The Failure of Private Regulation: Elite Control and Market Crises in the Manhattan Banking Industry

Abstract In this paper, we develop an account of the failure of private market-governance institutions to maintain market order by highlighting how control of their distributional function by powerful elites limits their regulatory capacity. We examine the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA), a private market-governance institution among commercial banks in Manhattan that operated from 1853 to 1913. We find that the NYCHA, founded to achieve coordinating benefits among banks and to limit the effect of financial panics, evolved at the turn of the twentieth century into a device for large, elite market players to promote their own interests to the disadvantage of rival groups that were not members. Elites prevented the rest of the market from having equal opportunities to participate in emergency loan programs during bank panics. The elites' control not only worsened the condition of the rest of the market by allowing non-member banks to fail; it also diminished the influence of the NYCHA and escalated market crises as bank failures spread to member banks. As a result, crises developed to an extent that exceeded the control of the NYCHA and ended up hurting even elites' own interests. This paper suggests that institutional stability rests on a deliberate balance of interests between different market sectors and that, without such a balance, the distributional function of market-governance institutions plants the seeds of institutional destruction. Keywords: private regulation, power elite, market crises, banking regulation 3 It is now widely understood that effective market economies are not "free" but instead rely on various forms of market-governance institutions. These institutions define norms, stabilize expectations, and consequently supply order so that transactions can occur and markets can expand. Because rules and norms guide interaction in a market and support its activity, strategic market players are motivated to build institutions to mediate the problems they encounter in exchange, competition, and production Because market-governance institutions create patterns for action, they will inevitably raise resource considerations and have distributional consequences. Market-governance institutions are thus laden with political implications. They can be designed to distribute scarce resources to some market actors but not to others, thereby creating a situation of institutional exclusion. Fligstein (1996Fligstein ( , 2001) has offered a political-cultural model of markets that uses the metaphor of "markets as politics" and argued that market institutions "are best viewed as attempts to mitigate the effects of competition with other firms" (Fligstein, 1996: 657). He defined market institutions as sets of rules that powerful actors attempt to produce in order to stabilize their situation vis-à-vis other actors (Fligstein, 2008). Private market institutions are especially likely to fit this definition because they are 4 designed and maintained by actors who have direct interests in them. With such a definition, however, the political-cultural model of markets implies a process of self-perpetuation. Because powerful market actors would have no incentives to change an order that works in their favor, market-governance institutions are likely to persist and, if there is an increasing benefit to power, even expand. In this study, we propose that the distributional function of market-governance institutions contains within itself a destabilizing potential. Managing mutual dependence between social groups is critical for maintaining institutional stability. After all, the possibility for institutional incumbents to exercise power depends on the tacit or explicit assent of other groups that might otherwise disrupt existing arrangements. To ensure continuity, incumbents who benefit from existing arrangements need to strike a balance of distributional outcomes with other groups. Without such a balance, the very means that allow incumbents to concentrate market power can pave the way for regime collapse by compromising the regulatory efficacy of the co-opted institutions. We draw on insights from power-elite theory (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 2009) to argue that private market-governance institutions created to achieve coordinating benefits can be captured by market elites as an instrument to obtain distributional advantages. What delineates the boundaries of market competition and cooperation is a common identity that may be created by shared salient attributes such as organizational form, incumbent status, or interaction in a network. Elites mobilize among themselves through social networks. A high level of network cohesion facilitates coordination and helps elites to better govern private institutions according to their group interests. Cohesive elites may be tempted to maintain a high level of exclusivity and deny the outgroup equal opportunities for participation in an attempt to monopolize institutional benefits. But elites who succumb to this temptation ignore the fact that the stability of competitive environments rests on a deliberate distributional balance with the out-group. Their monopoly causes the condition 5 of the rest of the market to deteriorate, diminishes the influence of market-governance institutions, and escalates the severity of market crises. When the efficacy of governance institutions in maintaining market order depends on the control over a sufficient market share and there is a strong negative spillover effect, elites' efforts to deploy private market-governance institutions to control a market result in endogenous market disorder. We developed theoretical predictions and tested them by studying the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA), a private institution that regulated the commercial banking market in Manhattan for sixty years before the Federal Reserve replaced it in 1914. In an era without a central bank in the U.S., the NYCHA fulfilled some of the same functions as a central bank, providing emergency loans for member banks during financial crises and imposing discipline during normal times. Through alleviating the severity of bank panics, the NYCHA maintained market order at the epicenter of American capitalism and was once regarded as "a most important and beneficial part in the general economic health of the nation" (Gilpin and Wallace, 1905: 5). The NYCHA regulated the Manhattan banking market in an era in which the government supplied little regulation over the banking sector, an institutional vacuum that combined with high levels of market volatility to create demand for private sources of market order. The absence of formal governmental solutions to bank panics provides an opportunity, which is in increasingly short supply in modern contexts, for investigating the efficacy of private regulation in maintaining market order. The NYCHA also regulated the market in an era before antitrust laws were rigorously enforced, affording an opportunity to test its distributional function, which favored market