Testimony of Rena Steinzor…before the U.S. House of Representatives, Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Environment and Economics. 112th Congress, 1st Session (2011).

Environmental regulations have saved millions of lives, preventing chronic respiratory illness and heart attacks in cities across the country. These rules protect children from irreversible neurological damage, save billions of dollars in cleanup costs, and preserve water quality in lakes, rivers, and streams. If anything, our regulatory system is dangerously weak, and Congress should focus on reviving it rather than eroding public protections…

SECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN THE AFRICAN ECONOMY – SOME ISSUES AND TRENDS

African economies are facing the critical challenge of raising the rate of GDP growth and sustaining high growth rates and thus meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The performance of agriculture is more paradoxical and African exports of industrial goods are dominated by mining and crude oil. The financial systems remain largely underdeveloped both in terms of the size and range of financial instruments and services offered. This article explores the recent growth performance both at the continental and subregional level. It discusses disparities in growth performance and the factors behind the observed disparities across countries and subregions. It also discusses developments at the sectoral level and progress and challenges in human development, closing with a brief exposition of the prospects for 2007. The paper further analyses the HIV/AIDS in the continent and its impact on the economy.African Economy, MDGS, Financial System, Crude Oil, Human Development

Conflicts of Interest in Derivatives Clearing

[Excerpt] The financial crisis implicated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market as a source of systemic risk. In the wake of the crisis, lawmakers sought to reduce systemic risk to the financial system by regulating this market. One of the reforms that Congress introduced in the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) was mandatory clearing of OTC derivatives through clearinghouses, in an effort to remake the OTC market more in the image of the regulated futures exchanges. Clearinghouses require traders to put down cash or liquid assets, called margin, to cover potential losses and prevent any firm from building up a large uncapitalized exposure, as happened in the case of the American International Group (AIG). Clearinghouses thus limit the size of a cleared position based on a firm’s ability to post margin to cover its potential losses. As lawmakers focused on clearing requirements to reduce systemic risk, concerns also arose as to whether the small number of large swaps dealers in existence—mostly the largest banks—might influence clearinghouses or trading platforms in ways that could undermine the efficacy of the approach. Concerns about conflicts of interest in clearing center around whether, if large swap dealers dominate a clearinghouse, they might directly or indirectly restrict access to the clearinghouse; whether they might limit the scope of derivatives products eligible for clearing; or whether they might influence a clearinghouse to lower margin requirements. Trading in OTC derivatives is in fact concentrated around a dozen or so major dealers. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimated that, as of the third quarter of 2010, five large commercial banks in the United States represented 96% of the banking industry’s total notional amounts of all derivatives; and those five banks represented 81% of the industry’s net credit exposure to derivatives. The first group of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipients included nearly all the large derivatives dealers. As a result of the high degree of market concentration, the failure of a large swaps dealer still has the potential to result in the nullification of tens of billions of dollars worth of contracts, which could pose a systemic threat. A 2009-proposed amendment proposed to H.R. 4173, which passed the House, would have limited ownership interest and governance of the new derivatives clearinghouses by certain large financial institutions and major swap participants. Sections 726 and 765 in the final version of the Dodd-Frank Act mandate that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), respectively, must adopt rules to mitigate conflicts of interest. However, it allowed the agencies to decide whether those rules include strict numerical limits on ownership or control. In the CFTC’s proposed rules to mitigate conflicts of interest, published on October 18, 2010, and on January 6, 2011, the CFTC did choose to adopt strict ownership limits, along the lines of the Lynch amendment. The SEC’s proposed rule, published on October 13, 2010, does the same. This report examines how conflicts of interest may arise and analyzes the measures that the CFTC and SEC proposed to address them. It discusses what effect, if any, ownership and control limits may have on derivatives clearing; and whether such limits effectively address the types of conflicts of interest that are of concern to some in the 112th Congress. These rulemakings may interest the 112th Congress as part of its oversight authority for the CFTC and SEC. Trends in clearing and trading derivatives, and the ownership of swap clearinghouses, are discussed in the Appendix

You Are Only as Good as You Are Behind Closed Doors: The Stability of Virtuous Dispositions

Virtues are standardly characterized as stable dispositions. A stable disposition implies that the virtuous actor must be disposed to act well in any domain required of them. For example, a politician is not virtuous if s/he is friendly in debate with an opponent, but hostile at home with a partner or children. Some recent virtue theoretic accounts focus on specific domains in which virtues can be exercised. I call these domain-variant accounts of virtue. This paper examines two such accounts: Randall Curren and Charles Dorn’s (2018) discussion of virtue in the civic sphere, and Michael Brady’s (2018) account of virtues of vulnerability. I argue that being consistent with the standard characterization of virtue requires generalizing beyond a domain. I suggest four actions the authors could take to preserve their accounts while remaining consistent with the standard characterization. I also discuss how virtue education could be enhanced by domain-variant accounts