255 research outputs found
Reliabilism and Relativism
Process reliabilism says that a belief is justified iff the belief-forming process that produced it is sufficiently reliable. But any token belief-forming process is an instance of a number of different belief-forming process types. The problem of specifying the relevant type is known as the âgenerality problemâ for process reliabilism. This paper proposes a broadly relativist solution to the generality problem. The thought is that the relevant belief-forming process type is relative to the context. While the basic idea behind the solution is from Mark Heller (1995), the solution defended here departs from Heller on a crucial point. Because of this departure, my solution avoids a serious problem with Hellerâs solution
The Disappearance of Ignorance
Keith DeRoseâs new book The Appearance of Ignorance is a welcome companion volume to his 2009 book The Case for Contextualism. Where latter focused on contextualism as a view in the philosophy of language, the former focuses on how contextualism contributes to our understanding of some perennial epistemological problems, with the skeptical problem being the main focus of six of the seven chapters. DeRoseâs view is that a solution to the skeptical problem must do two things. First, it must explain how it is that we can know lots of things, such as that we have hands. Second, it must explain how it can seem that we donât know these things. In slogan form, DeRoseâs argument is that a contextualist semantics for knowledge attributions is needed to account for the âappearance of ignoranceââthe appearance that we donât know that skeptical hypotheses fail to obtain. In my critical discussion, I will argue inter alia that we donât need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the âstrengthâ of the appearance of ignorance is unclear, as is the need for a philosophical diagnosis of it
Clifford and the Common Epistemic Norm
This paper develops a âCliffordianâ argument for a common epistemic norm governing belief, action, and assertion. The idea is that beliefs are the sorts of things that lead to actions and assertions. What each of us believes influences what we act on and assert, and in turn influences what those around us believe, act on, and assert. Belief, action, and assertion should be held to a common epistemic norm because, otherwise, this system will become contaminated. The paper finishes by drawing out the relativistic implications of the Cliffordian argument
No Epistemic Trouble for Engineering âWomanâ
In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslangerâs âengineeringâ approach to gender concepts such as âwomanâ faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all conceptsâgender concepts includedâis to represent the world, but Haslangerâs engineering account of âwomanâ fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesnât include all women in the extension of the concept âwoman.â I argue that this objection fails because the primary function of gender conceptsâand social kind concepts in generalâis not to represent the world, but rather to shape it. I finish by considering the consequences for âconceptual engineeringâ in philosophy more generally. While Haslangerâs account may escape Simionâs objection, other appeals to conceptual engineering might not fair so well
Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief
Recent work in psychology on âcultural cognitionâ suggests that our cultural background drives our attitudes towards a range of politically contentious issues in science such as global warming. This work is part of a more general attempt to investigate the ways in which our wants, wishes and desires impact on our assessments of information, events and theories. Put crudely, the idea is that we conform our assessments of the evidence for and against scientific theories with clear political relevance to our pre-existing political beliefs and convictions. In this paper I explore the epistemological consequences of cultural cognition. What does it mean for the rationality of our beliefs about issues such as global warming? I argue for an unsettling conclusion. Not only are those on the âpolitical rightâ who reject the scientific consensus on issues like global warming unjustified in doing so, some of those on the âpolitical leftâ who accept the consensus are also unjustified in doing so. I finish by addressing the practical implications of my conclusions
Assertion, action, and context
A common objection to both contextualism and relativism about knowledge ascriptions is that they threaten knowledge norms of assertion and action. Consequently, if there is good reason to accept knowledge norms of assertion or action, there is good reason to reject both contextualism and relativism. In this paper we argue that neither contextualism nor relativism threaten knowledge norms of assertion or action
Sosa versus Kornblith on Grades of Knowledge
In a series of works Ernest Sosa (see Sosa 1991, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2015, 2017) has defended the view that there are two kinds or âgradesâ of knowledge, animal and reflective. One of the most persistent critics of Sosaâs attempts to bifurcate knowledge is Hilary Kornblith (see Kornblith 2004, 2009, 2012). Our aim in this paper is to outline and evaluate Kornblithâs criticisms. We will argue that, while they raise a range of difficult (exegetical and substantive) questions about Sosaâs âbi-levelâ epistemology, Sosa has the resources to adequately respond to all of them. Thus, this paper is a (qualified) defence of Sosaâs bi-level epistemology
Epistemic contextualism defended
Epistemic contextualists think that the extension of the expression âknowsâ depends on and varies with the context of utterance. In the last 15 years or so this view has faced intense criticism. This paper focuses on two sorts of objections. The first are what I call the âlinguistic objectionsâ, which purport to show that the best available linguistic evidence suggests that âknowsâ is not context-sensitive. The second is what I call the âdisagreement problemâ, which concerns the behaviour of âknowsâ in disagreement reports. These may not be the only objections to epistemic contextualism, but they are probably the most influential. I argue that the best current epistemic contextualist response to the linguistic objection is incomplete, and I show how it can be supplemented to deal with the full range of linguistic objections. I also develop a new solution to the disagreement problem. The upshot is that neither sort of objection gives us any reason to reject epistemic contextualism. This conclusion is, in a sense, negativeâno new arguments for epistemic contextualism are advancedâbut itâs a vital step towards rehabilitating the vie
Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology
This paper is about two topics: metaepistemological absolutism and the epistemic principles governing perceptual warrant. Our aim is to highlightâby taking the debate between dogmatists and conservativists about perceptual warrant as a case studyâa surprising and hitherto unnoticed problem with metaepistemological absolutism, at least as it has been influentially defended by Paul Boghossian (Fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006a) as the principal metaepistemological contrast point to relativism. What we find is that the metaepistemological commitments at play on both sides of this dogmatism/conservativism debate do not line up with epistemic relativism nor do they line up with absolutism, at least as Boghossian articulates this position. What this case study reveals is the need in metaepistemological option space for the recognition of a weaker and less tendentious form of absolutism, what we call âenvironment relativismâ. On this view, epistemic principles are knowable, objective, and they can serve as the basis of particular epistemic evaluations, but their validity is relative to the wider global environment in which they are applied
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