Fame

No country in the world is so driven by personality as is the United States. Since 1953, when the right of publicity first received explicit legal recognition, courts, legislatures, and academicians have become increasingly interested in the doctrine\u27s application and scope. Noticeably absent from virtually all of the judicial opinions and the volume of legal commentary on the right of publicity, however, is any consideration of the sociological and cultural influences that have prompted the doctrine\u27s initial recognition and increasing application. The right of publicity has come under attack recently on the ground that it eliminates important semiotic material from the public domain. Critics of the right of publicity charge that allowing celebrities to control the meanings of their constructed personas deprives us all of the ability to recode or reinterpret these texts for our own personal expression. This Article contends that once the historical, sociological, and cultural influences are duly considered, the right of publicity\u27s place in our legal system becomes more defensible, both theoretially and practically. On the whole, relatively little research exists on the underlying causes of the fame phenomenon in the United States. Moreover, the existing works do not attempt to illuminate the right of publicity in light of the complex explanations underlying our fascination with fame. This Article undertakes such an examination and demonstrates that the right of publicity is consistent not only with our cultural fabric and history, but also with our legal conceptions of property. In addition, this Article explores the socially based criticisms of the right of publicity, and finds them insufficient to negate the well-deserved status of the right of publicity as a property right

Creativity and Cultural Influence in Early Jewish Law

The article discusses various aspects of creativity in early Jewish law, including the fundamental tenets of the Jewish legal system, the relationship between the law and culture, and acculturation in 21st century communities. The author states that a cultural analysis will provide insight into how evolution in the Jewish law can ensure Jewish survival. She argues that halakhah, also known as Jewish religious law, has been formed by various Jewish and non-Jewish cultural developments

Creativity and Cultural Influence in Early Jewish Law

The article discusses various aspects of creativity in early Jewish law, including the fundamental tenets of the Jewish legal system, the relationship between the law and culture, and acculturation in 21st century communities. The author states that a cultural analysis will provide insight into how evolution in the Jewish law can ensure Jewish survival. She argues that halakhah, also known as Jewish religious law, has been formed by various Jewish and non-Jewish cultural developments

The Attibution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section 43(A)

The human impulse for attribution symbolizes the linkage between an author and her creative work. In many countries, authors are afforded a right of attribution as part of a broader doctrine known as moral rights. The United States, however, does not adequately protect moral rights. This Article focuses exclusively on the right of attribution as one component of the moral rights doctrine. Initially, it examines the connection between copyright law and the right of attribution and establishes the inadequacy of the current copyright law as a means of safeguarding the right of attribution. Next, it addresses why section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which frequently has been hailed as a viable substitute for the right of attribution, is an inadequate safeguard for the attribution interest. The underlying theme of this Article is that because United States\u27 copyright law and section 43(a) are grounded in objectives other than the personality and non-monetary interests with which the right of attribution is concerned, the federal enactment of a right of attribution applicable to a broad category of copyrightable works is vital. The adoption of this approach is necessary for protecting fully the authorial interests that currently are insufficiently addressed under our legal system. Such explicit recognition for a right of attribution can be accomplished with a relatively minimal degree of controversy and disruption to our current legal fabric

Response to Zadoff on Kwall

In The Cultural Analysis Paradigm: Women and Synagogue Ritual as a Case Study, I demonstrate that a cultural analysis of halakhah views the norms of female ritualistic participation concerning being called to, and reading from the Torah as the result of environment, conditioning, history, and context, rather than as an unalterable mandate. To my knowledge, the idea that halakhah should be understood through a cultural analysis lens has not previously been explored in either the legal or Jewish studies literature. The paradigm developed in the Article was based on an extensive review of the cultural analysis literature and represents an original attempt to identify the major themes in the writings of those scholars who rely on a more culturally nuanced approach to the law. Toward that end, I identified five factors that explain the relationship between law and culture. The last factor, the interrelationship between law and culture, illustrates that law and culture are deeply intertwined and cannot be separated from one another. In fact, the Article emphasizes that this factor is “the most all-encompassing characteristic” of my cultural analysis paradigm, and it features an extensive analysis of this interconnection in the context of women publicly reading from the Torah and receiving aliyyot. Surprisingly, however, this fundamental premise did not resonate with Mr. Zadoff in his critique. Instead, he claims that my assessment classifies “the cultural as something external to the law.” To set the record straight, my Article argues that the cultural and the legal are deeply embedded with one another

Hoisting Originality: A Response

This commentary originally appeared as part of the inaugural Virtual Workshop sponsored by the Intellectual Property Institute at the University of Richmond School of Law. The workshop featured a paper entitled Hoisting Originality (now published at Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 31, p. 451, 2009) by Professor Joseph Miller, along with two commentaries on the paper. My commentary examines and responds to Miller\u27s argument that the standard for copyright law\u27s originality requirement should be hoisted and thus analogized to that present in patent law