories of the patent system. Uniquely, all three prevalent economic theories of the patent system – (1) reward theory, (2) prospect theory, and (3) rent dissipation theory – support the enforcement of interactive patents. Reward theory is consistent with enforcing the rights of interactive patents so long as the patent system balances the social cost with the social benefit of interactive technologies. Prospect theory recommends enforcing interactive patents where it would promote an inventor’s ability to commercialize her invention free from direct competition. Finally, rent dissipation theory suggests enforcing interactive patents if it will effectively reduce the dissipation of patent rents. Viewing interactive patent enforcement through the lens of these economic theories reveals how doctrinal tests for divided infringement may align with the economic goals of the patent system. Although it is likely that the doctrinal test for divided infringement will continue to evolve, start-ups and disruptive, hi-tech companies who own interactive patents should find some guidance in the notion that the economic underpinnings of the patent system support enforcement of their interactive inventions

Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory on Emerging Technology Patents

Two cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit articulate the standards for joint infringement. In BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., the court ruled that to find liability in situations where steps of a method claim are performed by multiple parties, the entire method must be performed at the control or direction of the alleged direct infringer — the mastermind. Approximately one year later, in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit clarified that “the control or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party that are required to complete performance of a claimed method.” District courts have attempted to apply the holdings of BMC Resources and Muniauction in the two years following the Federal Circuit’s decisions. In deciding their cases, district courts have focused on how the asserted claims are drafted and the relationships between the accused infringer and third parties. Absent significant evidence of how an accused infringer controlled third parties, patent holders have found it difficult to support claims of infringement under a joint infringement theory. Further, courts have suggested that carefully drafted claims directed to a single actor would eliminate the need for patent holders to rely solely on joint infringement theory

Trade Secrets, Safe Harbors, and International Trade

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed trade agreement that establishes terms for trade and business between the United States and eleven Pacific Rim nations. The United States has withdrawn from the TPP, but interest in the agreement remains because some of its provisions serve as a template for future international trade deals. This article focuses on the TPP provisions concerning trade secrets and Internet Service Provider (ISP) Safe Harbors. While both provisions mirror U.S. law, they do lack certain safeguards. Commentators have observed that the absence of these safeguards unfairly favor the interests of large corporations and rights holders over individuals and the public. This article argues for a flexible approach that encourages participating countries to include safeguards in future trade agreements that are missing from the TPP. Adding these safeguards will balance the interests of individuals with the interests of corporations and large rights holders