28 research outputs found

    PUBLIC GOODS, CORRUPTION AND GROWTH???

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    In this paper, we analyse implications of corruption on growth. We extend existing growth models by incorporating ubiquitous corruption as a by-product of the public sector. Corruption affects both taxation and public good provision, and therefore causes income redistribution and inefficiencies in the public sector. These effects of corruption lead to lower growth through distortions of investment incentives and resources allocation.Corruption, growth, public goods, tax evasion

    Is there a direct effect of corruption on growth?

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    Recent empirical studies find that the direct effect of corruption on growth is statistically insignificant. However, there exists a discrepancy between these results and the intuition that corruption reduces over-all productivity, because total factor productivity also depends on the quality of institutions and their efficiency. The current paper addresses this issue and offers a new perspective on growth effects of corruption and shows that direct and indirect growth effects of corruption can be statistically significant. Moreover, the empirical results confirm the existence of both negative and positive growth effect of corruption.corruption, growth

    Corruption and regulatory burden

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    It is known that government has discretionary power in providing public goods and regulating the economy. Corrupt bureaucracy with discretionary power creates and extracts rents by manipulating with the public good supply and regulations: i) by attaching excessive red tape to the public good they are providing; ii) or by making the regulations di±cult for the private agents to comply with. The former type of corruption results in less public input being provided at higher cost to the private agents. The latter increases non-compliance, which then breeds bribery. Consequently, the overall public sector burden is higher in the environment with corrupt bureaucracy. We show this outcome using a simple theoretical model, and then confront it with empirical evidence.corruption, regulatory burden

    Corruption and Disposable Risk

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    Corrupt bureaucrats manipulate rules and regulations to coerce the private agents to pay bribes. In such an environment the cost of dealing with the public sector is uncertain as the regulations are not observed as they are originally defined. Combined with weak enforcement and compliance, predation of corrupt bureaucrats makes private disposable income volatile. We study this uncertainty within a stochastic dynamic growth model framework, where we generalize the corruption caused uncertainty as a shock to disposable income of agents. Consequently, corruption creates two adverse effects in the economy: higher risks associated with private investments and lower returns on private capital due to increased public burden. Both effects tend to lower the demand for investments, thus long run growth is compromised in the economy with the corrupt public sector.Corruption, public input, growth, burden

    CORRUPTION, UNCERTAINTY AND GROWTH

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    Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.Corruption, growth, public goods, tax evasion, uncertainty

    A Stochastic Growth Model with Income Tax Evasion: Implications for Australia

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    In this paper we develop a stochastic endogenous growth model augmented with income tax evasion. Our model avoids some existing discrepancies between empirical evidence and theoretical predictions of traditional tax evasion models. Further, we show that: i) productive government expenditures play an important role in affecting economy's tax evasion rate; ii) the average marginal income tax rate in Australia come close to the optimal; and iii) the phenomenon of tax evasion is not an excuse for a productive government to advocate an excessive income taxation.Tax evasion; Economic growth; Public services

    Taxation and Migration: Policies to Manage a Resource Boom

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    The Australian economy is currently experiencing a resource boom and policy responses to this boom such as migration and taxation, as well as the broader role of monetary and fiscal policies are the subject of academic as well as public debate. This paper investigates the impact of a resource boom in a dynamic macroeconomic model, focusing on the allocation of resources across sectors and changes in income distribution. Further, the paper contributes to the current policy debate by analysing the role and effectiveness of government policy through its migration policy and taxation of the mining sector, in addressing the short run and steady state impacts of a resource boom. Results illustrate that while increased immigration is an appropriate short run response, long run welfare can be enhanced by higher taxation of the mining sector. Indeed, results show that increased tax revenue can fund appropriate transfers to mitigate the adverse effects on labour income and provision of public goods to increase productivity in the rest of the economy.Dutch Disease, natural resources, economic growth, income distribution

    CAN WE TAX THE DESIRE FOR TAX EVASION?

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    A static income tax evasion model ?? la Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that an increase in the tax rate causes taxpayers to increase their income declaration. In an important contribution, Lin and Yang (2001) obtained exactly the opposite result by extending the Yitzhaki (1974) model to a dynamic one with Ak(t) production technology. In this paper we show that once the Lin and Yang (2001) model becomes fully compatible with the Yitzhaki's (1974) setting, the negative relationship between taxes and evasion still prevails. We then enrich the dynamic model with a productive public sector, and obtain an ambiguous relationship between taxes and evasion incentives as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972). We also prove that the growth-maximizing share of public expenditures in total output satisfies the natural efficiency condition even in the presence of tax evasion. However, the latter result is not robust to the introduction of the costs associated with income declaration and concealment activities.Tax Evasion, Optimal Taxation, Economic Growth

    Exporting, R&D Investment and Firm Survival

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    This paper examines the effect of exporting on firm survival for a panel of Indian IT firms. We show that exporting has competing effects on firm survival. On the one hand, exporting and investing in productivity are complementary activities, while on the other exporting activity is an additional source of uncertainty for the firm. We show that both effects influence survival, but operate at different points in time. Specifically, the hazard facing exporters is higher than non-exporters in the initial phase following entry into the export market, reflecting the fact that exporters are particularly vulnerable to shocks in the start-up phase. However, over time, exporters benefit more from productivity gains than non-exporters and the hazard facing exporters falls below that confronting non-exporters.India, Firm survival, Information Technology, R&D, Exports

    Corruption and regulatory burden

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    It is known that government has discretionary power in providing public goods and regulating the economy. Corrupt bureaucracy with discretionary power creates and extracts rents by manipulating with the public good supply and regulations: i) by attaching excessive red tape to the public good they are providing; ii) or by making the regulations di±cult for the private agents to comply with. The former type of corruption results in less public input being provided at higher cost to the private agents. The latter increases non-compliance, which then breeds bribery. Consequently, the overall public sector burden is higher in the environment with corrupt bureaucracy. We show this outcome using a simple theoretical model, and then confront it with empirical evidence
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