Las bombas de Londres y el contexto estratégico más amplio

Con anterioridad a los atentados de Londres, las agencias británicas de contraterrorismo consideraban que la posibilidad de que Reino Unido sufriera un ataque era muy alta y que los terroristas bien podían ser británicos. El Reino Unido estaba excepcionalmente preparado para el desafío de un atentado terrorista islamista al haber creado una arquitectura de inteligencia muy integrada al mismo tiempo que desarrollaba una completa estrategia de contraterrorismo basada en el fortalecimiento de la sociedad londinense y británica y en minimizar los riesgos de terrorismo. A pesar de todo, los terroristas pasaron inadvertidos y burlaron las medidas de seguridad. Los atentados de Londres demuestran que la amenaza asimétrica del terrorismo no va a desaparecer a corto plazo, sino que lo más probable es que se afiance y cree mayor división dentro de nuestras sociedades democráticas

Radical Shi'ism in Lebanon: Western government crisis management techniques in dealing with hostage incidents, 1982-1992

The responses by the American, French, and British governments, in efforts to secure the release of their citizens taken hostage in Lebanon, have demonstrated the difficulty for Western states in reconciling their firmly-held principles of no-negotiations and no-concessions in dealing with either the Hizb'allah or its patrons with the actual and practical realities governing any resolution to the hostage-situations in Lebanon, This case-study on the dynamics of the Hizb'allah and its interaction with Iran and Syria provides a basis for the evaluation of the effectiveness of Western government responses to the hostage-crisis in Lebanon using crisis management techniques. This study shows that the abduction of Western citizens by Hizb'allah was motivated either by internal organisational requirements or in alignment with Syrian and Iranian interests, and that mechanisms for the resolution of the hostage-crisis were subject to continuous interaction between Hizb'allah, Iran, and Syria influenced by internal Lebanese, regional, and international events. The Western responses to the hostage-crisis showed limited effectiveness as the crisis management techniques were poorly adjusted in timing and direction to the actual crisis environment. With the exception of the French response, the overall employment of Western crisis management techniques showed disregard for the opportunities and constraints in the fluctuating relationship between Syria and Iran as well as the political environment within Lebanon which the Hizb'allah operates and exists. This was clear by their failure to rely on either Iran or Syria as the only channel in negotiations over hostages without regard to their individual ability to exert its influence over the movement in accordance with shifts in their ties to Hizb'allah's command leadership between 1987-1991 and to the status of the Iranian-Syrian relationship over time, as displayed by the friction between 1986-92. This study provides a new approach in the study of terrorism by merging a case-study of the dynamics of the hostage-crisis with an evaluation of Western responses through crisis management techniques in order to more closely resolve the dilemma of the fulfillment of these states' duty to protect their citizens taken hostage abroad, without major sacrifices in the conduct of foreign policy

Die Rolle des Internets und sozialer Medien für Radikalisierung und Deradikalisierung

Welche Rolle spielen die Mög­lich­keiten des Inter­nets bei der Ra­di­ka­li­sierung von In­di­vi­duen und Gruppen? Dieser Re­port liefert eine Über­sicht über die be­ste­hende For­schung. Er geht der Frage nach, wie und warum ex­tre­mis­tische Or­ga­ni­sa­tionen und In­di­vi­duen das Inter­net ver­wenden. Darüber hinaus dis­ku­tiert er Mög­lich­keiten (und Grenzen), wie On­line-Ex­tre­mis­mus wirk­sam ent­ge­gen­ge­treten werden kann. Es zeigt sich unter anderem, dass die Nutz­ung von In­ter­net­an­ge­boten durch ex­tre­mis­tische Gruppen oft­mals eher laien­haft und her­kömm­lich ist. Dies sollte auch bei der Ent­wick­lung von Gegen­maß­nahmen be­achtet werden. Reine On­line-Gegen­maß­nahmen stoßen an Grenzen, da Off­line- und On­line-Ra­di­ka­li­sierung auf das engste ver­schränkt sind und nicht ge­trennt be­trachtet werden können. Um der Struk­tur und den Nutzungs­ge­wohn­heiten des Inter­nets ge­recht zu werden, be­darf es einer engen Inter­aktion zwischen öffent­lichen und privaten Ak­teuren in der Stra­te­gie­ent­wick­lung. Der öffent­liche Sek­tor sollte hier An­reize setzen und muss die Kon­se­quenzen von kritischen Maß­nahmen im Bereich der Zen­sur gründ­licher als bis­her ab­wägen