Competitive Rent Preservation, Reform Paralysis, and the Persistence of Underdevelopment

Initial inequality in endowments and opportunities, together with low average levels of endowments, can create constituencies in a society that combine to paralyze reforms, even though the status quo hurts them collectively. Each constituency prefers reforms that expand its opportunities, but in an unequal society, this will typically hurt another constituency’s rents. Competitive rent preservation ensures no comprehensive reform path may command broad support. Though the initial conditions may well be a legacy of the colonial past, persistence does not require the presence of coercive political institutions, perhaps one reason why underdevelopment has survived independence and democratization. Instead, the roots of underdevelopment may lie in the natural tendency towards rent preservation in a divided society.

The credit crisis and cycle-proof regulation

This article was originally presented as the Homer Jones Memorial Lecture, organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, April 15, 2009.Financial crises ; Systemic risk

Dollar Shortages and Crises

Emerging markets do not handle adverse shocks well. In this paper, I will outline an explanation of why emerging markets are so fragile, and why they may adopt contractual mechanisms -- such as a dollarized banking system -- that increase their fragility. I draw on this analysis to explain why dollarized economies may be prone to dollar shortages and twin crises. The model of crises described here differs in some important aspects from what is now termed the first, second, and third generation models of crises. I then examine how domestic policies, especially monetary policy, can mitigate the adverse effects of these crises. Finally, I will ask if there is a constructive role for international financial institutions both in helping to prevent the crises and in helping resolve them.

Book review of Fault Lines by Raghuram G. Rajan

Most people believe that the recent financial crisis had its roots in a boom in housing lending in the United States. After the dot-com bubble, the argument goes, the Federal Reserve Bank lowered the interest rates to stimulate corporate investment and recover from the downturn. As a side effect of low interest rates, mortgages became cheaper and Americans became attracted to the housing market. Credit for housing was provided by the sophisticated financial system of the United States, which allowed investors to purchase packages of mortgages from diversified geographical locations, and from individuals with different probabilities of default, according to their desired level of risk. As it turned out, these products caught the attention of investors from all over the world, who were attracted by their profitable returns and the implicit guarantees provided by the U.S. government to the issuing agencies and financial intermediaries. Therefore, housing credit was plentiful and, as a consequence, house prices in the United States rose. This in turn allowed mortgage borrowers to refinance their debts and avoid default. The party came to an end when interest rates increased and house prices fell, triggering a series of defaults in mortgages and driving values of the financial products near to zero, resulting in consequences with which we all are too familia

The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms

Major technological, regulatory, and institutional changes have made finance more widely available in recent years, amounting to a bone fide 'financial revolution'. In this article, we focus on the impact the financial revolution has had on the way firms are (or should be) organized and managed, and on the policy consequences.

The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms

A fundamental problem entrepreneurs face in the formative stages of their businesses is how to provide incentives for employees to protect, rather than steal, the source of organizational rents. We study how the entrepreneur's response to this problem will determine the organization's internal structure, growth, and its eventual size. In particular, our model suggests large, steep hierarchies will predominate in physical capital intensive industries, and these will typically have seniority-based promotion policies. By contrast, flat hierarchies will be seen in human capital intensive industries. These will have up-or-out promotion systems, where experienced managers either become owners or are fired. Furthermore, flat hierarchies will have more distinctive technologies or cultures than steep hierarchies. The model points to some essential differences between organized hierarchies and markets.

What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data

We investigate the determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the financing decisions of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an aggregate level, firm leverage is fairly similar across the G-7 countries. We find that factors identified by previous studies as important in determining the cross- section of capital structure in the U.S. affect firm leverage in other countries as well. However, a deeper examination of the U.S. and foreign evidence suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlations are still largely unresolved.