Patterson superposition system for the IBM 7074

A system is described which aids in resolving the N(N-1) peaks that appear on a PATTERSON MAP into the fundamental set of N vectors corresponding to the N atoms

Commercialization of Los Alamos National Laboratory technologies via small businesses. Final report

Appendices are presented from a study performed on a concept model system for the commercialization of Los Alamos National Laboratory technologies via small businesses. Topics include a summary of information from the joint MCC/Los Alamos technology conference; a comparison of New Mexico infrastructure to other areas; a typical licensing agreement; technology screening guides; summaries of specific DOE/UC/Los Alamos documents; a bibliography; the Oak Ridge National Laboratory TCRD; The Ames Center for Advanced Technology Development; Los Alamos licensing procedures; presentation of slides from monthly MCC/Los Alamos review meetings; generalized entrepreneurship model; and a discussion on receiving equity for technology

Charge dynamics and "ferromagnetism" of A1-xLaxB6 (A=Ca and Sr)

Ferromagnetism has been reported recently in La-doped alkaline-earth hexaborides, A1-xLaxB6 (A=Ca, Sr, and Ba). We have performed the reflectivity, Hall resistivity, and magnetization measurements of A1-xLaxB6. The results indicate that A1-xLaxB6 can be regarded as a simple doped semimetal, with no signature of an excitonic state as suggested by several theories. It is also found that the surface of as-grown samples (10 micrometer in thickness) has a different electronic structure from a bulk one, and a fairly large number of paramagnetic moments are confined in this region. After eliminating these paramagnetic moments at the surface, we could not find any evidence of an intrinsic ferromagnetic moment in our samples, implying the possibility that the ferromagnetism of A1-xLaxB6 reported so far is neither intrinsic.Comment: 7 pages, 8 figure

Tricritical Point and the Doping Dependence of the Order of the Ferromagnetic Phase Transition of La1-xCaxMnO3

We report the doping dependence of the order of the ferromagnetic metal to paramagnetic insulator phase transition in La1-xCaxMnO3. At x = 0.33, magnetization and specific heat data show a first order transition, with an entropy change (2.3 J/molK) accounted for by both volume expansion and the discontinuity of M ~ 1.7 Bohr magnetons via the Clausius-Clapeyron equation. At x = 0.4, the data show a continuous transition with tricritical point exponents alpha = 0.48+/- 0.06, beta = 0.25+/- 0.03, gamma = 1.03+/- 0.05, and delta = 5.0 +/- 0.8. This tricritical point separates first order (x<0.4) from second order (x>0.4) transitions.Comment: 14 pages, including 4 figures: i.e. 10 pages of text and 4 pages of figures. to appear in Physical Review Letters (accepted

Theory of interlayer exchange interactions in magnetic multilayers

This paper presents a review of the phenomenon of interlayer exchange coupling in magnetic multilayers. The emphasis is put on a pedagogical presentation of the mechanism of the phenomenon, which has been successfully explained in terms of a spin-dependent quantum confinement effect. The theoretical predictions are discussed in connection with corresponding experimental investigations.Comment: 18 pages, 4 PS figures, LaTeX with IOP package; v2: ref. added. Further (p)reprints available from http://www.mpi-halle.de/~theory

Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review

As the number, cost, and complexity of federal regulations have grown over the past twenty years, there has been growing interest in the use of analytic tools such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis to improve the regulatory process. The application of these tools to public health, safety, and environmental problems has become commonplace in the peer-reviewed scientific and medical literatures. Recent studies prepared by Resources for the Future, the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis have demonstrated how formal analyses can and often do help government agencies achieve more protection against hazards at less cost than would otherwise occur. Although analytic tools hold great promise, their use by federal agencies is neither consistent nor rigorous. The 103rd, 104th, 105th and 106th Congresses demonstrated sustained interest in the passage of comprehensive legislation governing the employment of these tools in the federal regulatory process. While legislative proposals on this issue have attracted significant bipartisan interest, and recent amendments to particular enabling statutes have incorporated some of these analytical requirements, no comprehensive legislation has been enacted into law since passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. The inability to pass such legislation has been attributed to a variety of factors, but a common substantive concern has been uncertainty and controversy about how such legislation should address judicial review issues. For example, the judicial review portion of The Regulatory Improvement Act (S. 981), the 105th Congress\u27s major legislative initiative, was criticized simultaneously as meaningless (for allegedly offering too few opportunities for petitioners to challenge poorly reasoned agency rules) and dangerous (as supposedly enabling petitioners to paralyze even well-reasoned agency rules). Thus, a significant obstacle to regulatory improvement legislation appears to be the conflicting opinions among legal scholars and practitioners about how judicial review issues should be addressed in such legislation. The Clinton Administration and the authors of S. 981 believe they have crafted a workable compromise, one that accommodates the need to bring more rigor and transparency to an agency\u27s decisional processes without imposing excessive judicial review. Nevertheless, it is clear that their agreement on this subject, if included in future legislative deliberations, will be scrutinized and contested. Recognizing the importance of the judicial review issue to this and, indeed, any effort to improve the regulatory process, the Center for Risk Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health convened an invitational Workshop of accomplished legal practitioners and scholars to discuss how judicial review should be handled in legislation of this kind. The full-day Workshop was conducted in Washington, D.C. on December 17, 1998. Its purpose was to discuss principles, experiences, and insights that might inform future public debate about how judicial review should be addressed in legislative proposals that entail use of risk assessment and/or cost-benefit analysis in agency decision-making (whether the proposals are comprehensive or agency-specific). In order to provide the Workshop a practical focus, participants analyzed the provisions of S. 981 (as modified at the request of the Clinton Administration). An exchange of letters between S. 981\u27s chief sponsors and the Clinton Administration defining the terms of the agreement was examined as well. This Report highlights the themes of the Workshop discussion and offers some specific commentary on how proposed legislation (including but not limited to S. 981) could be improved in future legislative deliberations

Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Judicial Review

As the number, cost, and complexity of federal regulations have grown over the past twenty years, there has been growing interest in the use of analytic tools such as risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis to improve the regulatory process. The application of these tools to public health, safety, and environmental problems has become commonplace in the peer-reviewed scientific and medical literatures. Recent studies prepared by Resources for the Future, the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis have demonstrated how formal analyses can and often do help government agencies achieve more protection against hazards at less cost than would otherwise occur. Although analytic tools hold great promise, their use by federal agencies is neither consistent nor rigorous. The 103rd, 104th, 105th and 106th Congresses demonstrated sustained interest in the passage of comprehensive legislation governing the employment of these tools in the federal regulatory process. While legislative proposals on this issue have attracted significant bipartisan interest, and recent amendments to particular enabling statutes have incorporated some of these analytical requirements, no comprehensive legislation has been enacted into law since passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. The inability to pass such legislation has been attributed to a variety of factors, but a common substantive concern has been uncertainty and controversy about how such legislation should address judicial review issues. For example, the judicial review portion of The Regulatory Improvement Act (S. 981), the 105th Congress\u27s major legislative initiative, was criticized simultaneously as meaningless (for allegedly offering too few opportunities for petitioners to challenge poorly reasoned agency rules) and dangerous (as supposedly enabling petitioners to paralyze even well-reasoned agency rules). Thus, a significant obstacle to regulatory improvement legislation appears to be the conflicting opinions among legal scholars and practitioners about how judicial review issues should be addressed in such legislation. The Clinton Administration and the authors of S. 981 believe they have crafted a workable compromise, one that accommodates the need to bring more rigor and transparency to an agency\u27s decisional processes without imposing excessive judicial review. Nevertheless, it is clear that their agreement on this subject, if included in future legislative deliberations, will be scrutinized and contested. Recognizing the importance of the judicial review issue to this and, indeed, any effort to improve the regulatory process, the Center for Risk Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health convened an invitational Workshop of accomplished legal practitioners and scholars to discuss how judicial review should be handled in legislation of this kind. The full-day Workshop was conducted in Washington, D.C. on December 17, 1998. Its purpose was to discuss principles, experiences, and insights that might inform future public debate about how judicial review should be addressed in legislative proposals that entail use of risk assessment and/or cost-benefit analysis in agency decision-making (whether the proposals are comprehensive or agency-specific). In order to provide the Workshop a practical focus, participants analyzed the provisions of S. 981 (as modified at the request of the Clinton Administration). An exchange of letters between S. 981\u27s chief sponsors and the Clinton Administration defining the terms of the agreement was examined as well. This Report highlights the themes of the Workshop discussion and offers some specific commentary on how proposed legislation (including but not limited to S. 981) could be improved in future legislative deliberations