Future direction for infrastructure research

Infrastructure was not a widely researched topic until Aschauer identified the wider economic benefits of investment in the United States during the 1980s. Achauer's work was a catalyst for further research and debate as researchers tackled weakness in the production function approach to measurement and sought to adjust for two-way causation. The literature that followed confirmed a significant and causal connection between public investment, productivity and output and research moved to international panel data, regional economies and the relationship between infrastructure investment, output capacity, growth and productivity.</jats:p

Book Review of Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, How Lawyers Lose Their Way: A Profession Fails Its Creative Minds (2005)

How Lawyers Lose Their Way claims that lawyers\u27 unease stems from a distinctive source: their excessive use of and exposure to formalism in their work. I think that they are on to something, but the analysis in this book is too underdeveloped to provide much insight into what it is. The authors\u27 use of the term formalism risks being so inclusive that it loses explanatory power. In addition, their claim that overreliance on formalism is the chief culprit in lawyers\u27 unhappiness is vulnerable to the charge that lawyers arc suffering the effect of trends in the workplace affecting a wide range of occupations. Finally, Stefancic and Delgado fail to explore in any depth the material conditions of law practice, and how the evolution of those conditions might relate to the formalism they decry. Their treatment of formalism is, well, formalistic. Formalism seems to be an independent force that rises, falls, and now has reemerged, on its own. This makes it difficult to identify any steps that might help reshape law practice beyond the personal responses of individual lawyers. The result is that the authors leave us with no sense of any collective efforts holding out any promise. One can\u27t help but be disappointed at this conclusion. In what follows, I lay out the authors\u27 arguments, and suggest how its limitations lead to this result. I then offer some thoughts on how what I think of as hyperabstraction may well pose particular hazards for lawyers, which could have broader social ramifications as well

From Protecting Lives to Protecting States: Use of Force Across the Threat Continuum

The increasing prominence in recent years of non-international armed conflicts that extend across state borders has strained the traditional legal categories that we use to regulate state use of force. Simultaneous with this phenomenon has been growing acceptance that human rights law and international humanitarian law should co-exist, with the former informing interpretations of the latter to varying degrees. Scholars continue to debate vigorously the implications of these developments and how these bodies of law should interact. As Kenneth Watkin’s book Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict observes, however, commanders have no choice but to navigate these ambiguities and attempt to reconcile these tensions on the operational level as they engage in hostilities. Watkin’s magisterial book can be seen both as a work of operational law and a major scholarly treatment of the law governing the use of force. It provides detailed accounts of how situations arise on the ground that evade easy classification in terms of our existing conceptual and legal categories. At the same time, it furnishes a valuable framework for analyzing the features of such operations that are relevant in assessing how force should be used in particular scenarios. Finally, Watkin offers a set of principles for both operational law and broader policy decisions to help navigate the complex terrain of modern security challenges. Watkin argues that the twenty-first century approach to conflict must be “holistic” in nature. On the one hand, it must it must acknowledge “the simultaneous application of humanitarian and human rights law,” and the greater influence of the latter in shaping perceptions of the legitimacy of violence. On the other hand, it must appreciate that “the altered security environment of this century has witnessed a definite move away from looking at conflict itself as being uniquely conventional or unconventional,” as transnational non-state organized armed groups have emerged that do not resemble traditional armed forces. This review essay describes the main ideas in Watkin’s rich and comprehensive analysis. It then focuses in more detail on two of his suggestions. The first is that state forces should presumptively operate under law enforcement rules until this is insufficient to meet a threat, even in the course of an armed conflict. This reflects the incorporation of human rights principles as a default policy even when more permissive rules on use of force are available. The second suggestion is that certain hostile engagements with non-state forces may appropriately be characterized as armed conflicts of limited duration, governed by international humanitarian law. These two proposals reflect his view that characterization of the nature of hostilities should depend upon facts on the ground, specifically the nature of the means that states must use in order effectively to deal with a threat. I then discuss whether this approach should lead to assessments of state use of force that rely on contextual analysis of the weight of the interests at stake in a given situation, rather than on classification of hostilities in one of our two traditional main legal categories. While Watkin does not take this step, I analyze the work of others who make a cogent argument that we should. Ultimately, I conclude that our existing imperfect legal framework is preferable to a purely contextual approach, because of the radically different moral universes that animate human rights law and international humanitarian law

Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture

Many efforts to understand and respond to a succession of corporate scandals over the last few years have underscored the importance of organizational culture in shaping the behavior of individuals. This focus reflects appreciation that even if an organization has adopted elaborate rules and policies designed to ensure legal compliance and ethical behavior, those pronouncements will be ineffective if other norms and incentives promote contrary conduct. Responding to the call for creating and sustaining an ethical culture in organizations requires appreciating the subtle ways in which various characteristics of an organization may work in tandem or at cross-purposes in shaping behavior. The idea is to identify the influences likely to be most important, analyze how people are apt to respond to them, and revise them if necessary so that they create the right kinds of incentives when individuals are deciding how to act. This can be a tall order even if we assume that most behavior is the result of a deliberative process that weighs multiple risks and rewards. It’s even more daunting if we accept the notion that conscious deliberation typically plays but a minor role in shaping behavior. A focus on what two scholars describe as “the unbearable automaticity of being” posits that most of a person’s everyday life is determined not by conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes outside of conscious awareness. In this article, I discuss a particular strand of research that is rooted in the study of non-conscious mental processes, and consider its implications for ethics and culture in the organizational setting. This is work on the process that we use to identify and respond to situations that raise what we think of as distinctly moral questions. A growing body of research suggests that a large portion of this process involves automatic non-conscious cognitive and emotional reactions rather than conscious deliberation. One way to think of these reactions is that they reflect reliance on moral intuitions. When such intuitions arise, we don’t engage in moral reasoning in order to arrive at a conclusion. Instead, we do so in order to justify a conclusion that we’ve already reached. In other words, moral conclusions precede, rather than follow, moral reasoning. If this research accurately captures much of our moral experience, what does it suggest about what’s necessary to foster an ethical organizational culture? At first blush, the implications seem unsettling. The non-conscious realm is commonly associated with irrational and arbitrary impulses, and morality often is characterized as the hard-won achievement of reason over these unruly forces. If most of our moral judgments are the product of non-conscious processes, how can we hope to understand, much less influence, our moral responses? Are moral reactions fundamentally inscrutable and beyond appeals to reason? If reason has no persuasive force, does appreciation of the non-conscious source of our moral judgments suggest that any effort to promote ethical conduct must rest on a crude behaviorism that manipulates penalties and rewards? I believe that acknowledging the prominent role of non-conscious processes in shaping moral responses need not inevitably lead either to fatalism or Skinnerian behaviorism. Research has begun to shed light on how these processes operate. Related work has suggested how our moral responses may be rooted in human evolution. This perspective focuses on the ways in which our capacity for moral judgment is embedded in physical and mental processes that have provided an adaptive advantage in human evolution. These bodies of research contribute to a richer portrait of human cognition and behavior that can be valuable in thinking about how to promote ethical awareness and conduct. As Owen Flanagan has put it, “seeing clearly the kinds of persons we are is a necessary condition for any productive ethical reflection.” If there were such a thing as a normative theory of human movement, it would be futile if it exhorted us to fly. Efforts to create an organizational culture that encouraged people to fly would be doomed as well. In thinking about ethics, we need to have a sense of what lies between simply accommodating what we tend to do and demanding that we fly. My hope is that this article takes a small step in that direction

The planar dynamics of airships

The forces and moments acting upon a LTA vehicle are considered in order to develop parameters describing planar motion. Similar expressions for HTA vehicles will be given to emphasize the greater complexity of aerodynamic effects when buoyancy effects cannot be neglected. A brief summary is also given of the use of virtual mass coefficients to calculate loads on airships

