A systematics of deontic action logics based on Boolean algebra

Within the scope of interest of deontic logic, systems in which names of actions are arguments of deontic operators (deontic action logic) have attracted less interest than purely propositional systems. However, in our opinion, they are even more interesting from both theoretical and practical point of view. The fundament for contemporary research was established by K. Segerberg, who introduced his systems of basic deontic logic of urn model actions in early 1980s. Nowadays such logics are considered mainly within propositional dynamic logic (PDL). Two approaches can be distinguished: in one of them deontic operators are introduced using dynamic operators and the notion of violation, in the other at least some of them are taken as primitive. The second approach may be further divided into the systems based on Boolean algebra of actions and the systems built on the top of standard PDL.In the present paper we are interested in the systems of deontic action logic based on Boolean algebra. We present axiomatizations of six systems and set theoretical models for them. We also show the relations among them and the position of some existing theories on the resulting picture. Such a presentation allows the reader to see the spectrum of possibilities of formalization of the subject

Judging Actions on the Basis of Prima Facie Duties. The case of self-driving cars

The need for a logic that allows us to reason about conflicting and non-conflicting norms has recently emerged in the domain of self-driving cars. In this paper we propose a formal model that supports moral decisions making by autonomous agents such as for example autonomous vehicles. Such a model – which we call a “Deontic Machine” – helps resolve both typical and atypical moral and legal situations that agents may encounter. The Deontic Machine has two sources of inspiration. The first one is W.D. Ross’s theory of prima facie norms and the other one is a deontic multi-valued logic. The main contribution of this paper is bringing together conceptual and technical tools of deontic logic to show how they can be used to control or assess the behaviour of a self-driving car

A Unified Logical Framework for Reasoning about Deontic Properties of Actions and States

This paper studies some normative relations that hold between actions, their preconditions and their effects, with particular attention to connecting what are often called ‘ought to be’ norms with ‘ought to do’ norms. We use a formal model based on a form of transition system called a ‘coloured labelled transition system’ (coloured LTS) introduced in a series of papers by Sergot and Craven. Those works have variously presented a formalism (an ‘action language’) nC+ for defining and computing with a (coloured) LTS, and another, separate formalism, a modal language interpreted on a (coloured) LTS used to express its properties. We consolidate these two strands. Instead of specifying the obligatory and prohibited states and transitions as part of the construction of a coloured LTS as in nC+, we represent norms in the modal language and use those to construct a coloured LTS from a given regular (uncoloured) one. We also show how connections between norms on states and norms on transitions previously treated as fixed constraints of a coloured LTS can instead be defined within the modal language used for representing norms

Ontologie w historyczno-geograficznych systemach informacyjnych

Pozna

The Discussion about the Truth Value of Norms. Logic of Norms and Deontic Logic

The main purpose of this paper was the trial to answer the question if norms can function as premises or conclusions in logical inferences. According to definition of logical inference, the parts of its may be only sentences (in indicative mood) which are true or false. The logic, which accepts that norms are the true and false propositions, can be named the Logic of Norms. Otherwise the logic, which reject that norms are true and false propositions, we name Deontic Logic. The last one, in order to use the logical inference, changes each of norms N into normative sentences: ‘N exists’ or ‘N exists for the sake of set of norms’. The normative sentences are sentences in indicative mood and thereby are true or false. The whole consideration about two types aforementioned logic is preceded by some remarks about variety of the meanings of the word ‘norm’, the linguistic structures of norm and the views of the truth value of norms

ABOUT THE PUTTING NAMES TO OBJECTS, I.E. HOW TADEUSZ KOTARBIŃSKI TEACHES UNDERSTAND STANISŁAW LEŚNIEWSKI’S ONTOLOGY

This article presents an attempt to fund Ontology of StanisOaw Leeniewski on a simple theory with one primitive relation “being denoted by”. Developed theory shows that to the linguistic model of the Ontology can belong only such general names that in their extensions have at least two objects (references) denoted by individual names.Artykuł jest próbą ufundowania małej, elementarnej Ontologii Stanisława Leśniewskiego na prostej teorii relacji „podpadania przedmiotu pod nazwę”. Skonstruowana teoria pokazuje, że do lingwistycznego modelu Ontologii mogą należeć tylko takie nazwy ogólne, które maja co najmniej dwa desygnaty mające swoje nazwy indywidualne

'Setna' - Simple Theory of Norms and Actions

In the first systems of deontic logic obligatoriness, prohibitiveness and permissibility were features of actions. It was a very natural choice, corresponding to the way in which these concepts were used not only in natural language but also in Law and Ethics. It's well known that contemporary systems of deontic logics do not deal with actions any more. They are simply deontic logics of propositions providing for deontic qualification of states of affairs. Such an approach, although might be useful for instance in Computer Science (especially in security applications, where there is a need of expressing that a certain state of machine is, say, permitted and the other is forbidden), is inadequate for modeling norms of Law and Ethics (and possibly norms of many other fields). In this paper the Simple Theory of Norms and Actions (in short: Setna) is proposed. It is inspired by the first deontic logics, i.e. it's deontic operators take names of actions as their arguments. Additionally this theory has as its part a theory of actions which has not been taken into account in deontic logic until now. Enriching deontic theory with a theory of action gives an account for expressing dependencies which hold between the deontic properties and some other properties of actions. For instance Setna states that two actions that cannot be carried out simultaneously in the same situation should not be both regulated as obligatory-an agent would not be able to follow such a law

Contribution to the Cognitive Value of Systems of Logic of Agency

In this article the two approaches towards representation of action, namely the Anselmian and Davidsonian ones, are described and compared. Especially the ontological commitment of the two approaches are brought to light. The central problem of the paper is the question of adequacy of these approaches to representation of actions