A critical period of Corticomuscular and EMG-EMG coherence detection in 9-25 week old healthy infants

The early postnatal development of functional corticospinal connections in human infants is not fully clarified. We used EEG and EMG to investigate the development of corticomuscular and intramuscular coherence as indicators of functional corticospinal connectivity in healthy infants aged 1-66 weeks. EEG was recorded over leg and hand area of motor cortex. EMG recordings were made from right ankle dorsiflexor and right wrist extensor muscles. Quantification of the amount of corticomuscular coherence in the 20-40 Hz frequency band showed a significantly larger coherence for infants aged 9-25 weeks compared to younger and older infants. Coherence between paired EMG recordings from Tibialis anterior muscle in the 20-40 Hz frequency band was also significantly larger for the 9-25 week age group. A low amplitude, broad-duration (40-50 ms) central peak of EMG-EMG synchronization was observed for infants younger than 9 weeks, whereas a short-lasting (10-20 ms) central peak was observed for EMG-EMG synchronization in older infants. This peak was largest for infants in between 9-25 weeks. These data suggest that the corticospinal drive to lower and upper limb muscles shows significant developmental changes with an increase in functional coupling in infants aged 9-25 weeks, a period which coincides partly with the developmental period of normal fidgety movements. We propose that these neurophysiological findings may reflect the existence of a sensitive period where the functional connections between corticospinal tract fibres and spinal motoneurones undergo activity-dependent reorganization. This may be relevant for the timing of early therapy interventions in infants with pre- and peri-natal brain injury

Altered sense of Agency in children with spastic cerebral palsy

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Children diagnosed with spastic Cerebral Palsy (CP) often show perceptual and cognitive problems, which may contribute to their functional deficit. Here we investigated if altered ability to determine whether an observed movement is performed by themselves (sense of agency) contributes to the motor deficit in children with CP.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Three groups; ₁₎CP children, ₂₎healthy peers, and ₃₎healthy adults produced straight drawing movements on a pen-tablet which was not visible for the subjects. The produced movement was presented as a virtual moving object on a computer screen. Subjects had to evaluate after each trial whether the movement of the object on the computer screen was generated by themselves or by a computer program which randomly manipulated the visual feedback by angling the trajectories 0, 5, 10, 15, 20 degrees away from target.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Healthy adults executed the movements in 310 seconds, whereas healthy children and especially CP children were significantly slower (p < 0.002) (on average 456 seconds and 543 seconds respectively). There was also a statistical difference between the healthy and age matched CP children (p = 0.037). When the trajectory of the object generated by the computer corresponded to the subject's own movements all three groups reported that they were responsible for the movement of the object. When the trajectory of the object deviated by more than 10 degrees from target, healthy adults and children more frequently than CP children reported that the computer was responsible for the movement of the object. CP children consequently also attempted to compensate more frequently from the perturbation generated by the computer.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>We conclude that CP children have a reduced ability to determine whether movement of a virtual moving object is caused by themselves or an external source. We suggest that this may be related to a poor integration of their intention of movement with visual and proprioceptive information about the performed movement and that altered sense of agency may be an important functional problem in children with CP.</p

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences. Mindfulness meditation centrally involves awareness of intentions and is associated with improved metacognitive access to intentions. Therefore, mindfulness meditators and highly hypnotizable people may lie at opposite ends of a spectrum with regard to metacognitive access to intention‐related information. Here we review the theoretical background and evidence for differences in the metacognition of intentions in these groups, as revealed by chronometric measures of the awareness of voluntary action: the timing of an intention to move (Libet's “W” judgments) and the compressed perception of time between an intentional action and its outcome (“intentional binding”). We review these measures and critically evaluate their proposed connection to the experience of volition and sense of agency

Instrumental Divergence and the Value of Control

A critical aspect of flexible choice is that alternative actions yield distinct consequences: Only when available action alternatives produce distinct outcome states does discrimination and selection between actions allow an agent to flexibly obtain the currently most desired outcome. Here, we use instrumental divergence – the degree to which alternative actions differ with respect to their outcome probability distributions – as an index of flexible instrumental control, and assess the influence of this novel decision variable on choice preference. In Experiment 1, when other decision variables, such as expected value and outcome entropy, were held constant, we found a significant preference for high instrumental divergence. In Experiment 2, we used an “auto- vs. self-play” manipulation to eliminate outcome diversity as a source of behavioral preferences, and to contrast flexible instrumental control with the complete absence of voluntary choice. Our results suggest that flexible instrumental control over decision outcomes may have intrinsic value