Anatomical and morphological changes in scion of some olive grafting combinations under water deficit

Effects of water stress deficit were studied on xylem anatomical fea- tures and some growth parameters among six olive grafting combinations; Amygdalifolia/Arbequina (Am/Ar), Amygdalifolia/Koroneiki (Am/Ko), Amygdalifolia/Zard (Am/Z), Conservallia/Koroneiki (Co/Ko), Conservallia/Zard (Co/Z) and Conservallia/Arbequina (Co/Ar) of about three-year-old olive trees (Olea europaea L.) under greenhouse conditions. To realize this, a factorial experiment was conducted in a completely randomized design (CRD). The results showed that rootstocks exhibited significant effects on scions xylem anatomical physiognomies, such as vessel lumen area (VLA) and vessel diame- ter (VD) and additionally on some growth indices including main stem length (SL), lateral shoot number (LSN) and graft union-cross sectional area (GU-CSA). Xylem anatomical characteristics including VLA, porosity, vessel frequency (VF) and VD of scions decreased when they were grafted onto Arbequina and Koroneiki rootstocks, but increased onto Zard rootstock. All growth parameters showed a decrease under drought stress, while this reduction was more pro- nounced for Zard rootstock than the other rootstocks. However, Co/Z showed the highest VF and the lowest vulnerability index (VI) and exhibited a better performance at the end of recovery.

Foreign market entry, upstream market power, and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and ver tical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy mea sures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large

Using Local Public Goods to Attract and Retain the Creative Class: A Tale of Two Cities

We study the impact that the provision of a local public good (LPG) by two cities has on their ability to attract and retain members of the creative class. This creative class consists of two types of members known as engineers and artists. Engineers are wealthier than artists and they also value the LPG more. We first focus on each city in isolation. We compute the marginal value and the marginal cost of the LPG and then determine the provision of this LPG when the provision is determined by uniform contributions and majority voting. Next, we allow the creative class members to migrate between the two cities and analyze whether engineers or artists migrate, the equilibrium distribution of the creative class, and the efficiency of the LPG provision. Finally, we consider the situation in each city just before migration and study how much of the LPG is provided when proportional contributions and majority voting determine this provision. A related question we address is whether engineers or artists now have an incentive to migrate and, if yes, we identify who would like to migrate and to which city

The scope for strategic asymmetry under international rivalry

In the context of a model of international trade through reciprocal dumping with horizontally differentiated goods, we study the endogenous choice of quantities and prices as strategic variables. We show that while a Cournot outcome prevails under conditions of export rivalry, strategic asymmetry under foreign direct investment rivalry may be observed, especially when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or takes time

International trade, differentiated goods, and strategic asymmetry

We scrutinize international trade arising from oligopolistic rivalry (reciprocal dumping) in a model where the goods are horizontally differentiated and where otherwise symmetric firms located in different regions adopt asymmetric strategies – one competing in prices and the other competing in quantities. Uni-directional and intra-industry trade appear endogenously in our framework. We show that as trade costs decline the equilibrium outcome will transition from autarky through a region of uni-directional trade, before intra-industry trade ultimately arises. In the uni-directional trade region, potential market entry by the rival has an impact on firm behavior even though the rival is not exporting. The implications of product differentiation and changing trade costs for trade volumes and for the gains from trade are asymmetric in general. Welfare may rise monotonically as trade costs fall for one of the economies, but will necessarily fall initially relative to autarky for the other