Wer ist der beste Formel 1 Fahrer? Eine ökonometrische Talentbewertung

Who is the best Formula 1 driver? Until today it was impossible to answer this question because the observable performance of a driver depends both on his talent and the quality of his cars. In this article we separate for the first time driver talent from car quality by econometrically analyzing data for 57 years of Formula 1 racing. Our estimates also control for the number of drivers finishing, technical breakdowns and many other variables that influence race results. While Michael Schumacher is often believed to be the best driver, he is overtaken by Juan Manuel Fangio and Jim Clar

How Federalism Protects Future Generations from Today's Public Debts

From the politico-economic perspective, federalism is a protector of the present generation. But what about future generations? In federal states, Ricardian equivalence cannot be assumed to work properly, as migration between local jurisdictions undermines intergenerational redistribution based on parental altruism. However, we argue that there exists another equivalence mechanism which also works with purely selfish individuals: Public debts capitalize into property values. Jurisdictions with larger net debts exhibit, ceteris paribus, lower property prices. Debt capitalization in property values is the more pronounced the less elastic land supply is and the more mobile the other factors of production are. Therefore, capitalization is more relevant for local than for national debts, i.e. it is more pronounced in a federal than in a centralized state. Thus, federalism also becomes a protector of future generation

Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government

Controlling government is a primary focus of the politico-economic literature. Recently, various political institutions have been analyzed from this perspective, most importantly balanced budget rules, fiscal federalism, and direct democracy. However, one type of institution has been neglected so far: elected competitors to the government. Such institutional competition between the government and an independent agency can be found at the Swiss local level, where finance Commissions compete with the government. In some parts of Switzerland, local finance commissions can ex ante criticize government projects and bring alternative policy proposals onto the political agenda, which are then voted on by the citizens. Thus, they become strong competitors to the government. We econometrically investigate this institutional setting by comparing the 26 Swiss cantons. We find the power of the local finance commission to have an economically relevant, statistically significant and robust negative effect on the tax burden and on public expenditure

Fairness in Extended Dictator Game Experiments

We test the robustness of behavior in dictator games by offering allocators the choice to play an unattractive lottery. With this lottery option, mean transfers from allocators to recipients substantially decline, partly because many allocators now keep the entire endowment for themselves (without playing the lottery). In our standard dictator game, the median transfer amounts to 41% of the dictators' endowment. Once the lottery option is present, the median transfer falls to zero. Introducing an additional unattractive choice thus leads subjects to violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP

The Ranking of Economists and Management Scientists in Europe

Cet article présente une analyse statistique de la position des économistes français et des spécialistes français des sciences de gestion parmi les chercheurs européens de haut rang. La preuve empirique révèle que la France ne développe pas fortement ses ressources humaines sur la scène internationale. La position de la France en Europe, repérée par les citations (pour les économistes) et les nominations par les pairs (pour les spécialistes des sciences de gestion) des chercheurs de haut rang et normalisée par la taille de la population, est seulement au neuvième rang en ce qui concerne les sciences économiques et au huitième rang pour les sciences de gestion. Cela laisse penser que la politique scientifique a encore beaucoup à faire pour améliorer la situation.This note provides a statistical analysis of the position of French economists and French management scientists among the leading European scholars. The evidence shows that France does not strongly develop its human resources in the international setting. Frances position in Europe based on citations (for economists) and peer nominations (for management scientists) of the leading scholars normalized by the size of the population is only rank 9 with respect to economics, and rank 8 with respect to management science. This suggests that there is considerable scope for science policy to improve this situatio

District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences—a reply and new perspectives

We reply to the comment of John Carey and Simon Hix on our original contribution entitled "District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority's Preferences: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes” in Public Choice 151:585-610 (2012). District magnitude does not necessarily affect deviations between political representatives and their district voters in a strictly monotonic way but monotonicity is upheld for deviations between representatives and the national majority. We provide new perspectives and caution against evaluating electoral systems by focusing on individual politicians' behavior but neglecting aggregation effect

District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament's voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives' incentives to adhere to citizens' revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preference

Ökonomen, Publikationen und Zitationen: Ein europäischer Vergleich

This paper measures the publishing activity and the impact of European economists, 1986±1996. The analysis of the number of publications in selected scholarly journals and the citations shows that, relative to population size, the British economists are in the lead. They publish much more than their German, French and Italian colleagues. At the same time, their work seems also to be cited more often. However, compared to the economists from the small western European countries, the British dominance is much less pronounced. The latter seem to be much more focused on the international academic market than scholars from the large continental countries. 16