700 research outputs found

    Does It Pay, at the Margin, to Work and Save? -- Measuring Effective Marginal Taxes on Americans' Labor Supply and Saving

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    Building on Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sluchynsky's (2002) study of Americans' incentives to work full or part time, this paper uses ESPlanner, a life-cycle financial planning program, in conjunction with detailed modeling of transfer programs to determine a) total marginal net tax rates on current labor supply, b) total net marginal tax rates on life-cycle labor supply, c) total net marginal tax rates on saving, and d) the tax-arbitrage opportunities available from contributing to retirement accounts. In seeking to provide the most comprehensive analysis to date of fiscal incentives, the paper incorporates federal and state personal income taxes, the FICA payroll tax, federal and state corporate income taxes, federal and state sales and excise taxes, Social Security benefits, Medicare benefits, Medicaid benefits, Foods Stamps, welfare (TAFCD) benefits, and other transfer program benefits. The paper offers four main takeaways. First, thanks to the incredible complexity of the U.S. fiscal system, it's impossible for anyone to understand her incentive to work, save, or contribute to retirement accounts absent highly advanced computer technology and software. Second, the U.S. fiscal system provides most households with very strong reasons to limit their labor supply and saving. Third, the system offers very high-income young and middle aged households as well as most older households tremendous opportunities to arbitrage the tax system by contributing to retirement accounts. Fourth, the patterns by age and income of marginal net tax rates on earnings, marginal net tax rates on saving, and tax-arbitrage opportunities can be summarized with one word -- bizarre.

    Comparing Average and Marginal Tax Rates Under the FairTax and the Current System of Federal Taxation

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    This paper compares marginal and average tax rates on working and saving under our current federal tax system with those that would arise under a federal retail sales tax, specifically the FairTax. The FairTax would replace the personal income, corporate income, payroll, and estate and gift taxes with a 23 percent effective retail sales tax plus a progressive rebate. The 23 percent rate generates more revenue than the taxes it replaces, but the rebate's cost necessitates scaling back non-Social Security expenditures to their 2000 share of GDP. The FairTax's effective marginal tax on labor supply is 23 percent. Its effective marginal tax on saving is zero. In contrast, for the stylized working households considered here, current effective marginal labor taxes are higher or much higher than 23 percent. Take our stylized 45 year-old, married couple earning 35,000peryearwithtwochildren.Giventheirfederaltaxbracket,theclawbackoftheEarnedIncomeTaxCredit,andtheFICAtax,theirmarginaltaxis47.6percent.TheFairTaximposesazeromarginaltaxonsavingmeaningthatreducingthisyearsconsumptionbyadollarpermitsonetoincreasethepresentvalueoffutureconsumptionbyadollar.Incontrast,theexistingfederaltaxsystemimposesveryhighmarginaltaxesonfutureconsumption.Forourstylizedworkinghouseholdsforegoingadollarsconsumptionthisyeartouniformlyraiseconsumptioninallfutureyearsraisesthepresentvalueoffutureconsumptionbyonly45.8to77.4cents,i.e.,theeffectivemarginaltaxratesonuniformlyraisingfutureconsumptionviasavingfacingourhouseholdsrangesfrom22.6percentto54.2percent.TheFairTaxalsoreducesmostofourstylizedhouseholdsremainingaveragelifetimetaxratesand,often,byalot.Considerourstylized30yearold,singlehouseholdearning35,000 per year with two children. Given their federal tax bracket, the claw-back of the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the FICA tax, their marginal tax is 47.6 percent. The FairTax imposes a zero marginal tax on saving meaning that reducing this year's consumption by a dollar permits one to increase the present value of future consumption by a dollar. In contrast, the existing federal tax system imposes very high marginal taxes on future consumption. For our stylized working households foregoing a dollar's consumption this year to uniformly raise consumption in all future years raises the present value of future consumption by only 45.8 to 77.4 cents, i.e., the effective marginal tax rates on uniformly raising future consumption via saving facing our households ranges from 22.6 percent to 54.2 percent. The FairTax also reduces most of our stylized households' remaining average lifetime tax rates - and, often, by a lot. Consider our stylized 30 year-old, single household earning 50,000. The household's average remaining lifetime tax rate under the current system is 21.1 percent. It's 16.2 percent under the FairTax.

    To Guard Against the Unfounded Actions . . . . --The Issue Behind the Mendel Labels

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    Deficient Treatment of Deficiency Claims: Gilmore Would Have Repented

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    Part I of this Article examines the fair value rule in the context of Gilmore\u27s perception of the commercial reasonableness concept. Part II discusses the reaction to, and progress of, the fair value proposal in the Article 9 Drafing Committee

    Introduction: Planetary memory in contemporary American fiction

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    This special issue considers the ways in which contemporary American fiction seeks to imagine a mode of ‘planetary memory’ able to address the scalar and systemic complexities of the Anthropocene – the epoch in which the combined activity of the human species has become a geological force in its own right. As Naomi Klein has recently argued, confronting the problem of anthropogenic climate change alters everything we know about the world: demanding wholesale recalibration of economic and political priorities; destabilising the epistemic frameworks through which quotidian life is interpreted and enacted; and decentring the dominant cultural imaginaries that seek to give form to historical experienc

    To Roth or Not? -- That is the Question

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    Do regular 401(k) and IRA accounts offer greater tax benefits than Roth 401(k)s and Roth IRAs? This is a tough question. Regular 401(k)s and IRAs save taxes in the short term; Roth accounts save taxes in the long term. Regular 401(k)s and IRAs are vulnerable to future income tax hikes, but may benefit from a future switch to consumption taxation if the switch exempts withdrawals from income taxation. Roth accounts are exempt from future income tax hikes, but are exposed to future consumption taxation. For any given assumption about future tax policy, assessing the relative merits of the two types of saving vehicles requires very accurate calculations of taxes in each future year -- calculations that incorporate not just standard federal income tax provisions, but also the Savers Credit, the taxation of Social Security benefits, the Alternative Minimum Tax, and state income taxation. This paper uses ESPlanner (Economic Security Planner) -- a financial planning software program co-developed by Kotlikoff -- to study the relative merits of regular and Roth retirement accounts. In providing its consumption smoothing recommendations, ESPlanner makes the highly detailed tax and Social Security benefit calculations needed to compare retirement account options. In particular, ESPlanner can determine how different retirement account options affect different households' living standards under different assumptions about future tax policy. Our main findings are these: Absent future tax changes, middle-income, single-parent households benefit slightly more from Roth accounts; other single and married households generally fare better with a regular 401(k). Future tax changes, however, can dramatically change this horse race. In the case of low- and middle-income households, Regular 401(k) accounts under-perform Roth accounts in terms of long-run living standards assuming income taxes will rise by 30 percent in retirement. But the Roth falls far short of the regular 401(k) if taxes in retirement are assessed on consumption rather than on income and the transition to consumption taxation exempts 401(k) withdrawals from income taxation.
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