Australia’s welfare system: a review of reviews 1941-2013

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper is a ‘review of reviews’ undertaken into Australia’s welfare system between 1941 and 2013. It covers mainly those reviews most like ‘public inquiries’ i.e. time-limited policy reviews that typically involve external experts appointed by, but operating (to varying degrees) independently of, government. The focus is on reviews where social security or the transfer system is a primary concern, so it does not cover reviews associated with wider welfare concerns such as housing, health or education. The reviews completed in this period were many and varied. The descriptions and analysis of the reviews are based on published material. In addition to a wide-ranging historical narrative, and to provide some depth to the analysis, the paper explores a selected number of reviews in some detail. These are: &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security (1941-1946), chaired initially by the Hon John A Perkins MP and later by HC Barnard MP and tasked with identifying ‘ways and means of improving social and living conditions in Australia.’ &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1972-1976), chaired by Professor Ronald F Henderson and commissioned to undertake a wide and far reaching inquiry into poverty. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The Social Security Review (1986-1988), led by then Associate Professor Bettina Cass and focusing on immediate and longer-term reform of income support programs. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The Reference Group on Welfare Reform (1999-2000), chaired by Patrick McClure, and set up to provide advice on preventing and reducing welfare dependency. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The Ministerial Taskforce on Child Support (2004-2005), chaired by Professor Patrick Parkinson and tasked with reforming the Child Support Scheme. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Australia’s Future Tax System Review (2008-2010), chaired by Ken Henry and commissioned to set out a 21st century vision for the tax and transfer system, and the associated Pension Review (2008-2009) led by Jeff Harmer which reviewed pension payments. The reviews are considered collectively under a simple framework. This framework uses three main criteria: review characteristics (what they look like); review process and activities (what they do); and review outputs and outcomes (what they produce and achieve). The analysis provides some insights into the use of reviews in the welfare domain: &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Broad and in-depth reviews of the transfer or social security system have been very rare. In the post-war period, there have been only two – the Henderson Poverty Inquiry (which also looked at wider aspects of welfare) and the Cass Social Security Review. Most reviews have focused on a particular aspect or parts of the social security system, or considered this in the context of a wider review (for example, a tax review or Commission of Audit). &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;A great variety in organisational forms has been used – Committees of Inquiry, Reference Groups, Task Forces and Reviews Panels, but no Royal Commissions (in the post-war period). Different forms have served different functions. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Reviews have, however, used similar methods (but with varying emphasis and effort) – undertaking research, conducting public and stakeholder consultation exercises, synthesising knowledge and building consensus. International comparisons were a common feature of the reviews. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The impact and influence of the various reviews has been mixed. To varying degrees, all of the reviews have influenced public discourse and enhanced the evidence base. Most have contributed to changes in public policy, in the short- or long-term. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Many common themes recur throughout the reviews, for example, the links between the social security system, employment and the labour market; the obligations of welfare 1recipients (conditionality); the targeting and means-testing of payments; the adequacy of benefits and incentives/disincentives to work; and the relationship between the tax and transfer systems. These are all challenges and tensions that prevail today. The ‘value’ of reviews stems from a range of factors: &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;They are versatile and multi-functional (combining research, consultation, consensus- building and analysis in one entity and to fit the task at hand). &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;They provide time and a space outside of the day-to-day demands of government (and beyond the limits of departmental or institutional boundaries) to refresh knowledge and think critically, creatively and long-term. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;They are ‘public’- involving stakeholders and the wider public, publishing terms of reference and reports and thereby engendering transparency in process and findings. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;They are usually led by, and involve, external experts, bringing expertise and knowledge to the policy process that is often not available within government. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;They are (to varying degrees) independent, operating at a distance from government and populated mainly by external members. &gt;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;But, they are also connected to government - commissioned by government, resourced by government and frequently involve public servants in their membership. The analysis finds that there would be merit in on-going evaluation of reviews (and public inquiries in general) and of introducing a method by which knowledge (of members and administrators) can be captured and shared, for example through a Review Handbook or a mediated alumni program for ex- reviewers