Combining losing games into a winning game

Parrondo's paradox is extended to regime switching random walks in random environments. The paradoxical behavior of the resulting random walk is explained by the effect of the random environment. Full characterization of the asymptotic behavior is achieved in terms of the dimensions of some random subspaces occurring in Oseledec's theorem. The regime switching mechanism gives our models a richer and more complex asymptotic behavior than the simple random walks in random environments appearing in the literature, in terms of transience and recurrence

Souveraineté et fédéralisme

The notion of sovereignty is the most fundamental concept of public law. At the same time, it is one of the main difficulties federalism has to face. Where does sovereignty reside in a federal state ? While this question is not an easy one to answer, knowledge of the manner in which it has been answered in Canadian constitutional law is essential to an understanding of the present constitutional crisis. The most appropriate definition of sovereignty is « jurisdiction to define jurisdictions ». This definition implies the concept of an ultimate authority and its application to a federal system is of great difficulty. Two main theories confront each other. The first one develops the concept that sovereignty should be shared between the federal government and the federated states. The second sees sovereignty as belonging exclusively to the federal government, regional governments merely enjoying some form of autonomy. This paper studies the implications of both theories in Canadian federalism

Quelques propositions

Professor Rémillard questions the failure of the Senate after dealing with the debate on its reform within the context of Rapatriation of the Constitution. The Fathers of Confederation intended the Senate to represent and protect regional interests. It has enough powers to be effective but fails to manage its very own powers. The passivity might explained by the fact that senators have been too bound by party discipline to be reliable. An extended reform of the Senate would certainly be better than its abolition. First, the Senate should fight to keep democracy alive and to counterbalance the powers of the House of Commons. It should be an effective guardian of regional interests in the dual Canadian context. The author suggests that the reform of the Senate should be done within the limits of an entire reform of federal institutions. This would help Canadian federalism preserve its parliamentary system