The puzzle of regulatory competition

Our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with ‘races’ and ‘final outcomes’ of conventional theoretical approaches and start modelling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations

Europeanisation: solution or problem?

Is there something new in recent research on Europeanisation? Or should we go back to what we already know about political integration in Europe and avoid the term? This article reviews recent work in four steps: the identification of the specific domain of Europeanisation; the relationship between Europeanisation, on the one hand, and governance, institutions, and discourse, on the other; the methodological problems and the models emerging in this new field of research; and an assessment of the results arising out of theoretical and empirical research. One theme throughout the article is that, in order to develop a progressive agenda, Europeanisation should be seen as a problem, not as a solution. It is neither a new theory, nor an ad-hoc approach. Rather, it is a way of orchestrating existing concepts and to contribute to cumulative research in political science. Europeanisation does not provide any simple fix to theoretical or empirical problems. Quite the opposite, it can deliver if approached as a set of puzzles. A problem in search of explanation – not the explanation itself (Gualini 2003). The conclusion is that Europeanisation has contributed to the emergence of new insights, original explanations, and interesting questions on three important issues: the understanding and analysis of 'impact', how to endogeneise international governance in models of domestic politics, and the relationship between agency and change. These three issues are prominent in the research agendas of international relations, theoretical policy analysis, and comparative politics. To contribute to major issues at the core of political science is a valuable result for a relatively new field of inquiry

Indicators of regulatory quality: final report

Project was part of the Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship 2001-2005.Report for DG Enterprise, European Commission, December 2004

Impact Assessment in the European Union: Lessons from a Research Project

publication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticleIn this article, we present some major lessons drawn from a recently completed research project. Our research dealt with ex-ante evaluation, mainly impact assessment (IA). We shed new light on research questions about the control of bureaucracy, the role of IA in decision-making, economics and policy learning, and the narrative dimension of appraisal. We identify how our findings stand in relation to conventional arguments about these issues, and reflect on their normative implications. We finally reason on the possible extensions of our arguments to the wider field of policy evaluation, connecting IA and ex-post evaluation.European Research Council (ERC) project Analysis of Learning in Regulatory Governance (ALREG

