Civilian casualties and public support for military action: Experimental evidence

In contrast to the expansive literature on military casualties and support for war, we know very little about public reactions to foreign civilian casualties. This article, based on representative sample surveys in the US and Britain, reports four survey experiments weaving information about civilian casualties into vignettes about Western military action. These produce consistent evidence of civilian casualty aversion: where death tolls were higher, support for force was invariably and significantly lower. Casualty effects were moderate in size but robust across our two cases and across different scenarios. They were also strikingly resistant to moderation by other factors manipulated in the experiments, such as the framing of casualties or their religious affiliation. The importance of numbers over even strongly humanizing frames points towards a utilitarian rather than a social-psychological model of casualty aversion. Either way, civilian casualties deserve a more prominent place in the literature on public support for war

‘Women and Children First’: Gender, Norms, and Humanitarian Evacuation in the Balkans 1991–95

Of all noncombatants in the former Yugoslavia, adult civilian men were most likely to be massacred by enemy forces. Why, therefore, did international agencies mandated with the protection of civilians evacuate women and children, but not military-age men, from besieged areas? This article reviews the operational dilemmas faced by protection workers in the former Yugoslavia when negotiating access to civilian populations. I argue that a social constructivist approach incorporating gender analysis is required to explain both the civilian protection community s discourse and its operational behavior. First, gender beliefs constitute the discursive strategies on which civilian protection advocacy is based. Second, gender norms operate in practice to constrain the options available to protection workers in assisting civilians. These two causal pathways converged in the former Yugoslavia to produce effects disastrous to civilians, particularly adult men and male adolescents.This project was supported in part by a Jane Grant Fellowship through the Center for the Study of Women in Society at the University of Oregon. I am indebted to the availability and engagement of all those at the ICRC and UNHCR during the interview process; particular thanks to David Harland, Mark Cutts, and Charlotte Lindsey. Adam Jones provided the insight that led to this empirical study. I am also grateful to Ronald Mitchell, Robert Darst, Lars Skalnes, Dennis Galvan, Anita Weiss, Wendy Weber, Julie Mertus, Alyson Smith, Smail Cecic, Helen Kinsella, Debra DeLaet, Michael Barnett, Lisa Martin, Kristin Williams, Valerie Sperling, Jordan Salberg, and Stuart Shulman for encouragement and helpful feedback.

Studying Issue (Non)-Adoption in Transnational Advocacy Networks

Why do some issues but not others galvanize transnational advocacy networks? To gain insight into this question, I studied how advocates in the human rights sector think and talk about an issue that has received little advocacy attention to date: stigma against children born of wartime rape. Focus groups with humanitarian practitioners were coded and analyzed for evidence of a variety of explanations for issue adoption drawn from the literature on advocacy networks. The analysis suggests that the conditions for issue adoption are constituted by dynamics across, rather than primarily within, issue networks.This project was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES 0432488 and by a Hewlett Research Grant from University of Pittsburgh s University Center for International Studies. I am deeply indebted to Stuart Shulman and University of Pittsburgh s Qualitative Data Analysis Program for assistance with Atlas.ti software, and to Laurel Person, Abbie Zahler, Betcy Jose-Thota, Vanja Lundell, Rachel Helwig, and Justin Reed for assistance in coding and data analysis. Vera Achvarina, Lisa Alfredson, David Bearce, Clifford Bob, Daniel Chong, Jack Donnelly, Michael Goodhart, John Mendeloff, Joel Oestreich, Simon Reich, Stephen Rothman, Ben Rubin, Nita Rudra, Laura Sjoberg, Dan Thomas, and participants in Yale University s Genocide Studies Seminar Series provided helpful feedback on earlier drafts. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors.

Behavior under extreme conditions : the Titanic disaster

During the night of April 14, 1912, the RMS Titanic collided with an iceberg on her maiden voyage. Two hours and 40 minutes later she sank, resulting in the loss of 1,501 lives—more than two-thirds of her 2,207 passengers and crew. This remains one of the deadliest peacetime maritime disasters in history and by far the most famous. For social scientists, evidence about how people behaved as the Titanic sunk offers a quasi-natural field experiment to explore behavior under extreme conditions of life and death. A common assumption is that in such situations, self-interested reactions will predominate and social cohesion is expected to disappear. However, empirical evidence on the extent to which people in the throes of a disaster react with self-regarding or with other-regarding behavior is scanty. The sinking of the Titanic posed a life-or-death situation for its passengers. The Titanic carried only 20 lifeboats, which could accommodate about half the people aboard, and deck officers exacerbated the shortage by launching lifeboats that were partially empty. Failure to secure a seat in a lifeboat virtually guaranteed death. We have collected individual-level data on the passengers and crew on the Titanic, which allow us to analyze some specific questions: Did physical strength (being male and in prime age) or social status (being a first- or second-class passenger) raise the survival chance? Was it favorable for survival to travel alone or in company? Does one's role or function (being a crew member or a passenger) affect the probability of survival? Do social norms, such as "Women and children first!" have any effect? Does nationality affect the chance of survival? We also explore whether the time from impact to sinking might matter by comparing the sinking of the Titanic over nearly three hours to the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, which took only 18 minutes from when the torpedo hit the ship