Estimating Infrastructural Investment Needs for India

This paper attempts to systemically project the demand and fund requirements of the Indian infrastructure sector up to 2013. In the infrastructure sector transportation (rail, port, air and road), electricity and telecommunication sectors are covered in this study. Our analysis is performed in three stages. In the first stage, long run linkage between infrastructure variables and income are established by applying cointegration method. Subsequently, infrastructure demand functions are estimated by using Dynamic OLS (DOLS) technique. In the second stage, by using the estimated infrastructure elasticity to income of variables and IMF’s projected income data, we project the sector-wise demand and funding requirement. In the final stage, we put forward some suggestions for reforms in infrastructure financing, so the projected demand in the country would be achieved. The results of the analysis indicates that in important sectors like electricity and port, the government(the Planning Commission) has seriously underestimated the future demand, while in air transport sector, the demand seems to be overestimated. Only in telecommunication sector, the projections of this study are at par with their projections. Overall, we find that the government has at least 7% underestimated the infrastructure needs. Based on these results, we propose for initiation of a set of reforms in existing financing pattern of infrastructure in the countryInfrastructure projection, DOLS, India

Utility Design for Distributed Resource Allocation -- Part I: Characterizing and Optimizing the Exact Price of Anarchy

Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a desirable collective behavior. In this work we focus on a well-studied class of distributed resource allocation problems where each agent is requested to select a subset of resources with the goal of optimizing a given system-level objective. Our core contribution is the development of a novel framework to tightly characterize the worst case performance of any resulting Nash equilibrium (price of anarchy) as a function of the chosen agents' utility functions. Leveraging this result, we identify how to design such utilities so as to optimize the price of anarchy through a tractable linear program. This provides us with a priori performance certificates applicable to any existing learning algorithm capable of driving the system to an equilibrium. Part II of this work specializes these results to submodular and supermodular objectives, discusses the complexity of computing Nash equilibria, and provides multiple illustrations of the theoretical findings.Comment: 15 pages, 5 figure

Oscillating magnetoresistance due to fragile spin structure in metallic GdPd3_3

Studies on the phenomenon of magnetoresistance (MR) have produced intriguing and application-oriented outcomes for decades--colossal MR, giant MR and recently discovered extremely large MR of millions of percents in semimetals can be taken as examples. We report here the investigation of oscillating MR in a cubic intermetallic compound GdPd$_3$, which is the only compound that exhibits MR oscillations between positive and negative values. Our study shows that a very strong correlation between magnetic, electrical and magnetotransport properties is present in this compound. The magnetic structure in GdPd$_3$ is highly fragile since applied magnetic fields of moderate strength significantly alter the spin arrangement within the system--a behavior that manifests itself in the oscillating MR. Intriguing magnetotransport characteristics of GdPd$_3$ are appealing for field-sensitive device applications, especially if the MR oscillation could materialize at higher temperature by manipulating the magnetic interaction through perturbations caused by chemical substitutions.Comment: 10 pages, 7 figures. A slightly modified version is published in Scientific Report

Characterizing the interplay between information and strength in Blotto games

In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to randomness. One of the two players knows the valuations with certainty. The other knows only a distribution on the battlefield realizations. However, the informed player has fewer resources to allocate. We characterize unique equilibrium payoffs in a two battlefield setup of the Colonel Blotto game. We then focus on a three battlefield setup in the General Lotto game, a popular variant of the Colonel Blotto game. We characterize the unique equilibrium payoffs and mixed equilibrium strategies. We quantify the value of information - the difference in equilibrium payoff between the asymmetric information game and complete information game. We find information strictly improves the informed player's performance guarantee. However, the magnitude of improvement varies with the informed player's strength as well as the game parameters. Our analysis highlights the interplay between strength and information in adversarial environments.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures. Accepted for presentation at 58th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 201