25 research outputs found
The Impossibility of a Perfectly Competitive Labor Market
Using the institutional theory of transaction cost, I demonstrate that the assumptions of the competitive labor market model are internally contradictory and lead to the conclusion that on purely theoretical grounds a perfectly competitive labor market is a logical impossibility. By extension, the familiar diagram of wage determination by supply and demand is also a logical impossibility and the neoclassical labor demand curve is not a well-defined construct. The reason is that the perfectly competitive market model presumes zero transaction cost and with zero transaction cost all labor is hired as independent contractors, implying multi-person firms, the employment relationship, and labor market disappear. With positive transaction cost, on the other hand, employment contracts are incomplete and the labor supply curve to the firm is upward sloping, again causing the labor demand curve to be ill-defined. As a result, theory suggests that wage rates are always and everywhere an amalgam of an administered and bargained price. Working Paper 06-0
The Non-existence of the Labor Demand/Supply Diagram, and Other Theorems of Institutional Economics
The most famous and influential diagram in modern (neoclassical) labor economics is the model of wage determination by supply and demand. Using concepts and ideas from institutional economics, I argue that the theory of a perfectly competitive labor market is logically contradictory and, hence, the demand/supply diagram cannot exist on the plane of pure theory. Four other fundamental theorems concerning labor markets are also derived, as are implications about the theoretical foundation of the field of industrial relations and the economic evaluation of labor and employment policy. In this article I accomplish four things of significance. The first is to demonstrate that the core diagram of neoclassical labor economics - the diagram of wage determination by demand and supply (D/S) - does not have logical coherence and thus has no existence on the plane of pure theory. The second is to deduce this conclusion using a core concept of institutional economics (i.e., transaction cost), thus demonstrating that the institutional approach to labor economics has theoretical explanatory power. The third is to use the transaction cost idea to also deduce four fundamental theorems concerning labor markets and wage determination. The fourth is to identify the core theoretical foundation of the field of industrial relations. This discussion also yields important implications for the economic evaluation of labor and employment policy, as well as interesting insights on the history of thought in labor economics. Working Paper 07-2
Economic Analysis of Labor Markets and Labor Law: An Institutional/Industrial Relations Perspective
Corporations, the UN and Neo-liberal Bio-politics
Ewa Charkiewicz shares with readers a think piece that puzzles out the ever increasing popularity of corporate social responsibility (CSR). She is interested in why it appealed so strongly to the UN and civil society and asks what problems did it help to solve, on what terms does it operate and in particular, how has the consent and engagement with the discourse on CSR been generated? She warns that there is a double game being played, and that behind the caring face of CSR a war is being played out against ‘bare life’ and peoples' livelihoods. Development (2005) 48, 75–83. doi:10.1057/palgrave.development.1100102
Does Economics have an Effect? Towards an Economics of Economics
"Due to its formality and highly analytic thinking, economics is often attributed a leading role among the social sciences and a prominent position as contributor to economic or social issues in the real world. Fact is, however, that the empirical proof for such a claim is either missing or anecdotal. This paper aims to outline the “economics of economics”. It surveys and compares approaches of impact measurement such as a production function of economics or the demand and supply of trained economists and discusses the determinants of the strength of the influence of economics. It furthermore discriminates between the impact of economic ideas versus that of economists as scientists or politicians.