Distribution and Ignorance

According to the so-called presumption of equality, a person who does not know whether there is an acceptable reason for differential treatment should just presume the similarity of the cases and treat them equally. If we assume that the presumption of equality is an acceptable moral principle, at least when the allocation cannot be postponed and an equal distribution of goods is possible, then an important question arises: when exactly does the allocator have sufficient reasons for differential treatment and is not relevantly ignorant? This is a question about the required strength of the “acceptable reasons” for differential treatment. It has been commonplace to think that the presumption of equality demands that the reasons that refute the presumption must be very strong and that differential treatment requires that there is a proper justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. I will argue, however, that refuting the presumption and solving the issue (of whether the cases are relevantly similar or relevantly different) are two separate matters. A person can have good enough reasons for rejecting the presumption that the cases are relevantly similar without having reasons that she could present as a full justification for the claim that the cases are relevantly different. A precondition of the applicability of the presumption of equality is ignorance, but not ignorance in the sense of “not having a full justification”.</p

Olettama tasa-arvosta

Niin kutsutun tasa-arvo-olettaman (engl. presumption of equality) mukaan tapauksia on kohdeltava aina samalla tavalla, ellei tiedossa ole riittävää perustetta kohdella niitä eri tavalla. Tapausten samanlaisuus tulee lähtökohtaisesti olettaa. Tämä periaate ohjaa päätöksentekoa ja on informatiivinen myös tilanteissa, joissa (1) emme tunne samanlaisuuden kriteeriä tai joissa (2) emme tiedä, ovatko tapaukset tuon kriteerin valossa samanlaisia (tai joissa emme tiedä kumpaakaan asiaa). Tasa-arvo-olettama kehottaa meitä kohtelemaan tapauksia joka tapauksessa samalla tavalla, mikäli tietoa ei ole. Jos esimerkiksi työnantaja ei tiedä, millä kriteerillä palkan suuruus määräytyy tai jos hän ei tiedä, kuinka ansioituneita hänen työntekijänsä tuon kriteerin valossa ovat, hänen tulee maksaa kaikille samaa palkkaa – mikäli tietoa ei ole saatavilla eikä tietämättömyys ole hänen omaa syytään. Kirjoituksessani teen katsauksen filosofiseen keskusteluun tasa-arvo-olettaman hyväksyttävyydestä ja luonteesta. Argumentoin, että olettamaa tasa-arvosta voidaan tietyissä olosuhteissa pitää hyväksyttävänä ja että olettaman käyttämiseen on itse asiassa useita perusteita – toisin kuin keskustelussa on joskus implisiittisesti oletettu

Moderate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation

AbstractCultural appropriation, also called cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking, cultural appropriation happens when someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group takes or uses some object that is characteristic or in some way important to the group without the group’s permission. Individuals who find cultural appropriation (or borrowing) unproblematic have often argued that if we express moral criticism of the use of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then we are logically committed to criticize all kinds of habits that are clearly acceptable –such as using jeans, eating pizza or drinking tea. However, we will argue that in many cases that objection is problematic. We point out that if one social habit or practice is prohibited (or supported) by existing social conventions but another is not, then there is a convention difference between the cases. The convention difference is in turn a morally relevant difference, or so we aim to show. We refer to “moderate conventionalism,” according to which existing social conventions are morally relevant facts that should be taken into account when choosing how to act, whatever the content of the conventions happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that laws have some moral relevance and binding force independent of their content.</p

Non-Doxastic Conspiracy Theories

To a large extent, recent debates on conspiracy theories have been based on what we call the “doxastic assumption”. According to that assumption, a person who supports a conspiracy theory believes that the theory is (likely to be) true, or at least equally plausible as the “official explanation”. In this paper we argue that the doxastic assumption does not always hold. There are, indeed, “non-doxastic conspiracy theories”: theories that have many supporters who do not really believe in their truth or likelihood. One implication of this view is that some debunking strategies that have been suggested to fight conspiracy theories are doomed to fail, since they are based on the false view that supporting a conspiracy theory means, ipso facto, believing in it. </p

Environmental Security and Just Causes for War

This article asks whether a country that suffers from serious environmental problems caused by another country could have a just cause for a defensive war? Danish philosopher Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen has argued that under certain conditions extreme poverty may give a just cause for a country to defensive war, if that poverty is caused by other countries. This raises the question whether the victims of environmental damages could also have a similar right to self-defense. Although the article concerns justice of war, we will concentrate only on the issue of what can be just causes of war, instead of evaluating the entire justification of war. This is to say that we will limit our discussion to the question concerning just cause and leave aside more general questions concerning justness and moral permissibility of war. Our aim is to list the questions that must be made and settled if defensive war in the case of serious environmental problems is said to have (or not to have) a just cause. We will argue that there are three questions that are most important in this context. They are the question concerning liability, the question of collective responsibility, and the question whether environmental harms may create a “sufficient reason” for raising a war