Making the Numbers? "Short Termism” & the Puzzle of Only Occasional Disaster

Much recent work in strategy and popular discussion suggests that an excessive focus on “managing the numbers” --delivering quarterly earnings at the expense of longer term investments--makes it difficult for firms to make the investments necessary to build competitive advantage. “Short termism” has been blamed for everything from the decline of the US automobile industry to the low penetration of techniques such as TQM and continuous improvement. Yet a vigorous tradition in the accounting literature establishes that firms routinely sacrifice long-term investment to manage earnings and are rewarded for doing so. This paper presents a model that can reconcile these apparently contradictory perspectives. We show that if the source of long-term advantage is modeled as a stock of capability that accumulates gradually over time, a firm’s proclivity to manage short-term earnings at the expense of long-term investment can have very different consequences depending on whether the firm’s capability is close to a critical “tipping threshold”. When the firm operates above this threshold, managing earnings smoothes revenue with few long-term consequences. Below it, managing earnings can tip the firm into a vicious cycle of accelerating decline. Our results have important implications for understanding managerial incentives and the internal processes that lead to sustained advantage.

Making the Numbers? "Short Termism" & the Puzzle of Only Occasional Disaster

Much recent work in strategy and popular discussion suggests that an excessive focus on “managing the numbers” ―delivering quarterly earnings at the expense of longer term investments―makes it difficult for firms to make the investments necessary to build competitive advantage. “Short termism” has been blamed for everything from the decline of the US automobile industry to the low penetration of techniques such as TQM and continuous improvement. Yet a vigorous tradition in the accounting literature establishes that firms routinely sacrifice long-term investment to manage earnings and are rewarded for doing so. This paper presents a model that reconciles these apparently contradictory perspectives. We show that if the source of long-term advantage is modeled as a stock of capability that accumulates over time, a firm’s proclivity to manage short-term earnings at the expense of long-term investment can have very different consequences depending on whether the firm’s capability is close to a critical “tipping threshold”. When the firm operates above this threshold, managing earnings smoothes revenue and cash flow with few long-term consequences. Below it, managing earnings can tip the firm into a vicious cycle of accelerating decline. Our results have important implications for understanding managerial incentives and the internal processes that create sustained advantage

The improvement paradox : three essays on process improvement initiatives

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1996.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 140-143).by Nelson P. Repenning.Ph.D

Drive out fear (unless you can drive it in) : the role of agency and job security in process improvement

HD28 .M414 no.4041-98,

The transition problem in product development

HD28 .M414 no.4036-98,

Getting quality the old-fashioned way : self confirming attributions in the dynamics of process improvement

HD28 .M414 no.3952-97,

Unanticipated Side Effects of Successful Quality Programs: Exploring a Paradox of Organizational Improvement

Recent evidence suggests the connection between quality improvement and financial results may be weak. Consider the case of Analog Devices, Inc., a leading manufacturer of integrated circuits. Analog's TQM program was a dramatic success. Yield doubled, cycle time was cut in half, and product defects fell by a factor of ten. However, financial performance worsened. To explore the apparent paradox we develop a detailed simulation model of Analog, including operations, financial and cost accounting, product development, human resources, the competitive environment, and the financial markets. We used econometric estimation, interviews, observation, and archival data to specify and estimate the model. We find that improvement programs like TQM can present firms with a tradeoff between short and long run effects. In the long run TQM can increase productivity, raise quality, and lower costs. In the short run, these improvements can interact with prevailing accounting systems and organizational routines to create excess capacity, financial stress, and pressure for layoffs that undercut commitment to continuous improvement. We explore policies to promote sustained improvement in financial as well as nonfinancial measures of performance.organizational behavior, quality, simulation, system dynamics, TQM