elites. Finally, observing the NYCHA over its 60 years of regulation of the Manhattan banking market offers a remarkable opportunity to document the rise and fall of one of the most prominent private market-governance institutions in the economic history of the U.S. 6 ELITE CONTROL AND MARKET CRISES In the political-cultural model of markets, market-governance institutions are viewed as sets of rules that powerful actors attempt to produce in order to stabilize their situation vis-à-vis other actors (Fligstein, 1996(Fligstein, , 2001. Markets are contentious places. To curb uncertainties, privileged market actors attempt to defend their status through building institutions. Within an organization, struggles are about conceptions of control (Fligstein, 1990); between organizations, struggles center on rules of competition and cooperation. Thus regulatory authorities, either the state or private entities, are intimately linked with the power structure in a market. When market-governance institutions mobilize significant and highly valuable resources, they are often specifically intended to distribute resources to particular kinds of actors but not to others. With such a conceptualization, however, the political-cultural model of markets implies a process of institutional perpetuation. Because market-governance institutions work to strengthen their positions within a market, powerful actors would have no incentives to challenge the status quo. Thus institutions are likely to persist. If power and institutions are mutually reinforcing, then institutions will be self-perpetuating. As such, the political-cultural model of markets provides few clues about possible sources of endogenous change. Instead, it points to exogenous entities or forces, such as shifts in environmental conditions that reshuffle power relations in a market, to explain institutional change (Fligstein, 1996). This self-perpetuation implication has to do with the politicalcultural model's view of institutional stabilization as a cultural project. Once in place, institutions lay out an enduring logic regarding how things work in a particular market setting; market actors are therefore cognitively constrained by a culture that favors incumbents. Hence institutional stabilization operates in a quasi-automatic process in that "groups in the field who have more power use the acceptable cultural rules to reproduce their power" (Fligstein, 2001:15). 7 Institutional stabilization is not necessarily an automatic process but rests on ongoing mobilization both within the institutionally advantaged group and between them and other social groups. Stability is not a settled outcome but reflects a relatively durable state of specific coalitional dynamics. Markets remain orderly if actors can coordinate under a set of compromises, even if they benefit unevenly from an institutional arrangement. Internally, incumbents need to mobilize among themselves to ensure conformity to norms and rules. They need to develop a high level of cohesion to monitor and regulate the behavior of members. Externally, incumbents depend on backing from other groups so that an institutional arrangement that favors them will run smoothly. Subordinate groups are also willing to ally themselves with more powerful groups if the latter can secure enough resources for them to survive As a result, institutional outcomes do not need to reflect the will of any particular group but will depend on interactions and conflicts between different social groups. Market-governance institutions are not self-perpetuating and are always vulnerable to shifts because changing market conditions require constant renegotiation. Renegotiation is not always successful, however, because incumbents face a tension resulting from the need to manage external dependence by sharing privileges with other groups and the desire to monopolize distributional advantages by resorting to closure. Institutional exclusion occurs when incumbents attempt to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of the eligible. According to Weber (1968: 8 342), "the tendency toward the monopolization of specific, usually economic opportunities is always the driving force in such cases as 'cooperative organization,' which always means closed monopolistic groups." Deeming exclusionary practices as a general character of any distributive system, Weber (1968: 342) concluded that institutional exclusion is "an ever-recurring process." Exclusionary strategies, however, are a double-edged sword. If maintaining institutional stability means managing mutual dependence, then incumbents' attempt to secure a privileged position at the expense of other groups would destroy a delicate balance and churn a market. In other words, institutional exclusivity breeds institutional instability. This idea is elaborated by power-elite theory. Power-elite theory has been developed by political sociologists (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 2009) who assert that a group of interconnected social elites controls the decision-making power in society, designs policies that work in their favor, and consequently obtains a disproportionate amount of distributional advantages. Connecting through dense, overlapping networks, elites develop a high level of cohesion Power-elite theorists have recognized the danger of maintaining a closed system of social elites (Baltzell, 1964(Baltzell, , 1971. As Tocqueville (1856) argued in The Old Regime and the French Revolution, in order for the upper class to maintain control over power and authority, interclass mobility has to be allowed; otherwise, distributional inequalities will only work to intensify interclass conflicts and induce social instability. In an inquiry into why the nobility in France was struck down by violent revolution while its counterpart in Britain was able to avoid revolution and remain a ruling aristocracy, Tocqueville (1856) pointed to institutional exclusion as a critical mechanism. He observed that the British nobility adopted a much more open attitude and absorbed businessmen while its French counterpart 9 "had deliberately cut itself off from the middle class and from the peasantry and had thus become like a foreign body in the State: ostensibly the high command of a great army, but actually a corps of officers without troops to follow them" (Tocqueville, 1856: 204). In praise of the British nobility's unique capacity of being "prepared to stoop to conquer," he argued that to maintain a robust ruling authority, elites need to move beyond their narrow self-interests, share their privileges with the lower classes, and fulfill a leadership role in society (p. 105). While elites are sometimes defined as the upper class or their representatives, class origins are not the only basis for identifying elites or defining the boundaries of institutional exclusion. For example, Mills (1956) suggested that elites must be determined in the specific case of any given society, and he defined elites in the post-World War II U.S. as an institution-based social group that occupies the command posts of key economic, political, and military organizations rather than as a class. Similarly, Baltzell (1964) coined