Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity and dynamic multiple equilibria

In a plain-vanilla New Keynesian model with two-period staggered price-setting, discretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. Complementarity between the pricing decisions of forward-looking firms underlies the multiplicity, which is intrinsically dynamic in nature. At each point in time, the discretionary monetary authority optimally accommodates the level of predetermined prices when setting the money supply because it is concerned solely about real activity. Hence, if other firms set a high price in the current period, an individual firm will optimally choose a high price because it knows that the monetary authority next period will accommodate with a high money supply. Under commitment, the mechanism generating complementarity is absent: the monetary authority commits not to respond to future predetermined prices. Multiple equilibria also arise in other similar contexts where (i) a policymaker cannot commit, and (ii) forward-looking agents determine a state variable to which future policy respond. JEL Klassifikation: E5, E61, D7

Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria

In a plain-vanilla New Keynesian model with two-period staggered price-setting, discretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. Complementarity between the pricing decisions of forward-looking firms underlies the multiplicity, which is intrinsically dynamic in nature. At each point in time, the discretionary monetary authority optimally accommodates the level of predetermined prices when setting the money supply because it is concerned solely about real activity. Hence, if other firms set a high price in the current period, an individual firm will optimally choose a high price because it knows that the monetary authority next period will accommodate with a high money supply. Under commitment, the mechanism generating complementarity is absent: the monetary authority commits not to respond to future predetermined prices. We compute a traditional inflation bias equilibrium, in which price-setters are optimistic, rationally expecting small adjustments by other firms. But there is another steady-state equilibrium in which price setters are pessimistic and inflation is much higher. Further, we find that there are multiple equilibria at a point in time, not just in steady states. In a stochastic setting with equilibrium selection each period determined by an i.i.d. sunspot, there is greater inflation bias on average than if price-setters were always optimistic. The sunspot realization also has real effects: periods of higher than average inflation are accompanied by low output. Thus, increased real volatility may be an additional cost of discretion in monetary policy.

PROBABILISTIC PRICE FORECASTS BASED ON COMMODITY OPTION VALUES

Demand and Price Analysis,

Inflation targeting in a St. Louis model of the 21st century

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ; Inflation (Finance)

Monetary discretion, pricing complementarity and dynamic multiple equilibria

In a plain-vanilla New Keynesian model with two-period staggered price-setting, discretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. Complementarity between pricing decisions of forward-looking firms underlies the multiplicity, which is intrinsically dynamic in nature. At each point in time, the discretionary monetary authority optimally accommodates the level of predetermined prices when setting the money supply because it is concerned solely about real activity. Hence, if other firms set a high price in the current period, an individual firm will optimally choose a high price because it knows that the monetary authority next period will accommodate with a high money supply. Under commitment, the mechanism generating complementarity is absent: the monetary authority commits not to respond to future predetermined prices. Multiple equilibria also arise in other similar contexts where (i) a policymaker cannot commit, and (ii) forward-looking agents determine a state variable to which future policy responds. JEL Classification: E5, E61, D78complementarity, discretion, monetary policy, Multiple Equilibria, time-consistency

Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria

In a plain-vanilla New Keynesian model with two-period staggered price-setting, discretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. Complementarity between the pricing decisions of forward-looking firms underlies the multiplicity, which is intrinsically dynamic in nature. At each point in time, the discretionary monetary authority optimally accommodates the level of predetermined prices when setting the money supply because it is concerned solely about real activity. Hence, if other firms set a high price in the current period, an individual firm will optimally choose a high price because it knows that the monetary authority next period will accommodate with a high money supply. Under commitment, the mechanism generating complementarity is absent: the monetary authority commits not to respond to future predetermined prices. Multiple equilibria also arise in other similar contexts where (i) a policymaker cannot commit, and (ii) forward-looking agents determine a state variable to which future policy responds.Monetary Policy, Discretion, Time-Consistency, Multiple Equilibria, Complementarity

High-extinction-ratio resonant cavity polarizer for quantum-optics measurements

The use of a high-finesse Fabry-Perot ring cavity with an odd number of reflections as a high-extinction-ratio resonant polarizer is shown. Experimental results from quantum-noise measurements using resonant cavities as spatial and spectral filters and precision polarizers are presented

SEQUENTIAL REGRESSION: A FLEXIBLE TOOL FOR TIME SERIES MODELING

Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,

Optimal monetary policy

Optimal monetary policy maximizes the welfare of a representative agent, given frictions in the economic environment. Constructing a model with two broad sets of frictions — costly price adjustment by imperfectly competitive firms and costly exchange of wealth for goods — we find optimal monetary policy is governed by two familar principles. ; First, the average level of the nominal interest rate should be sufficiently low, as suggested by Milton Friedman, that there should be deflation on average. Yet, the Keynesian frictions imply that the optimal nominal interest rate is positive. ; Second, as various shocks occur to the real and monetary sectors, the price level should be largely stabilized, as suggested by Irving Fisher, albeit around a deflationary trend path. (In modern language, there is only small “base drift” for the price level path as various shocks arise). Since expected inflation is roughly constant through time, the nominal interest rate must therefore vary with the Fisherian determinants of the real interest rate, i.e., with expected growth or contraction of real economic activity. ; Although the monetary authority has substantial leverage over real activity in our model economy, it chooses real allocations that closely resemble those that would occur if prices were flexible. In our benchmark model, we also find some tendency for the monetary authority to smooth nominal and real interest rates.Monetary policy