The Economics of Internet Search

This lecture provides an introduction to the economics of Internet search engines. After a brief review of the historical development of the technology and the industry, I describe some of the economic features of the auction system used for displaying ads. It turns out that some relatively simple economic models provide significant insight into the operation of these auctions. In particular, the classical theory of two-sided matching markets turns out to be very useful in this context.

Are there Psychological Barriers in the Dow-Jones Index?

The popular press attaches particular significance to certain numerical values of the Dow-Jones index. These magic numbers are referred to as `resistance levels' or `psychological barriers.' We examine 38 years of closing values of this index to see if it is of any help in predicting future stock market returns.Dow-Jones index, psychological barriers, resistance levels, market efficiency

Contidioning Prices on Purchase History

Many transactions are now computer mediated, making it possible for sellers to condition their pricing on the history of interactions with individual consumers. This paper investigates conditions under which price conditioning will or will not be used. Our simplest model involves rational consumers with constant valuations for the good being sold and a monopoly seller who can commit to a pricing policy. In this framework, the seller will not find it profitable to condition pricing on past behavior. We consider various generalizations of this model, such as allowing the seller to offer enhanced services to previous customers, making the seller unable to commit to a pricing policy, and allowing competition in the marketplace. All of these generalizations have equilibria with price conditioning.Price discrimination, Price conditioning, Privacy, Ecommerce

Taxation of Asset Income in the Presence of a World Securites Market

This paper shows, using a standard CAPM model of security prices in a world market, that even small countries can affect the price of domestically issued risky securities, while large countries can affect the prices of all securities. As a result, countries have the incentive to set tax rates such that in equilibrium investors specialize in domestic securities, and net capital flows between countries are restricted. Each country does this to increase the utility of domestic residents, taking as given the tax policies of other governments, but the net outcome is a reduction in world efficiency and likely a reduction in the utility of all individuals.

Economic FAQs About the Internet

This is a set of Frequently Asked Questions (and answers) about the economic, institutional, and technological structure of the Internet. We describe the history and current state of the Internet, discuss some of the pressing economic and regulatory problems, and speculate about future developments.Internet, telecommunications, congestion pricing, National Information Infrastructure

Monitoring Agents with Other Agents

I investigate the multiple agency problem when agents can monitor the performance of other agents. A particularly interesting incentive scheme of this sort has been used by the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and I use this example to motivate some general questions involving group incentive schemes. For example, I show that a principal prefers a monitor who can reduce the cost of desirable actions rather than increase the cost of undesirable actions. I also consider when it is beneficial to the principal for agents to mutually insure each other. Finally, I examine a sequential incentive plan in which agents form a group and first serve as monitors and later are monitored by other agents.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101029/1/ECON467.pd

A Solution to the Problem of Externalities and Public Goods when Agents are Well-Informed

I consider economic environments involving externalities and public goods where agents have full information but the regulator does not. For these environments I present a class of simple two-stage games whose subgame perfect equilibria are efficient allocations. In the case of two-party externalities, the equilibria involve compensation for the party upon whom the externality is inflicted. In the case of public goods, the equilibria are Lindahl allocations.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/101019/1/ECON458.pd

Table of contents, editorial board, and other front matter

Editorial front matter and table of contents for vol.64, no.3, July-Sept (1981) of The ACE Quarterly, Official Journal of the Agricultural Communicators in Educatio

Ace Officers and Board

Editorial back matter for vol.66, no.2, Apr-June (1983) of The ACE Quarterly, Official Journal of the Agricultural Communicators in Educatio

Table of contents, editorial board, and other front matter

Editorial front matter and table of contents for vol.65, no.4, Oct-Dec (1982) of The ACE Quarterly, Official Journal of the Agricultural Communicators in Educatio