Complexes of Iron(II) with silylated pentalene ligands; building blocks for homo- and heterobimetallics

A range of iron(II) complexes incorporating the silylated pentalene ligands (Pn†H = 1,4-{SiiPr3}2C8H5 and Pn† = 1,4-{SiiPr3}2C8H4) have been investigated as model molecules/building blocks for metallocene-based polymers. Six complexes have been synthesised and extensively characterised by a range of techniques, including by cyclic voltammetry and X-ray diffraction studies. Amongst these compounds are the homobimetallic [Cp∗Fe]2(μ-Pn†) which is a fused analogue of biferrocene, and the 3d/4s heterobimetallic [Cp∗Fe(η5-Pn†)][K] which forms an organometallic polymer in the solid state. DFT calculations on model mono-Fe(η5-Pn) compounds reveal the charge densities on the uncoordinated carbon atoms of the pentalene ligand, and hence the potential for incorporating these units into heteronuclear bimetallic complexes is assessed

Quality-based payment for medical groups and individual physicians

This paper measures the extent to which medical groups experience external pay-for-performance incentives based on quality and patient satisfaction and the extent to which these groups pay their primary care and specialist physicians using similar criteria. Over half (52%) of large medical groups received bonus payments from health insurance plans in the period 2006-2007 based on measures of quality and patient satisfaction. Medical groups facing external pay-for-performance incentives are more likely to pay their primary care physicians (odds ratio [OR] 4.5; p<.001) and specialists (OR 2.5; p=.07) based on quality and satisfaction. Groups facing capitation payment incentives to control costs are more likely to pay member physicians on salary and less likely to pay based on productivity (p<.001 for primary care; p<.05 for specialists) than groups paid by insurers on a fee-for-service basis

Quality-Based Payment for Medical Groups and Individual Physicians

This paper measures the extent to which medical groups experience external pay-for-performance incentives based on quality and patient satisfaction and the extent to which these groups pay their primary care and specialist physicians using similar criteria. Over half (52%) of large medical groups received bonus payments from health insurance plans in the period 2006–2007 based on measures of quality and patient satisfaction. Medical groups facing external pay-for-performance incentives are more likely to pay their primary care physicians (odds ratio [OR] 4.5; p<.001) and specialists (OR 2.5; p=.07) based on quality and satisfaction. Groups facing capitation payment incentives to control costs are more likely to pay member physicians on salary and less likely to pay based on productivity (p<.001 for primary care; p<.05 for specialists) than groups paid by insurers on a fee-for-service basis