Hedge Funds and Risk Decoupling: The Empty Voting Problem in the European Union

The law must remain adaptive and responsive to the constantly changing challenges of our society and our business life. One of the most pressing challenges of the past years is the emergence of alternative investment funds, in particular hedge funds, which masterfully exploit the traditional categories of corporate law, financial derivatives, and risk management. This Article is only concerned with the first of these two forms— negative decoupling.9 It looks at the various forms of negative riskdecoupling strategies and tries to shed light on their overall desirability. Three distinct theoretical perspectives are used as an analytical framework to examine the vast challenges of risk-decoupling: (1) a classical agency costs approach; (2) an information costs perspective; and (3) a view from corporate finance. This Article argues that shareholders with hedged risk exposure do not correspond to the traditional market expectations of shareholders. Based on the insight developed from these policy perspectives, this article develops regulatory reform proposals, particularly with regard to the EU context

Keeping up with Innovation: Designing a European Sandbox for Fintech. CEPS ECMI Commentary no 58 | January 2019

In the aftermath of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, regulators in all major jurisdictions introduced significant new requirements for financial firms. Certainly justified in purpose, these regulations have increased market barriers, both directly through specific obligations, and indirectly through the sheer magnitude and complexity they involve. Regulators primarily focused on bolstering financial stability and consumer protection, while frequently disregarding their objective of promoting financial innovation. Ten years after the crisis, we believe that it is time to reconsider the appropriate balance between those objectives. In this commentary, we show how EU financial regulation may stifle the innovation of financial services. We use the example of automated investment advice, so-called ‘robo-advisors’, and we show how a proper balance between regulatory objectives could be achieved through establishing a ‘guided’ regulatory sandbox

Investor-led sustainability in corporate governance

The transition to a sustainable economy currently involves a fundamental transformation of our capital markets. Lawmakers, in an attempt to overcome this challenge, frequently seek to prescribe and regulate how firms may address environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns by formulating conduct standards. Deviating from this conceptual starting point, the present paper makes the case for another path towards achieving greater sustainability in capital markets, namely through the empowerment of investors. This trust in the market itself is grounded in various recent developments both on the supply side and the demand side of financial markets, and also in the increasing tendency of institutional investors to engage in common ownership. The need to build coalitions among different types of asset managers or institutional investors, and to convince fellow investors of a given initiative, can then act as an in-built filter helping to overcome the pursuit of idiosyncratic motives and supporting only those campaigns that are seconded by a majority of investors. In particular, institutionalized investor platforms have emerged over recent years as a force for investor empowerment, serving to coordinate investor campaigns and to share the costs of engagement. ESG engagement has the potential to become a very powerful driver towards a more sustainability-oriented future. Indeed, I show that investor-led sustainability has many advantages compared to a more prescriptive, regulatory approach where legislatures are in the driver’s seat. For example, a focus on investor-led priorities would follow a more flexible and dynamic pattern rather than complying with inflexible pre-defined criteria. Moreover, investor-promoted assessments are not likely to impair welfare creation in the same way as ill-defined legal standards; they will also not trigger regulatory arbitrage and would avoid deadlock situations in corporate decision-making. Any regulatory activity should then be limited to a facilitative and supportive role

The European Company Statute in the context of freedom of establishment

One of the key features of the new Europeanwide legal form “European Company” (“Societas Europaea” or “SE”) is the possibility of transferring the company’s seat from one Member State to another without having to be wound up or to re-register. As this possibility does not exist for companies formed under national law, the formation of an SE will often present the only possibility for companies to transfer their incorporation and corporate headquarters between Member States. This is a big advantage and a milestone towards the European Internal Market. However, some doubts remain as to the practicability of the system. The mandatory linkage of the head office to the registered office within the same Member State according to Article 7 of the SE Regulation is very problematic and, in light of recent ECJ decisions such as Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art, may violate EC primary legislation. Why should companies that are formed under national law be allowed to have the head office in a Member State different from their registration state, while an SE – as an instrument of Community Law and a symbol of the Internal Market – is not? Furthermore, the detailed procedural rules laid down in the Regulation are sometimes overprotective and may significantly reduce the attractiveness of the SE’s mobility. It is argued that Article 7 of the SE Regulation is secondary law that itself is inconsistent with the (primary) EC Treaty. Furthermore, the Member States also tend to be overprotective when enacting safeguard measures for the benefit of creditors, minority shareholders and employees. Here again, freedom of establishment does not allow protectionist measures that contravene the gist of the SE’s mobility.</p

Die Sitzverlegung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft

Dieses Buch untersucht die neue gemeinschaftsweit gültige Rechtsform der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft ('Societas Europaea'). Mit ihr hat der Gemeinschaftsgesetzgeber Ende 2004 ein Instrument geschaffen, dass es europäischen Großunternehmen erstmals erlaubt, eine gemeinschaftsweit einheitliche Unternehmensverfassung zu wählen. Ein besonderer Vorteil der neuen Rechtsform ist die Vereinfachung grenzüberschreitender Restrukturierungen, insbesondere der grenzüberschreitenden Sitzverlegung. Diese Möglichkeit steht Gesellschaften nationalen Rechts bisher noch nicht umfassend zu. Kollisionsrechtlich versucht sich der Gemeinschaftsgesetzgeber im Rahmen der relevanten divergierenden mitgliedstaatlichen Theorien (Sitz- und Gründungstheorie) einer Stellungnahme zu enthalten. Materiellrechtlich ist die ausführliche Regelung der Sitzverlegung einer Societas Europaea (SE) relativ restriktiv ausgefallen: so müssen beispielsweise immer gleichzeitig Sitz und Hauptverwaltung zugleich verlegt werden, was in einem Spannungsverhältnis zu der jüngeren Rechtsprechung des EuGH steht (Überseering, Inspire Art). Außerdem wird den Schutzanliegen von betroffenen Kreisen wie Gläubigern und Aktionären Rechnung getragen. Den Mitgliedstaaten steht es zudem frei, zusätzliche Schutzmaßnahmen zu schaffen. Der Autor untersucht grundlegend aus kollisions- und sachrechtlicher Perspektive, ob das geschaffene Sitzverlegungsregime den Anforderungen an eine genuin gemeinschaftsrechtliche Rechtsform gerecht wird, insbesondere ob es mit den dem EG-Vertrag zugrundeliegenden Grundfreiheiten in Einklang steht