The economics of Theocracy

This paper models theocracy as a regime where the clergy in power retains knowledge of the cost of political production but which is potentially incompetent or corrupt. This is contrasted with a secular regime where government is contracted out to a secular ruler, and hence the church loses the possibility to observe costs and creates for itself a hidden-information agency problem. The church is free to choose between regimes – a make-or-buy choice – and we look for the range of environmental parameters that are most conducive to the superiority of theocracy and therefore to its occurrence and persistence, despite its disabilities. Numerical solution of the model indicates that the optimal environment for a theocracy is likely to be one in which the “bad” (high-cost) state is disastrously bad but the probability of its occurrence is not very high. A broad review of the historical evidence yields some suggestive support to the predictions of the model. Finally, the model is shown to be applicable to the make-or-buy-government choices of other groups, such as organized labor and the military

What Factors Determine the Number of Trading Partners?

The purpose of the paper is to provide a simple model explaining buyer-supplier relationships and show what factors determine the number of trading partners. We show that when the supplier is able to determine the number of trading partners, the optimal number is small if the supplier's bargaining power with them is weak, the economy of scope in the supplier's variable costs is significant, and that in its sunk investment is weak. Investment may be greater when the number of trading partners is small. The results may be consistent with the formation of Japanese buyer-supplier relations

VERTICAL CONTRACTS AS STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS

Abstract Recent literature has shown that when retailers cannot observe contracts between a manufacturer and their rivals, the manufacturer will be unable to obtain the vertically integrated profit using two-part tariff contracts alone. It has been suggested that vertical restraints, such as RPM and exclusive territories, are observable and thus permit the manufacturer to obtain profits closer to the vertically integrated level. Observability, however, is not sufficient. To serve as a strategic commitment mechanism, a vertical contract must be enforceable as well. We show that the vertical contracts that have been the focus of the recent literature are not self-enforcing but must be externally enforced. We find that in practice the enforceability condition has not been met. This suggests that models which rest on the premise that vertical restraints are strategic commitments do not provide general explanations of these practices

The Holdout Problem and Long-Term Contracting

The holdup problem of under-investment in specific capital has been studied extensively. Less attention has been paid to the "holdout" problem of over-investment in outside options. A buyer's gain from (unverifiably) developing an outside option exceeds the joint gain, given rent shifting when an inferior option binds in subsequent bargaining with the seller. Long-term contracts can solve holdout by increasing the buyer's surplus from trade within the relationship. With a nonbinding contract, however, the seller's participation constraint may require the buyer (who may be financially constrained) to pay a large signing bonus. This suggests a novel motive for vertical integration