the term "WASP" (White Anglo Saxon Protestant), suggesting that group attributes, such as race, ethnicity, and religion, can serve as the basis of institutional exclusion. Studying gender-based exclusion, The Founding and Function of the NYCHA The NYCHA was founded in 1853, a time when the government supplied little regulation over the banking industry. After the two early central banks (the First and Second Banks of the 10 United States, existing from 1791 to 1811 and from 1816 to 1836) failed, the U.S. entered a freebanking era, in which federal regulation was absent, and state authorities had limited power to charter and regulate banks. Loosened regulation caused market chaos: the average lifespan of a bank during this era was five years, and about half of all banks failed. This market chaos was amplified by a tragedy of the commons in market confidence in the banking industry, which is at the heart of bank panics Moreover, due to the law prohibiting branching, banks lacked geographical diversification and had limited intraorganizational coordination capacity The NYCHA was initially founded by 52 commercial banks as a cooperative device to centralize check clearing and save labor, and that is how it got its name. Except for one bank in Brooklyn, all the other banks were located in Manhattan. As a result of their initial cooperation, New York bankers soon recognized that the clearing house could also serve as a means to solve the market confidence problem. The NYCHA realized this function by offering emergency loans for members during bank panics. During the Panic of 1857, the NYCHA organized an emergency loan committee. The loan committee issued loan certificates to financially stressed members who in turn could use them in place of currency in the clearing process, freeing cash to satisfy depositors' demands. In this way, loan certificates served as a medium to transfer cash from banks with 11 surpluses to stressed banks so that members could survive bank panics. If a borrowing bank failed, the losses would be shared by allocating liabilities to members in proportion to their banks' capital Elite Control and Mobilization The NYCHA adopted a club structure that aimed to limit collective benefits to participants. Non-NYCHA banks could still use the check clearing function of the NYCHA through an agent bank that was a member, but non-NYCHA banks could not obtain emergency loans during panics and were not subject to the discipline of the NYCHA. To be admitted as a member of the NYCHA, a bank had to possess a minimum amount of capital and surplus and be approved by a large majority of existing members and by the Clearing House Committee (Gilpin and Wallace, 1905; Cannon, 1910). The Clearing House Committee was composed of five bank presidents and was "the body that has always really run the institution" (Tarbell, 1913: 42). As figure 1 clearly shows, the correlation between the size of banks and their membership in the NYCHA's power circle (i.e., the Clearing House Committee and the position of president) increased significantly over time, indicating that large banks gradually came to control decision-making power within the NYCHA. Besides its central power circle, the NYCHA itself gradually became an exclusive group of large banks. When the NYCHA was founded in 1853, 90 percent of market players were members, but by 12 the time of the Panic of 1907, the percentage had dwindled to less than 40 percent. During this time period, the NYCHA increased the minimum capital requirement for admission tenfold, making it increasingly difficult to join the institution. As William Sherer, the twenty-year manager of the NYCHA, admitted to the Pujo Committee in 1912, it was the policy of the NYCHA to admit only large banks Research on this era has shown that the formation of large industrial corporations gave birth to new elites that built a common identity through overlapping social infrastructures such as exclusive social clubs, trade associations, and board interlocks (Baltzell, 1971; Zunz, 1982; Beckert, 2001; Elite Exclusivity and Institutional Failure When functioning as a distributional instrument for institutional incumbents to obtain advantages vis-à-vis other groups, a private market-governance institution is often closed. The exclusivity is necessary when incumbents attempt to accrue collective benefits to themselves and to prevent rivals from obtaining them. Although exclusivity helps to maintain a high level of elite cohesion, it also comes at a cost. As Tocqueville (1856) observed with regard to the French Revolution, violent revolution came to France because the nobility had degenerated into a caste that refused to assimilate the bourgeoisie, new men of increasing economic power and influence. Tocqueville's insight that exclusivity breeds instability is doubly relevant for private marketgovernance institutions because in-group cohesion is necessary to resolve the free-rider problem that inhibits all forms of private governance. Exclusivity and the potential for group rivalry, then, are endogenous to the formation of private institutions. When the extent to which private institutions can supply market order depends on their ability to control a critical mass sufficient for market stability, elites controlling these institutions face a critical problem concerning how to manage the exclusivity. 14 Functioning as an instrument for large banks to control the market, the NYCHA excluded small banks and the newly emergent trust companies. Trust companies were a different form of banking organization, and their most important difference from traditional commercial banks was their organizational structure as a "department store of finance" (Herrick, 1909: 33). Trust companies were initially chartered as "corporations which would perform as savings banks for a wealthier clientele than the laboring classes presumably served by savings banks" (Neal, 1971: 37). To perform this function, trust companies obtained banking functions such as the ability to receive deposits and to make loans, gradually coming into competition with commercial banks. Trust companies grew rapidly with the accumulation of individual and corporate wealth, and they played important roles in reorganizing railroads and financing industrial consolidation at the turn of the twentieth century (Herrick, 1909). In the late 1890s, trust companies began to pose a serious threat to the older banking institutions In 1903, the NYCHA passed a rule requiring trust companies that cleared checks through NYCHA member banks to maintain a 15 percent cash reserve. But the NYCHA's practice intensified the rivalry with trust companies, and rather than complying with the rule, most trust companies abandoned their relationship with the NYCHA. Representing the voice of trust companies, George W. Young, the president of the New York Trust Company, published a 15 renowned article in the North American Review in 1906, accusing the NYCHA of dictating the market. Young (1906: 19) cautioned that the power of the NYCHA had drifted toward "a few strong hands" and that this private market-governance institution had become a tool for a "central, dominating group" to control the m

