Sarbanes-Oxley Act, insider trading and earnings management

The empirical motivation of this dissertation is the increasing importance of financial market’s regulation pursuant of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). There is currently incomplete knowledge on the relationship between insider trading and earnings management on the one hand and earnings management and firm performance on the other in light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Moreover, the relevance of political regulation of financial markets has not yet been thoroughly investigated. The research aims of the dissertation are: 1) To evaluate the effectiveness of financial market regulation (SOX) on Insider trading and Earnings management 2) To empirically examine how the different techniques used to manage earnings influence firm performance in light of the recent regulatory intervention (SOX). Both tests suggest ways in which investors can examine and unravel a comprehensive set of earnings management signals and their impact on either insider trading or future firm performance. The thesis is divided into two main empirical chapters: The first main empirical chapter (chapter 4) discusses insider trading and earnings management in light of the recent regulatory intervention mandated by the SOX. The second main empirical chapter (Chapter 5) discuss changes in earnings management and firm performance relationship in light of the recent regulatory intervention as prescribed by SOX. In an attempt to obtain a comprehensive understanding of several conceptual issues, the different techniques used to manage earnings are employed including, discretionary accruals techniques, real earnings management and the probability of financial statements distortion as measured by the Beneish M-Score. Overall, the focus is on managers of S&P 500 companies, holders of private information about the firm’s prospects, preparers and senders of financial reports and investors and analysts as receivers and users of these financial statements. Findings on the relationship between insider trading and earnings management in light of the recent regulatory intervention suggest that after the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, managers are less likely to time their trade and boast earnings to benefit at the expense of outside investors. Furthermore, under stricter regulations, market participants detect and react to insider trading and earnings management practices. Findings on the relationship between a comprehensive set of earnings management signals and firm performance suggest that there have been greater monitoring of financial III statements in the Post SOX era. When firms attempt to manage earnings during periods of intense market regulation, investors discount this through disappointing stock returns. Overall, the results suggest that there should be broad based approach in analysing financial statements

Harmonization of Accounting Standards

This research has been carried out to review the effectiveness of the European Commission (EC) Directive on regulating financial reporting policies and practices of companies in the EU member countries. This has been achieved through a comparative analysis of financial reporting practices of some key European banks. A sample has been drawn from two banks each in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany countries perceived to be a representative of three different financial reporting cultures within the European Union. Focusing on measurement and valuation methods, consolidation practice, and how financial information is presented, we found that comparable financial reporting exists among banks in the same country more than among banks in different European countries. Any divergence in reporting practice could be explained by the individual banks reporting needs and culture, which are shaped by many factors including the security market1 requirements and the institutional environments of different member countries. The influence of individual company needs explains why most German banks use the International Accounting Standards, and the influence of different institutional environments explains why most Swedish banks use national standards. The effort of the European Commission has to some extent increased harmonization but not standardization