Overcoming Illusions of Control: How to Nudge and Teach Regulatory Humility

In this chapter we focus on how to use insights from behavioural theory in the process of impact assessment of EU policy proposals. Over the last decade, the European Commission and more generally the European Union (EU) have developed an integrated approach to impact assessment of policy proposals – legislative or not. The impact assessment process is now a major step in the development of proposals by the European Commission. Recently, the European Parliament being biased in this way!!as invested in analytical capacity to work dialogically with the Commission on this issue. Extant literature has established that the EU impact assessment system is, comparatively speaking (for example, in comparison to the systems of the 28 Member States and the United States [US]), sufficiently robust and comprehensive (Fritsch et al., 2013; Renda, 2011; Radaelli, 2009; Wiener and Alemanno, 2010). In the debate of how to conduct impact assessment and train policymakers, there are calls for integrating the insights of behaviour science into policymaking and design regulatory options that take into account the various biases that affect citizens’ responses (Alemanno and Spina, 2013; John, 2013; John et al., 2013; Sunstein, 2011; Van Bavel et al, 2013; Vandebergh, Carrico and Schultz, 2011). But policymakers have a brain too, and therefore their own choices can be biased. The starting point for this chapter is the potential impact of one over-arching bias – the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). The proposition is that this illusion – which leads humans to over-estimate their competence and ability to control outcomes – may be particularly damaging when the tendency to regulate is institutionalised. Specifically, while the EU impact assessment process obliges policymakers to consider the status quo option (non-intervention), this is rarely ever selected. We should be clear: we do not claim that cognitive biases explain the preference for public intervention. There are different political and economic justifications for intervention. An organisation can also deliberatively decide to manipulate the IA procedures towards interventionist choices. If this is so, cognitive biases have no role to play since the organisation is not misdiagnosing the facts; rather it is manipulating them. Rather, we are interested in increasing policy makers’ awareness of ‘regulatory humility’ (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2015b). We believe this should be encouraged among policy-makers, and specifically that the option of not using public intervention (so called ‘do nothing’ option in IA) be given due consideration – whether it is rejected or not. The classic policy-making literature has always pointed toward the limits of policymaking and policymakers (notably, Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Simon, 1956; Vickers, 1965: chapter 8; Wildavsky, 1979: especially part 2). The increased complexity of the policy environment, the difficulty of getting evidence into policy, and greater clarity about human biases have all led to a re-discovery of these limitations. The result has been a renewed call for regulatory humility and humble decision-making (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2015b; Etzioni, 2014). We are interested in how EU policymakers might be de-biased in two main ways: first by structuring IA in ways that encourage policymakers act in ways that work with biases and second by using training to stimulate awareness and reflection about the biases and their possible impact on policymakers’ work. The chapter is structured as follows. In section one, we set up the proposition that EU policymakers are especially susceptible to an illusion of control. Then we explore what can be done to combat a pre-eminent bias. We outline two categories of solutions. In section two we look at how the IA system in the EU can be implemented and amended in ways that ‘go with the grain’ of cognitive biases (Dolan et al, 2009: 7). Here, we accept the reality of that policymakers often operate in ‘fast’ mode (Kahneman, 2011). Rather than try to re-wire the policymaker’s brain, we focus on re-wiring the context within which they work to ensure that what is automatic to them is also beneficial to policymaking. In short, how can we nudge EU policymakers to explore the ‘do-nothing option’, and indeed all policy options, with humility about the control they can exercise? Section three takes a slightly different tack. Here we focus on how policymakers can be exhorted to engage in more ‘slow’ thinking about the biases they carry. Such reflection can be triggered through training. We explore the possible teaching tools that can be and are being used including in-class behavioural experiments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how some of these ideas can be taken forward by the Commission

Occupy the semantic space! : Opening up the language of better regulation

Published online: 01 March 2023Policy agendas are often cast in semantic constructions that portray them as universally desirable outcomes. These semantic constructions protect and reinforce the power of dominant coalitions and make it hard to pursue alternatives. The semantic space is entirely occupied by the dominant concepts. At the same time, within the dominant coalition, ideational conflict is muted by decongesting concepts. Drawing on political theory, I show the presence of this double act of reducing the semantic space and decontesting concepts with the case of 'better regulation’. Then I briefly extend the argument to other terms such as policy coherence, agile governance, smart cities and social value judgements. The critical discussion of the implications of dominant language brings in transparency, allows other coalitions to articulate their vision in a discursive level-playing-field, and offers citizens the possibility to discuss what is really ‘better’ and ‘for whom’

The right to know : an emerging global issue implications for parliamentary assemblies

On 22 June 2021 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approved a Resolution tabled by Roberto Rampi (MP, SOC: Socialists, Democrats and Greens) on the right to know, defined as the citizen’s civil and political right to be actively informed of all aspects regarding all stages of the policy-making and administrative / rulemaking process, in order to allow for the full and democratic participation, and hold public goods administrators to account according to the standards of human rights and the Rule of Law. This definition is taken directly from the Global Committee for the Rule of Law “Marco Pannella”. In this way, the Council of Europe acknowledges the ingenuity and political battle for the right to know of the legendary former MEP and Italian MP Marco Pannella, active on this issue since the days of the Iraq War in 2003, until his death in 2016. Today the right to know is an emerging global issue, spanning from state secrecy to the systematic manipulation of information. This Policy Brief informs on the recent developments in the Italian Senate, where the Human Rights Committee approved a Resolution exactly one year after the Council of Europe, explains the difference between ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’, and explores the implications of this emerging global issue for Parliaments.Interview in Italian by Matteo Angioli (Comitato Mondiale per lo Stato di Diritto - Marco Pannella) to Claudio Radaelli on this policy paper, July 23 202