Giant 2D Skyrmion Topological Hall Effect with Ultrawide Temperature Window and Low-Current Manipulation in 2D Room-Temperature Ferromagnetic Crystals

The discovery and manipulation of topological Hall effect (THE), an abnormal magnetoelectric response mostly related to the Dzyaloshinskii-Moriya interaction (DMI), are promising for next-generation spintronic devices based on topological spin textures such as magnetic skyrmions. However, most skyrmions and THE are stabilized in a narrow temperature window either below or over room temperature with high critical current manipulation. It is still elusive and challenging to achieve large THE with both wide temperature window till room temperature and low critical current manipulation. Here, by using controllable, naturally-oxidized, sub-20 and sub-10 nm 2D van der Waals room-temperature ferromagnetic Fe3GaTe2-x crystals, robust 2D THE with ultrawide temperature window ranging in three orders of magnitude from 2 to 300 K is reported, combining with giant THE of ~5.4 micro-ohm cm at 10 K and ~0.15 micro-ohm cm at 300 K which is 1-3 orders of magnitude larger than that of all known room-temperature 2D skyrmion systems. Moreover, room-temperature current-controlled THE is also realized with a low critical current density of ~6.2*10^5 A cm^-2. First-principles calculations unveil natural oxidation-induced highly-enhanced 2D interfacial DMI reasonable for robust giant THE. This work paves the way to room-temperature, electrically-controlled 2D THE-based practical spintronic devices

