Mechanism Choice

This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research. Document is the author\u27s manuscrip

Guidance applications of a quasi-optimum control technique Final report

Quasi-optimal control technique for orbital injection guidanc

Mechanism Choice

Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure rules for social behavior. Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as “an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes” (Maskin 2008: 568). In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with “instrument choice” or policy design. The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success or failure as the intended policy outcome. Good intentions or objectives are not enough: the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures, matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue areas, governance systems, and time. Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies –legislatures, executive agencies, and courts – that are comprised of individuals with their own policy preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying, campaign contributions, and elections. Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the ones that best pursue the public interest. This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including the legal literature on instrument choice and the economics literature on mechanism design. It then moves to a more detailed discussion of positive mechanism choice, also called public choice, political economy, or positive politics. This positive literature explores how political institutions and pressures shape the selection of mechanisms to implement policy, notably when the selected instrument departs from the normative ideal. The positive study of mechanism choice not only informs how political processes shape policy outcomes, but also sheds useful insights into those processes themselves.

Do We Know Who We Are By Knowing Who We Are Not?: The Effects of Including Disliked Others in the Self-Concept

People include other people in their self-concept. Research has examined the causes and effects of including liked, but not disliked others into the self-concept. Liked others are included because of a motivation to affiliate and get closer to the other person. The current investigation examined whether disliked others are included as a result of a motivation to differentiate and distinguish oneself from the other person. It also examined how self-concept inclusion of disliked others affects self-concept clarity. First, I tested whether people include disliked others into their self-concepts by showing a memory bias for disliked others similar to that of liked others (Study 1). Liked others, but not disliked others or acquaintances, showed this memory bias. Next, I tested whether people were motivated to differentiate themselves from disliked others by measuring whether they had slower reaction times when characterizing the self with traits similar to those of disliked others (Study 2). I did not find this effect. Finally, neither study showed a mediating effect of self-concept clarity. These results failed to show support for the hypothesis that disliked others are included in the self-concept and that including others in the self affects self-concept clarity