22 research outputs found

    Lack of Cross-Scale Linkages Reduces Robustness of Community-Based Fisheries Management

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    Community-based management and the establishment of marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as means to overcome overexploitation of fisheries. Yet, researchers and managers are divided regarding the effectiveness of these measures. The “tragedy of the commons” model is often accepted as a universal paradigm, which assumes that unless managed by the State or privatized, common-pool resources are inevitably overexploited due to conflicts between the self-interest of individuals and the goals of a group as a whole. Under this paradigm, the emergence and maintenance of effective community-based efforts that include cooperative risky decisions as the establishment of marine reserves could not occur. In this paper, we question these assumptions and show that outcomes of commons dilemmas can be complex and scale-dependent. We studied the evolution and effectiveness of a community-based management effort to establish, monitor, and enforce a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico. Our findings build on social and ecological research before (1997–2001), during (2002) and after (2003–2004) the establishment of marine reserves, which included participant observation in >100 fishing trips and meetings, interviews, as well as fishery dependent and independent monitoring. We found that locally crafted and enforced harvesting rules led to a rapid increase in resource abundance. Nevertheless, news about this increase spread quickly at a regional scale, resulting in poaching from outsiders and a subsequent rapid cascading effect on fishing resources and locally-designed rule compliance. We show that cooperation for management of common-pool fisheries, in which marine reserves form a core component of the system, can emerge, evolve rapidly, and be effective at a local scale even in recently organized fisheries. Stakeholder participation in monitoring, where there is a rapid feedback of the systems response, can play a key role in reinforcing cooperation. However, without cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance, increase of local fishery stocks may attract outsiders who, if not restricted, will overharvest and threaten local governance. Fishers and fishing communities require incentives to maintain their management efforts. Rewarding local effective management with formal cross-scale governance recognition and support can generate these incentives

    Rapid Effects of Marine Reserves via Larval Dispersal

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    Marine reserves have been advocated worldwide as conservation and fishery management tools. It is argued that they can protect ecosystems and also benefit fisheries via density-dependent spillover of adults and enhanced larval dispersal into fishing areas. However, while evidence has shown that marine reserves can meet conservation targets, their effects on fisheries are less understood. In particular, the basic question of if and over what temporal and spatial scales reserves can benefit fished populations via larval dispersal remains unanswered. We tested predictions of a larval transport model for a marine reserve network in the Gulf of California, Mexico, via field oceanography and repeated density counts of recently settled juvenile commercial mollusks before and after reserve establishment. We show that local retention of larvae within a reserve network can take place with enhanced, but spatially-explicit, recruitment to local fisheries. Enhancement occurred rapidly (2 yrs), with up to a three-fold increase in density of juveniles found in fished areas at the downstream edge of the reserve network, but other fishing areas within the network were unaffected. These findings were consistent with our model predictions. Our findings underscore the potential benefits of protecting larval sources and show that enhancement in recruitment can be manifested rapidly. However, benefits can be markedly variable within a local seascape. Hence, effects of marine reserve networks, positive or negative, may be overlooked when only focusing on overall responses and not considering finer spatially-explicit responses within a reserve network and its adjacent fishing grounds. Our results therefore call for future research on marine reserves that addresses this variability in order to help frame appropriate scenarios for the spatial management scales of interest

    Changes in length and mass of rock scallops (<i>Spondylus calcifer</i>) and black murex snails (<i>Hexaplex nigritus</i>) before and after reserve establishment.

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    <p>(a) Comparison of the average adductor muscle length and mass of rock scallops from fishing areas (2002 = Spring, two months before reserve establishment). Data from reserves was not obtained as animals would have needed to be sacrificed. (b) Comparison of the average live mass of black murex snails from reserve and fishing areas.</p

    Rules and levels of compliance before and after entrance of roving bandits<sup>†</sup>.

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    †<p>Compliance levels based on percentage of fishers known to have broken the rule at least once: 1 = very low (<10%), 2 = low (10–40%), 3 = moderate (41–60%), 4 = high (61–90%), 5 = very high (>90%). Time A = June 2001–May 2004, Time B = first six months (June–November 2004) after entrance of roving bandits.</p

    Rapid rise and fall of San Jorge Island fishery stocks from summer 2002, when the Puerto PeĂąasco community-based reserve network was established, to the end of summer 2004, three months after roving bandits poached on the island.

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    <p>The graph depicts differences in relative densities (S.E. bars included) from one monitoring season to another for the main species harvested: murex snails (<i>Hexaplex nigritus</i>) and rock scallops (<i>Spondylus calcifer</i>).</p

    Community-based marine reserve network of Puerto PeĂąasco and sequential phases of poaching.

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    <p>During the first phase (green), divers from other locations, “roving bandits”, poached on the San Jorge Island reserve. This was followed by local rule breaking and some divers from Puerto Peñasco poaching on the Island (second phase, pink arrows). During the third phase (yellow), all members of the Puerto Peñasco diving cooperative broke their local rules and coastal reserves were targeted. It took less than two months for rules to be broken by all local divers after entrance of roving bandits.</p

    Formal and informal sanctions by rule type devised by local fishers.

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    <p>Formal and informal sanctions by rule type devised by local fishers.</p
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