Effects of rater priming and incentives on rating accuracy

We investigated the effects of two manipulations - incentives and rater priming - on performance appraisal accuracy. In contrast with previous studies, our results did not support the hypotheses that priming and incentives would improve Cronbach’s (1955) differential accuracy, a type of accuracy that is most relevant to employee feedback

Choosing Whether to Lead, Lag, or Match the Market

This paper demonstrates how cost-benefit analysis can be used to develop a company\u27s pay strategy. Using the case of Punk\u27s Backyard Grill, a new venture starting in the Washington, DC area, quantitative aspects of Utility Analysis are combined with the judgments of the company\u27s owners to provide estimates of the value associated with seven pay strategies. Results showed that leading the market by 5% produced the greatest return. Sensitivity analysis is used to see how drastically estimates changes owing to the nature of the paper\u27s estimates. This methods presented in this paper should help others making pay policy decisions use cost-benefit analysis as part of their decision process

Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy

Key Findings: Pay secrecy adversely impacts individual task performance because it weakens the perception that an increase in performance will be accompanied by increase in pay; Pay secrecy is associated with a decrease in employee performance and retention in pay-for-performance systems, which measure performance using relative (i.e., peer-ranked) criteria rather than an absolute scale (see Figure 2 on page 5); High performing employees tend to be most sensitive to negative pay-for- performance perceptions; There are many signals embedded within HR policies and practices, which can influence employees’ perception of workplace uncertainty/inequity and impact their performance and turnover intentions; and When pay transparency is impractical, organizations may benefit from introducing partial pay openness to mitigate these effects on employee performance and retention

Do you get what you pay for? Sales incentives and implications for motivation and changes in turnover intention and work effort

This study investigated relations between pay-for-performance incentives designed to vary in instrumentality (annual pay-for-performance, quarterly pay-for-performance, and base pay level) and employee outcomes (self-reported work effort and turnover intention) in a longitudinal study spanning more than 2 years. After controlling for perceived instrumentality, merit pay increase, and the initial values of the dependent variables, the amount of base pay was positively related to work effort and negatively related to turnover intention, where both relationships were mediated by autonomous motivation. The amounts of quarterly and annual pay-for-performance were both positively related to controlled motivation, but were differently related to the dependent variables due to different relations with autonomous motivation

The Reinforcing Therapist Performance (RTP) experiment: Study protocol for a cluster randomized trial

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Rewarding provider performance has been recommended by the Institute of Medicine as an approach to improve the quality of treatment, yet little empirical research currently exists that has examined the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of such approaches. The aim of this study is to test the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of providing monetary incentives directly to therapists as a method to improve substance abuse treatment service delivery and subsequent client treatment outcomes.</p> <p>Design</p> <p>Using a cluster randomized design, substance abuse treatment therapists from across 29 sites were assigned by site to either an implementation as usual (IAU) or pay-for-performance (P4P) condition.</p> <p>Participants</p> <p>Substance abuse treatment therapists participating in a large dissemination and implementation initiative funded by the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment.</p> <p>Intervention</p> <p>Therapists in both conditions received comprehensive training and ongoing monitoring, coaching, and feedback. However, those in the P4P condition also were given the opportunity to earn monetary incentives for achieving two sets of measurable behaviors related to quality implementation of the treatment.</p> <p>Outcomes</p> <p>Effectiveness outcomes will focus on the impact of the monetary incentives to increase the proportion of adolescents who receive a targeted threshold level of treatment, months that therapists demonstrate monthly competency, and adolescents who are in recovery following treatment. Similarly, cost-effectiveness outcomes will focus on cost per adolescent receiving targeted threshold level of treatment, cost per month of demonstrated competence, and cost per adolescent in recovery.</p> <p>Trial Registration</p> <p>Trial Registration Number: NCT01016704</p