Bias in judgement: Comparing individuals and groups

The relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases is considered. An overview of the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern. However, a theoretical analysis employing J. H. Davis's (1973) social decision scheme (SDS) model reveals that the relative magnitude of individual and group bias depends upon several factors, including group size, initial individual judgment, the magnitude of bias among individuals, the type of bias, and most of all, the group-judgment process. It is concluded that there can be no simple answer to the question, "Which are more biased, individuals or groups?," but the SDS model offers a framework for specifying some of the conditions under which individuals are both more and less biased than groups

Should Sixth Grade be in Elementary or Middle School? An Analysis of Grade Configuration and Student Behavior

Using administrative data on public school students in North Carolina, we find that sixth grade students attending middle schools are much more likely to be cited for discipline problems than those attending elementary school. That difference remains after adjusting for the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the students and their schools. Furthermore, the higher infraction rates recorded by sixth graders who are placed in middle school persist at least through ninth grade. A plausible explanation is that sixth graders are at an especially impressionable age; in middle school, the exposure to older peers and the relative freedom from supervision have deleterious consequences.

Amicus Brief: Kumho Tire v. Carmichael

This brief addresses the issue of jury performance and jury responses to expert testimony. It reviews and summaries a substantial body of research evidence about jury behavior that has been produced over the past quarter century. The great weight of that evidence challenges the view that jurors abdicate their responsibilities as fact finders when faced with expert evidence or that they are pro-plaintiff, anti-defendant, and anti-business. The Petitioners and amici on behalf of petitioners make a number of overlapping, but empirically unsupported, assertions about jury behavior in response to expert testimony, namely that juries are frequently incapable of critically evaluation expert testimony, are easily confused, give inordinate weight to expert testimony, are awed by science, defer to the opinions of unreliable experts, and, implicitly, that in civil trials juries tilt in favor of plaintiffs and against corporations