Liquidity and crude oil prices: China’s influence over 1996-2011

Movement in China’s money supply drives the movement in world money supply over the last twenty years. Within the framework advanced by Kilian (2009) that identifies the supply and demand side factors driving oil price changes we introduce the influence of liquidity in China and other countries on oil price changes. Structural shocks are large for both G3 (U.S., Eurozone and Japan) real M2 and China’s real M2. However, the cumulative impact of real G3 M2 shocks on real oil prices is small in contrast to a large cumulative effect of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil. It is shown that increased liquidity in China relative to that in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan significantly raises real oil prices over 1996:1-2011:12. Following a sharp fall in real oil price in the last half of 2008, the cumulative impact of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil is particularly substantial in the recovery of oil price during 2009 from a low of $41.68 for January 2009. The analysis sheds light on the causes of movement in oil prices over the last twenty five years and in assessing the relative importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil

Crude Oil Prices and Liquidity, the BRIC and G3 countries

Unanticipated increases in the BRIC countries’ liquidity lead to significant and persistent increases in real oil prices, global oil production and global real aggregate demand. Unanticipated shocks to the liquidity of developed countries over 1997:01-2011:12 do not. The relative contribution to real oil price of liquidity in BRIC countries to liquidity in developed countries is much greater since 2005 than before 2005. China and India drive the results for the effect of BRIC countries’ liquidity on real oil price and global oil production. China and India and Brazil and Russia reinforce one another on the effect of liquidity on global real aggregate demand. Due to the difference between countries as commodity importers/exporters, the liquidity of Brazil and Russia increases significantly with a rise in real oil price and that of China and India decreases significantly with a rise in real oil price. It is shown that the strong rebound in oil price during 2009 is mostly due to strong effects of shocks to liquidity in the BRIC countries. The analysis helps in assessing the importance of the BRIC economies in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil

Commodity Prices and BRIC and G3 Liquidity: A SFAVEC Approach

This paper investigates the influence of liquidity in the major developed and major developing economies on commodity prices. Unanticipated increases in the BRIC countries‟ liquidity is associated with significant and persistent increases in commodity prices that are much larger than the effect of unanticipated increases in G3 liquidity, and the difference increases over time. Over 1999-2012 BRIC liquidity is strongly linked with global energy prices and global real activity whereas G3 liquidity is not. The impact of BRIC liquidity on mineral and metal prices is twice as large as that of G3 liquidity. BRIC liquidity is significantly connected with global tightening while G3 liquidity is not. Granger casualty goes from liquidity to commodity prices. BRIC and G3 liquidity and commodity prices are cointegrated. BRIC and G3 liquidity and global output and global prices are cointegrated. We constructed a structural factor-augmented error correction (SFAVEC) model

Not All International Monetary Shocks are alike for the Japanese Economy

It is found that over 1999:1-2012:12 China’s monetary expansion influences Japan through the effect of China’s growth on world commodity prices, increased demand for imports, and exchange rate policy. China’s monetary expansion is associated with significant increases in Japan’s industrial production, exports and inflation, and decreases in the trade-weighted yen. In contrast, U.S. monetary expansion results in contraction in Japan’s industrial production, exports and trade balance (expenditure-switching). Monetary expansion in the Euro area does not significantly affect Japan. Structural vector error correction models are estimated. Results are robust to various contemporaneous restrictions for the effect of international monetary variables, the interaction of foreign and domestic variables and to factor augmented VAR to identify monetary shocks

Chinese Monetary Expansion and the US Economy

This paper examines the influence of monetary shocks in China on the U.S. economy over 1996-2012. The influence on the U.S. is through the sheer scale of China’s growth through effects in demand for imports, particularly that of commodities. China’s growth influences world commodity/oil prices and this is reflected in significantly higher inflation in the U.S. China’s monetary expansion is also associated with significant decreases in the trade weighted value of the U.S. dollar that is due to the operation of a pegged currency. China manages the exchange rate and has extensive capital controls in place. In terms of the Mundell–Fleming model, with imperfect capital mobility, sterilization actions under a managed exchange rate permit China to pursue an independent monetary policy with consequences for the U.S

OPEC and non‐OPEC oil production and the global economy

Hamilton identifies 1973 to 1996 as “the age of OPEC” and 1997 to the present as “a new industrial age.” During 1974-1996 growth in non-OPEC oil production Granger causes growth in OPEC oil production. OPEC oil production decreases significantly with positive shocks to non-OPEC oil production in the earlier period, but does not do so in the “new industrial age”. In the “new industrial age” OPEC oil production rises significantly with an increase in oil prices, unlike during “the age of OPEC” period. OPEC oil production responds significantly to positive innovations in global GDP throughout. Over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4 the negative effect on real oil price of positive shocks to non-OPEC oil production is larger in absolute value than that of positive shocks to OPEC oil production. The cumulative effects of structural shocks to non-OPEC oil production and to real oil price on OPEC oil production are large. The cumulative effects of structural shocks to OPEC production and real oil price on non-OPEC production are small. Results are robust to changes in model specification. An econometric technique to predict growth in OPEC oil production provides support for the results from the SVAR analysis. Results are consistent with important changes in the global oil market