Analysis of Collectivism and Egoism Phenomena within the Context of Social Welfare

Comparative benefits provided by the basic social strategies including collectivism and egoism are investigated within the framework of democratic decision-making. In particular, we study the mechanism of growing "snowball" of cooperation.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures. Translated from Russian. Original Russian Text published in Problemy Upravleniya, 2008, No. 4, pp. 30-3

An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem

Trockel W. An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem. Economic Theory. 1992;2(2):298-302.The paper presents an alternative short proof for the linear utility representation theorem. In particular a generalization of the theorem of Blackwell and Girshick (1954) and a special case of the theorem of Herstein and Milnor (1953) are proved by exploiting the topological group structure of finite-dimensional Euclidean vector space

Aversion to inequality in Italy and its determinants

The main goal of this paper is to estimate the preferences of the Italian society towards equity in order to verify whether preferences (i) have changed across the years, and (ii) can be related to specific socio-demographic characteristics. Introducing equity concerns in the implementation of economic policies is a fundamental problem faced by both economists and policy makers. This paper uses a social welfare function à la Jorgenson and Slesnick to estimate society’s aversion towards inequality by implement in a voting scheme for compiling individuals’ equity preferences in to a social choice by majority rule. The results show that preferences are highly polarized toward a low and a high concern for equity aversion and that this concern is significantly related with several sociodemographic characteristics. Among them, income plays an important role with richer people tending to favor less equity. Results also show that preferences towards equity have changed across the years. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2005inequality, majority rule, social welfare function, voting scheme,

Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good

Utilitarian welfare maximization, Admission rules for excludable public goods, Randomization in optimal mechanisms, D61, D63, H21, H41,

Aversion to inequality in Italy and its determinants

The main goal of this paper is to estimate the preferences of the Italian society towards equity in order to verify whether preferences (i) have changed across the years, and (ii) can be related to specific socio-demographic characteristics. Introducing equity concerns in the implementation of economic policies is a fundamental problem faced by both economists and policy makers. This paper uses a social welfare function à la Jorgenson and Slesnick to estimate society’s aversion towards inequality by implementing a voting scheme for compiling individuals’ equity preferences into a social choice by majority rule. The results show that preferences are highly polarized toward a low and a high concern for equity aversion and that this concern is significantly related with several sociodemographic characteristics. Among them, income plays an important role with richer people tending to favor less equity. Results also show that preferences towards equity have changed across the years. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004inequality, majority rule, social welfare function, voting scheme,

Behaviour, preferences and cities: urban theory and urban resurgence

The resurgence of big, old cities and their regions is real, but it is merely a part of a broader pattern of urban change in the developed countries, whose broadest tendency is urban emergence, including suburbanisation, and movements of population to certain 'Sunbelt' regions. The problem is that it is difficult to accommodate explanation of both resurgence and emergence using the main explanations in the field today. These include: theories of the knowledge or creative economy, urban amenities, diversity and tolerance, and urban beauty. In most of their common specifications, they do well for either resurgent or emergent cities, but not for both at the same time. This suggests that these ideas, interesting as they are, require much greater specification and, in some cases, overhaul, in order to offer satisfactory responses to the diversity of patterns of urban growth. By examining some of these deficiencies, we conclude that urban theory needs a better understanding of urban choice behaviours and especially the effects of bundling, the limits to preference substitutions and the relationship between past and present preferences, in order to become fully effective in explaining urban resurgence and urban emergence. When these aspects of choice and preference are better integrated into urban theory, then the 'exogenous' causes of urbanisation can be made more endogenous and, in addition, they can be applied better to both emergence and resurgence. Urban research can, by so doing, also potentially become more policy-relevant

Inefficient households and the mix of government spending

A model is presented in which individuals can vote over government subsidies to a private good and over redistributive taxation. The subsidized good is purchased and shared by couples who act noncooperatively, while possibly being altruistic towards each other. The framework allows a separation of the subsidy policy from redistributive policy. In a majority voting equilibrium the subsidy is used exclusively to correct the individuals' spending pattern. The results suggest that spending on private goods should be an important item in government expenditures when there is strong positive income bias in the political process and/or when household decisions are relatively inefficient. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Family behavior{, Public Policy, Government expenditure mix,