First-line treatment with chemotherapy plus cetuximab in Chinese patients with recurrent and/or metastatic squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck: Efficacy and safety results of the randomised, phase III CHANGE-2 trial.

Abstract Background The EXTREME regimen (chemotherapy [CT; cisplatin/carboplatin and 5-fluorouracil]) plus cetuximab is a standard-of-care first-line (1L) treatment for patients with recurrent and/or metastatic squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck (R/M SCCHN), as supported by international guidelines. The phase III CHANGE-2 trial assessed the efficacy and safety of a modified CT regimen (with a reduced dose of both components) and cetuximab versus CT for the 1L treatment of Chinese patients with R/M SCCHN. Methods Patients were randomised to receive up to six cycles of CT plus cetuximab followed by cetuximab maintenance until progressive disease or CT alone. The primary end-point was the progression-free survival (PFS) time assessed by the independent review committee (IRC). Results Overall, 243 patients were randomised (164 to CT plus cetuximab; 79 to CT). The hazard ratios for PFS by IRC and overall survival (OS) were 0.57 (95% CI: 0.40–0.80; median: 5.5 versus 4.2 months) and 0.69 (95% CI: 0.50–0.93; median: 11.1 versus 8.9 months), respectively, in favour of CT plus cetuximab. The objective response rates (ORR) by IRC were 50.0% and 26.6% with CT plus cetuximab and CT treatment, respectively. Treatment-emergent adverse events of maximum grade 3 or 4 occurred in 61.3% (CT plus cetuximab) and 48.7% (CT) of patients. Conclusions CHANGE-2 showed an improved median PFS, median OS and ORR with the addition of cetuximab to a modified platinum/5-fluorouracil regimen, with no new or unexpected safety findings, thereby confirming CT plus cetuximab as an effective and safe 1L treatment for Chinese patients with R/M SCCHN. Clinical trial registration number NCT02383966

Research on Flipped Classroom and Micro Classroom in English Teaching

The teaching mode of flipped classroom and micro class has gradually entered the daily teaching of College English classes. The new teaching concept and teaching mode not only promote the reform of the teaching mode in College English course, but also improve the teaching quality of College English course. This paper makes a rational distribution of teachers’ tasks and students’ tasks through the integration of "network model" and "classroom model", and designs the interactive turnover mode in College English teaching practice, which can promote the application of Information Science Technology in College English teaching

