Learning from a fool: searching for the 'unmanaged' context for radical learning

Drawing on the existing theorizing of organizational learning from a radical perspective, this article attempts to problematize such notion of learning and position it within the existing organizational contexts informed by divergent types of rationality. The study scrutinizes these frameworks with a view to reflect on the potentiality for radical learning to occur within them. In this vein, the conceptual analysis of non-technical and non-marginal notions, namely, ‘spirituality’, ‘luck’ and ‘wisdom’, in different modes of rationality is conducted. This article demonstrates that since the conceptual inclusiveness is entailed by the specificity of sensemaking mechanisms, which these modes employ, the analysed notions can be approached as their litmus paper. The functionalist rationality types are found to be incommensurate with exigencies of the radical context for learning. In pursue of the conducive area for radical learning, the notions of unmanaged organization and the technology of foolishness provide the theoretical frame for the study, and their joint sensemaking context is discussed using examples. This unmanaged space driven by inclusive foolishness is recognized as one that enables the liminal sensemaking processes conducive for radical learning to occur

Safety out of control: dopamine and defence

We enjoy a sophisticated understanding of how animals learn to predict appetitive outcomes and direct their behaviour accordingly. This encompasses well-defined learning algorithms and details of how these might be implemented in the brain. Dopamine has played an important part in this unfolding story, appearing to embody a learning signal for predicting rewards and stamping in useful actions, while also being a modulator of behavioural vigour. By contrast, although choosing correct actions and executing them vigorously in the face of adversity is at least as important, our understanding of learning and behaviour in aversive settings is less well developed. We examine aversive processing through the medium of the role of dopamine and targets such as D2 receptors in the striatum. We consider critical factors such as the degree of control that an animal believes it exerts over key aspects of its environment, the distinction between 'better' and 'good' actual or predicted future states, and the potential requirement for a particular form of opponent to dopamine to ensure proper calibration of state values