Self-Organizing Maps and the US Urban Spatial Structure

This article considers urban spatial structure in US cities using a multi- dimensional approach. We select six key variables (commuting costs, den- sity, employment dispersion/concentration, land-use mix, polycentricity and size) from the urban literature and define measures to quantify them. We then apply these measures to 359 metropolitan areas from the 2000 US Census. The adopted methodological strategy combines two novel techniques for the social sciences to explore the existence of relevant pat- terns in such multi-dimensional datasets. Geodesic self-organizing maps (SOM) are used to visualize the whole set of information in a meaningful way, while the recently developed clustering algorithm of the max-p is applied to draw boundaries within the SOM and analyze which cities fall into each of them. JEL C45, R0, R12, R14. Keywords Urban spatial structure, self-organizing maps, US metropolitan areas

The determinants of contractual choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United States

Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is increasing in the United States. Numerous studies have examined the determinants of the degree of private participation in infrastructure projects as governed by contract type. We depart from this simple public/private dichotomy by examining a rich set of contractual arrangements. We utilize both municipal and state-level data on 472 projects of various types completed between 1985 and 2008. Our estimates indicate that infrastructure characteristics, particularly those that reflect stand alone versus network characteristics, are key factors influencing the extent of private participation. Fiscal variables, such as a jurisdiction’s relative debt level, and basic controls, such as population and locality of government, increase the degree of private participation, while a greater tax burden reduces private participation

Recovery Risk and Labor Costs in Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Choice in the US Water industry

We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of private involvement in the U.S. water sector through public-private partnerships. Our estimates suggest that a variety of factors help explain greater private participation in this sector. We find that the risk to private participants regarding cost recovery is an important driver of private participation. The relative cost of labor is also a key factor in determining the degree of private involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are high relative to private wages, private participation is viewed as a source of cost savings. We thus find two main drivers of greater private involvement: one encouraging private participation by reducing risk, and another encouraging government to seek out private participation in lowering costs

Do public-private partnership enabling laws increase private investment in transportation infrastructure?

The use of public-private partnerships, or PPPs, is an important development in U.S. infrastructure delivery. PPPs are detailed contracts between a public-sector project sponsor and a private-sector provider that bundle together key delivery services. PPPs represent an important middle ground between pure-public project delivery and complete privatization. As of 2016, thirty-five U.S. states had enacted PPP enabling laws. Those laws define the broad institutional framework surrounding a PPP agreement. They address such questions as the mixing of public- and private-sector funds, the treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, and the need for prior legislative approval of PPP contracts, among other issues. We provide the first comprehensive empirical assessment of the impact of those laws on a state's utilization of private investment. We analyze the overall effect of a state having a PPP enabling law while controlling for a variety of factors. A law's average impact represents an almost six-fold increase relative to the average percentage of PPP investment prior to enactment in treated states. We then assess the impact of PPP enabling-law provisions. We develop an expert-informed weighted index reflecting the degree to which a state's law is encouraging or discouraging of private investment. We find that PPP provisions that empower PPPs, such as exemptions from property taxes and from extant procurement laws, as well as confidentiality protections, successfully attract PPP investment

Strong versus Weak Vertical Integration: Contractual Choice and PPPs in the United States

Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and a private partner to deliver infrastructure projects across a range of economic sectors. Efficiency gains may derive from risk transfer and bundling different tasks within a single contract. We study the factors explaining the scope of bundling. We focus on the choice between weak vertical integration, which includes operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus strong vertical integration, which involves the combination of operational and construction tasks. We utilize a new data set that includes 553 PPPs concluded in the U.S. between 1985 and 2013

Do public-private partnership enabling laws increase private investment in infrastructure [WP]

Rising use of public-private partnerships, or PPPs, is an important development in U.S. infrastructure delivery. PPPs are detailed contracts between a public-sector infrastructure project sponsor and a private-sector provider that bundle delivery services. PPPs represent a middle ground between pure-public project delivery and complete privatization. As of 2016, thirty-five U.S. states had enacted PPP enabling laws. That legislation defines the broad institutional framework surrounding a PPP agreement. It addresses such questions as the mixing of public- and private-sector funds, the treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, and need for prior legislative approval of PPP contracts, among other key issues. We provide the first thorough empirical assessment of the impact of PPP enabling laws on a state’s utilization of private investment. We analyze the overall effect of having a PPP enabling law while controlling for a variety of factors, including the state’s indebtedness, its broad political disposition, union membership, per-capita income, and other variables. We then assess the impact of thirteen individual PPP enabling-law provisions. We develop an expert-informed weighted index reflecting the degree to which a state’s law is encouraging or discouraging of private investment. We find that more favorable PPP enabling laws increase private investment: when our favorability index increases by one-tenth, the proportion of infrastructure investment delivered via PPP in a state increases by 0.5-0.6. We find that PPP enabling-law provisions allowing unsolicited proposals and the comingling of public and private funds are particularly important in attracting private investment

How Much Vertical Integration? Contractual Choice and Public-Private Partnerships in the United States

Efficiency gains in Public-Private Partnerships derive from risk transfer and the bundling of different tasks. We study the factors that explain bundling in single contracts. We focus on the choice between integrating operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus vertically integrating both operational and construction tasks. We analyze a new data set that includes 553 PPPs that were concluded in the United States. We find evidence that some financial variables play a role in bundling decisions. In addition, market size and the type of economic sectors involved, are also important drivers of contract choice and bundling decisions

The desired and undesired effects of infrastructure and transport policy reforms: An introduction [Editorial]

Papers selected for this special issue were among those presented at the International Workshop the desired and undesired effects of Infrastructure and Transport Policy Reforms, held in the School of Economics and Business at the Universitat de Barcelona in November 2013. The workshop was jointly organized by the research unit Governments and Markets (Universitat de Barcelona) and the Cornell Program in Infrastructure Policy (Cornell University). The main topics discussed were ownership, financing and regulation, and public-private collaboration in transport policy. This special issue addresses those issues using case studies from various sectors including as airports and aviation, ports, and infrastructure overall

Reversal of economic fortunes: institutions and the changing ascendancy of Barcelona and Madrid as economic hubs

This paper looks at the divergent economic trajectories of Barcelona and Madrid since Spain's transition to democracy. It highlights how Barcelona, the city that was better positioned four decades ago to emerge as the main Spanish economic hub, has lost out to Madrid. We argue that the contrasting trajectories of the two cities have less to do with the pull of Madrid as the capital of Spain, with the development of new infrastructure in the country, or with agglomeration economies, and more with institutional factors. A growing societal divide in Barcelona along economic, social, and identity lines has led to a greater breakdown of trust and to the development of strong groups with limited capacity to bridge with one another than in Madrid. This has entailed the emergence of negative externalities that have limited the economic potential for growth in Barcelona and facilitated the rise of Madrid as the main economic hub within Spain