Experimental Study on Drop-Weight Impact Response of Basalt Fiber Aluminum Laminates (BFMLs)

The basalt fiber-reinforced polymer (epoxy resin), which has even better mechanical properties than glass fiber-reinforced polymer, is a good choice for making FML (fiber-metal laminate) composite. Herein, drop-weight impact tests of basalt fiber-based FMLs (called BFMLs) were conducted in the INSTON 9520HV testing machine to investigate the low-velocity impact properties of BFMLs. The specimens were of two diameters. And the impactors had two sizes of nose, dropping from different heights. The load-deflection behavior of aluminum sheet, BFRP (basalt fiber-reinforced polymer) panel, and BFML plate and their energy dissipation patterns during impact perforation were obtained. The test results showed that aluminum alloy sheet and BFMLs had no strain rate effect, while BFRP did. It was also concluded that the behavior of the thick BFML plate was clearly affected by debonding between aluminum sheet and BFRP panel, while the behavior of the thin BFML plate was controlled by membrane force. In failure analysis, it was found that the deformation and breakage of BFRP are the main contributions to energy absorption of BFMLs which counts for more than 75%. The energy absorbed by the aluminum sheet through plastic deformation and petaling is about 20%, while the energy absorbed in debonding can be ignored. In addition, with the help of ABAQUS simulation, it was found that decreasing the value of MVF (metal volume fraction) can increase the specific energy absorption of BFMLs, but the ductility of BFMLs may decrease

One-step solid-state-chemistry synthesized layered bismuth oxyiodide crystal for efficient solar-driven CO2 photoreduction

We develop a facile one-step solid-state-chemistry strategy for synthesizing BiOI crystals with layered microstructure. The BiOI photocatalyst shows typical mesoporous feature with available surface area, considerable wide-spectrum light absorption and carriers lifetime properties, and remarkable solar to thermal effect for efficient solar-driven photocatalytic CO2 reduction to CH4. The engineered BiOI displays a superior CH4 formation performance with the space-time yield of 13.1 μmol g−1 h−1 and the selectivity of 82.3% as well as excellent photostability for CO2 photoreduction under solar light irradiation. Furthermore, the versatile BiOI can boost the photo-stimulated efficiency on clean H2 generation and pollutant degradation

Intervention of Physical Activity for University Students with Anxiety and Depression during the COVID-19 Pandemic Prevention and Control Period: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

(1) Background: Although physical activity has been widely recognized as an effective way to improve anxiety and depression, we lack a systematic summary of research on improving anxiety and depression during the COVID-19 pandemic. The study aims to systematically analyze how physical activity impacts on this situation in college students during COVID-19. (2) Methods: Both Chinese and English databases (PubMed the Cochrane Library, EMBASE, Web of Science, Scopus, Chinese National Knowledge Infrastructure, Wanfang) were analyzed. All the randomized controlled trials (RCTs) about physical activity intervention for this were included. We received eight eligible RCT experiments before the retrieval time (4 October 2022) in the meta-analysis. (3) Results: Physical activity benefits for college students with significant anxiety were (SMD = −0.50; 95% CI = −0.83 to −0.17; I2 = 84%; p < 0.001; Z = 2.98;) and depression (SMD = −0.62; 95% CI = −0.99 to −0.25; I2 = 80.7%; p < 0.001; Z = 3.27). Subgroup analyses showed physical activity of different intensities significantly impacted on improving college students’ depression and anxiety, but physical activity of 6 < 9 Mets intensity had a greater effect on anxiety than on depression. Interventions of eight weeks or less performed better than those of over eight weeks while interventions less than four times per week had a significant effect on improving the situation. The overall effect of a single intervention of 30 min was more effective than one of over 60 min. (4) Conclusion: Physical activities can effectively improve the situation of anxiety and depression for college students during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, a higher quality RCT experiment is needed to prove it

A real-time 106 Mbit/S visible light communication system design using general lighting LED with analog pre-emphasis

This paper presents a real-time 106 Mbit/s visible light communication (VLC) system using only non-return-to-zero on-off keying (OOK-NRZ) modulation and general lighting LED. With a pre-emphasis module based LED driver, the 3-dB modulation bandwidth of VLC link is extended from 4 to 106 MHz. Given the BER upper Limit was 1.3 × 10−3, the highest bit rates achieved through the designed system were 106 and 98 Mbit/s at the distances of 60 and 70 cm, respectively

The Effects of Selenium on Rumen Fermentation Parameters and Microbial Metagenome in Goats

This study evaluated the effects of selenium yeast (SY) on rumen fermentation parameters, rumen bacterial diversity, and expression pathways in goats. A total of 18 Qianbei-pockmarked weather goats from Guizhou (body weight, 25.75 ± 1.75 kg; mean ± standard deviation) were assigned to three groups according to a completely randomized design. Control group (CON, n = 6) kids were fed a basal diet, while treatment 1 (LS, n = 6) and treatment 2 (HS, n = 6) kids were fed a basal diet with 2.4 and 4.8 mg/kg SY, respectively. The feeding trial lasted for 74 days. The results indicated that the ruminal fluid of LS goats had significantly higher levels of propionic, caproic, isobutyric, and isovaleric acids than that of the CON. The levels of butyric and valeric acids were higher in the HS group than in the CON. The acetate:propionate ratio was significantly higher in the CON than in the two treatments. In addition, the inclusion of 2.4 mg/kg SY can lead to a significant decrease in the relative abundances of Euryarchaeota, and Proteobacteria at the phylum level compared to the CON and the HS groups. At the genus level, the LS group had a significant decrease in the relative abundance of Methanobrevibacter and Sarcina, whereas it could lead to a significant increase in the relative abundance of Clostridium in the ruminal fluid relative of the other two groups. At the species level, the LS group had a significant decrease in the relative abundance of bacterium_P3, bacterium_P201, and Sarcina_sp._DSM_11001 compared to the other groups. Moreover, the CON group had a significant decrease in the relative abundance of bacterium_P201 compared to the other two treatments. Compared to the CON, the addition of 2.4 mg/kg SY significantly enriched carbohydrate metabolism pathways in the ruminal fluid for gene encoding. Additionally, goats receiving SY showed a significant upregulation of glycosyl transferase and carbohydrate binding module pathways. These results suggest that dietary supplementation with SY modulates fermentation parameters, and it affects microbial diversity and microbial metagenome in the rumen of Qianbei-pockmarked goats

Highly Resolved Phylogenetic Relationships within Order Acipenseriformes According to Novel Nuclear Markers

Order Acipenseriformes contains 27 extant species distributed across the northern hemisphere, including so-called “living fossil” species of garfish and sturgeons. Previous studies have focused on their mitochondrial genetics and have rarely used nuclear genetic data, leaving questions as to their phylogenetic relationships. This study aimed to utilize a bioinformatics approach to screen for candidate single-copy nuclear genes, using transcriptomic data from sturgeon species and genomic data from the spotted gar, Lepisosteus oculatus. We utilized nested polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and degenerate primers to identify nuclear protein-coding (NPC) gene markers to determine phylogenetic relationships among the Acipenseriformes. We identified 193 nuclear single-copy genes, selected from 1850 candidate genes with at least one exon larger than 700 bp. Forty-three of these genes were used for primer design and development of 30 NPC markers, which were sequenced for at least 14 Acipenseriformes species. Twenty-seven NPC markers were found completely in 16 species. Gene trees according to Bayesian inference (BI) and maximum likelihood (ML) were calculated based on the 30 NPC markers (20,946 bp total). Both gene and species trees produced very similar topologies. A molecular clock model estimated the divergence time between sturgeon and paddlefish at 204.1 Mya, approximately 10% later than previous estimates based on cytochrome b data (184.4 Mya). The successful development and application of NPC markers provides a new perspective and insight for the phylogenetic relationships of Acipenseriformes. Furthermore, the newly developed nuclear markers may be useful in further studies on the conservation, evolution, and genomic biology of this group